THE  KNOWABLENESS  OF  GOD 


ITS    RELATION   TO  THE  THEORY 
OF  KNOWLEDGE  IN  ST.  THOMAS 


DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE 

CATHOLIC    UNIVERSITY   OF    AMERICA    IN    PART 

FULFILMENT     OF    THE    REQUIREMENTS 

FOR    THE  DEGREE  OF    DOCTOR 

OF    PHILOSOPHY 


^JlBIM 

OF  TV 

BY 

OF 
^ 

MATTHEW  SCHUMACHER,   C.  S.  C. 

(A.  B.,  S.  T.  B.) 


NOTRE  DAME,  INDIANA 

UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
1905. 


, 


Co  tbe 

of 

IRev.  peter  ^obannes,  C.  S.  C. 


CONTENTS. 


Introduction 1 

Historical 10 

CHAPTER  I. 

THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION  I. 

General  Principles  of  Knowledge 33 

a.  Union  of  Subject  and  Object 36 

b.  Object  Known  according  to  the  Nature  of  the 

Subject 41 

c.  Immateriality  and  Actuality  of  Subject  and  Object  46 

SECTION  II. 

Theory  of  Intellectual  Knowledge 54 

a.  Prime  and  Connatural  Object  of  the  Intellect 54 

b.  Active  and  Passive  Intellects 58 

c.  Intelligible  Species,   Completion   of  the    Act   of 

Knowledge 64 

SECTION  in. 

Validity  of  Knowledge 65 

a.  Sensible  and  Intellectual 67 

b.  Adaequatio  Rei  et  Intellectus 73 

c.  Relativity  of  Knowledge 79 

SECTION  rv. 
Causality  and  Knowledge 83 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE  KNOWABLENESS  OF  GOD. 

SECTION  I. 

Existence  of  God 95 

a.  Relation  between  Chapters  I.  and  II 96 

b.  Existence  and  Conception,  Relation  of. 98 

c.  Existence  of  God— How  Known  ? 99 

1.  Ontological  Argument,  not  by 101 

2.  Demonstration,  by.. 106 

3.  Innatism  of  Aquinas 109 

4.  Arguments  to  Prove  Existence  of  God 116 

SECTION  n. 
The  First  Cause 119 

SECTION  ra. 
Nature  of  God 130 

a.  Infinitely  Knowable  in  Itself. 132 

b.  Ontologism  Rejected 136 

c.  Position  of  Aquinas — God  Known  by  His  Mani- 

festations  141 

1.  Primum  Ens 142 

2.  Remotion,  Eminence,  Causality 143 

3.  Analogy,  Similarity,  Relation 148 

4.  Anthropomorphism 161 

SECTION  IV. 

Application  of  Principles  to : 

1.  Infinity 165 

2.  Omniscience: 169 

3.  Omnipotence 173 

4.  Personality 175 

5.  The  Rounded  Concept,  Qui  est 179 

Epilogue 183 

Bibliography 187 


ABBREVIATIONS. 

C.  G.  for  Contra  Gentes.  C.  G.,  1.  i,  c.  10  means, 
Contra  Gentes,  book  i,  chapter  10. 

Sum.  Theol.  for  Summa  Theologica.  Sum.  Theol., 
I,  q.  10.,  a.  i  ad  2  means,  Summa  Theologica, 
first  part,  question  10,  article  i,  second  objection. 

De  Veri.  for  De  Veritate.  De  Veri.,  q.  i,  a.  2  means 
De  Veritate,  question  i,  article  2. 

Com.  on  Lomb.  I,  Dis.  5,  q.  i.  a.  3  means,  Commen- 
tary on  the  Lombard,  first  book,  distinction  5, 
question  i,  article  3. 

Others  can  be  understood  from  these. 


INTRODUCTION. 


If  truth  is  God's  handwriting,  the  ink  is  indel- 
ible and  the  page  indestructible.  If  the  world  is 
God's,  it  cannot  deny  its  allegiance.  The  Con- 
ception of  God  as  found  in  the  works  of  St. 
Thomas  is  the  expression  of  the  power  of  the 
Creator  as  witnessed  to  by  the  work  of  His 
hands.  The  question  of  God  has  never  been  a 
problem  of  the  past;  in  some  phase  it  has 
always  demanded  the  best  thought  of  the  best 
thinkers  of  all  epochs.  There  are  times,  however, 
when  it  seems  to  arouse  especial  attention  — 
when  its  full  import  for  all  thought  is  pressed 
home.  We  are  now  in  such  a  time,  for  we  have 
gone  to  the  very  root  of  the  problem — we  are 
now  concerned  with  the  Idea  of  God.  Not  so 
much  the  existence  of  God,  nor  a  discussion  of 
His  Attributes  specifically,  but  the  quest  is  for 
a  Conception  of  God  that  will  quell  our  uneasi- 
ness in  presence  of  many  apparent  confusions,  and 
satisfy  our  demand  for  an  adequate  explanation. 
Many  have  been  and  are  to-day  seeking  this 
Concept,  but  it  is  an  idle  attempt  unless  the  path 
that  leads  to  it  has  been  shown  to  be  sure  and 
consistent,  for  this  Idea  is  not  the  product  of 
bare  thought.  In  other  words,  our  Concept  can 


only  have  the  validity  of  the  methods  that  have 
been  employed  in  reaching  it. 

Prof.  Ladd  has  pointed  out  what  he  considers 
preliminary  to  the  formation  of  the  Concept  of 
God.  We  must  know  the  development  of  man's 
religious  life,  we  must  know  human  nature  in  its 
totality,  and,  finally,  we  must  have  "points  of 
view  for  regarding  the  sum-total  of  human  ex- 
perience which  will  bear  the  test  of  the  severest 
critical  and  reflective  thinking."  This  last  point 
as  stated  in  another  place — "A  tenable  and  con- 
sistent theory  of  knowledge  is  then,  an  indis- 
pensable part  of  the  prolegomena  to  an  argument 
for  the  being  of  God,'12  is  what  we  wish  to  show 
in  the  present  paper.  Our  aim — and  this  is  the 
implicit  burden  of  all  Scholastic  treatments  of 
this  subject — is  to  show  the  intimate  connection 
between  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  set  forth  by 
St.  Thomas  and  his  handling  of  the  Knowable- 
ness  of  God.  The  principles  he  uses  in  arriving 
at  a  knowledge  of  any  subject  are  unchanged 
when  he  comes  to  discuss  the  question  of  our 
knowledge  of  God.  Ladd  also  notes  that  we  must 
have  some  theory  of  reality — we  shall  state  like- 
wise the  theory  of  reality  held  by  our  author  and 
follow  it  throughout.  "In  general  the  cause  of 

1  G.  T.  Ladd,  Prolegomena  to  an  Argument  for  the  Being  of 
God.    Phil.  Rev.,  v.  12,  pp.  130-137. 
3  Loc.  cit.,  p.  136. 


Theodicy  is  bound  up  with  that  of  Metaphysics. 
The  science  of  God  is  a  part  of  the  science  of 
being."  The  relation  of  the  knowableness  of 
God  to  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  so  close  in 
Aquinas  that  a  presentation  of  the  two  together 
may  give  a  more  satisfying  view  of  the  position 
he  held,  and  which  Christian  Philosophy  also 
holds,  than  those  unacquainted  with  his  works 
and  not  in  sympathy  with  his  thoughts  are 
accustomed  to  have.  With  this  purpose  we  have 
written  what  cannot  be  new  to  students  of 
Scholastic  Philosophy,  but  what  may  serve  to 
awaken  in  others  a  friendly  regard  for  a  Concep- 
tion of  God  arrived  at  by  ways  so  unlike  the 
ones  they  are  wont  to  use. 

There  are  a  few  points  in  the  method  of  St. 
Thomas  that  are  worth  noting  at  the  outset.  He 
begins  with  a  vague  sort  of  a  Conception  of  God 
that  he  considers  common  to  all  men.  By  induc- 
tion he  arrives  at  a  concept  more  specific  yet  not 
complete;  this  concept  he  treats  by  deduction 
and  evolves  its  implications.  The  development 
of  this  concept  by  deduction  is  done  according  to 
carefully  formulated  tests ;  its  necessity  is  due  to 
the  nature  of  our  mind,  for  God  is  trulv  one,  all 

•/ 

attributes  are  identical  in  Him,  but  we  can  only 
know  Him  by  considering  them  separately.  As 


3  Janet  et  S£ailles,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic,  p.  888. 


-4- 

a  result  we  have  a  full  and  many-sided  concept, 
and  no  one  attribute  in  particular  is  made  to 
bear  the  burden  of  the  whole. 

One  of  the  most  striking  differences  between 
the  attitude  of  Aquinas  and  that  of  Moderns 
who  have  no  specific  interest  in  the  Conception 
of  God  they  reach,  provided  it  harmonizes  in  some 
way  with  the  general  trend  of  the  philosophical 
systems  they  are  following  or  framing  unto 
themselves,  is  the  directness  and  consistency  with 
which  he  meets  the  problem  in  all  its  develop- 
ments. "Even  when  we  recognize  that  the 
modern  spirit  is  less  trammeled  in  its  researches, 
we  shall  be  forced  to  admit  that  it  is  to  some 
extent  hampered  by  the  restrictions  which  arise 
from  the  cultivations  of 'systems' and  from  loyalty 
to  the  traditions  of  the  'schools.'  '4  St.  Thomas 
sees  his  way  clearly  and  he  utilizes  his  light  to 
the  fullest  measure — there  is  no  hesitation  when 
it  is  asked  is  such  an  attribute  to  be  found  in 
God.  At  once  the  answer  is  given — and  this  is  so 
because  his  principles  are  plainly  before  him  and 
they  are  the  test  of  his  Concept.  This  fact  is 
highly  commendable  whether  we  agree  with  his 
principles  or  not.  There  are  few  Conceptions  of 
God  given  us  at  present — outside  of  Christian 

4  Prof.  VV.  Turner,  Kecent  Literature  on  Scholastic  Philoso 
phy.  The  Journal  of  Phil.,  Psycho!.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
April  14,  1904,  p.  201. 


5 

Philosophy — where  the  position  is  ever  essen- 
tially the  same,  that  cannot  be  criticised  on  the 
score  of  unwarranted  assumption,  inconsistent 
development,  incomplete  presentation, — some  of- 
fend against  all  three. 

If  we  contrast  a  thought  taken  from  Spencer 
and  one  from  Paulsen  with  the  position  of 
Aquinas  this  will  be  evident.  It  will  show  how 
he  admitted  the  truth  in  each  of  their  doctrines 
and  yet  did  not  stop  where  they  did.  With 
Spencer  from  a  consideration  of  Causation  in  the 
world  he  conies  to  a  First  Cause;  but  Spencer 
says,  if  we  reason  on  the  nature  of  this  Cause  we 
land  in  contradiction — "the  conception  of  the 
Absolute  and  Infinite,  from  whatever  side  we 
view  it,  appears  encompassed  with  contradic- 
tions",5 and  hence  is  practically  unknowable. 
Paulsen,  speaking  of  the  God  of  Pantheists,  re- 
marks :  "  We  cannot  presume  to  give  an  exhaus- 
tive definition  of  the  inner  life  of  the  all-real  God. 
.  .  .  The  difference  between  human  and  divine 
inner  life  must  indeed  be  great  and  thorough- 
going, so  great  that  there  can  be  no  homogeneity 
at  any  point."6  With  this  statement  St.  Thomas 
holds  that  we  cannot  have  an  exhaustive  defini- 
tion of  God;  his  fundamental  thesis — we  can 
know  God  from  creation  as  a  likeness  of  Him — 


5  First  Principles,  p.  42. 

6  Introd.  to  Phil.,  p.  252,  trans. 


—  6  — 

is  opposed  to  the  second  half  of  Paulsen's  view. 
"From  sensible  things",  Aquinas  says,  'our 
intellect  cannot  attain  to  a  view  of  God's  essence 
( inner  life )  because  creatures  are  effects  of  God 
not  equalling  the  power  of  the  Cause.  .  .  They 
lead  us,  however,  to  a  knowledge  of  God's  exist- 
ence and  from  them  we  learn  what  we  must 
ascribe  to  God."7  Agnosticism  wishes  to  know 
too  much,  Pantheism  is  too  modest,  as  usual  the 
mean  is  more  satisfying.  What  Caldecott  says 
of  the  Idea  of  God  found  in  Bradley 's  "Appear- 
ance and  Reality,"  we  quote  in  a  more  general 
sense  as  applicable,  in  our  opinion,  to  the  short- 
comings of  much  writing  on  this  question.  '  Is 
it  an  impertinence  to  suggest  to  an  original 
thinker  that  a  consideration  of  the  canon  of  '  ap- 
plication of  terms  of  human  thought  to  the 
Deity'  formulated  by  Aquinas,  and  never  sur- 
passed in  penetrative  and  judicious  subtlety, 
might  relieve  the  vacillation  and  inconsistency, 
\vhich  is  the  great  defect  of  Mr.  Bradley's  work 
as  it  stands."  This,  to  our  mind,  is  also  the 
defect  of  Prof.  Roycc's  "Conception",  as  we 
shall  point  out  in  the  text;  Prof.  Royce  uses  the 
same  terms  as  Mr.  Bradley.9 
There  is  no  need  of  presenting  the  views  of  the 

1  Sum.  Theol.,  q.  12,  a.  12. 

8  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  396. 

9  The  Conception  of  God,  pp.  44,  45. 


thinkers  of  all  times  on  our  question.  At  most 
we  might  show  how  their  Idea  of  God  was 
an  outcome  of  their  Theory  of  Knowledge  and 
Reality.  We  shall  be  content  to  bring  to  light 
again  the  view  of  Aquinas,  for  we  are  apt  to 
overlook  what  has  been  done  when  all  energies 
are  bent  on  doing  something  new.  As  far  as 
we  know,  the  question  has  not  been  handled 
explicitly  in  the  way  we  are  presenting  it,  at 
least  in  English.10  It  seemed  more  satisfactory 
to  give  the  Theory  of  Kno wedge  of  Aquinas  as 
a  basis  for  his  Conception  of  God,  rather  than 
start  with  the  Conception  itself  and  be  con- 
stantly referring  to  a  set  of  principles  that  are 
nowhere  given  together,  and  yet  are  closely 
connected  with  the  subject  itself. 

It  is  but  fair  to  admit  that  Aquinas  had 
advantages  in  the  construction  and  development 
of  his  Idea  of  God  that  are  not  at  hand  for 
many  to-day  who  are  busy  with  this  problem.  He 
saw  guiding -posts  on  all  sides  and  he  was 
presented  with  a  set  of  ideas  the  value  of  which 
he  did  not  question.  The  teaching  of  the 
Fathers,  especially  St.  Augustine,  the  attitude 
of  his  age  toward  the  Scriptures,  the  doctrine 

10  A  Commentator  on  St.  Thomas,  Capreolus,  handles  the 
question  practically  in  this  way.  He  discusses  the  basic 
principles  of  knowledge,  and  then  applies  them  to  God. 
Cfr.  Revue  Thomiste,  v.  8,  Fugues. 


—  8 


and  influence  of  the  Church  in  her  varied 
activities,  were  all  helps  to  one  who  gave  his 
attention  to  the  Supreme  Thought  of  all  these 
factors.  Yet  withal,  Aquinas  saw  clearly  the 
work  of  reason  in  the  question  of  God  and  set 
himself  to  know  what  the  powers  of  man  could 
do  to  solve  its  meaning.  His  works  bear 
testimony  to  the  careful  and  detailed  method 
he  brought  to  bear  on  this  question.  We  are 
told,  however,  by  Dr.  Carus,  "the  God  of 
mediaeval  theologians  is  a  mere  makeshift." 
"The  more  I  think  about  the  God-problem,  the 
surer  grows  my  conviction  that  the  God  of 
science  is  the  true  God,  and  the  God  of  mediaeval 
theologians  is  a  mere  makeshift,  a  substitution 
for  the  true  God,  a  temporary  surrogate  of  God, 
a  surrogate  which  at  the  time  was  good  enough 
for  immature  minds,  but  too  often  only  lead 
people  astray." 

Dr.  Carus  tells  us  that  our  conception  of  God 
will  be  true  "if  only  we  agree  to  be  serious  in 
the  purification  of  the  God  idea,  if  only  we  think 
of  God  as  a  truly  divine  being,  if  only  we  are 
serious  in  looking  upon  Him  as  truly  eternal, 
omnipresent,  omniscient,  omnipotent,  etc."  He 
adds  the  astounding  sentence :  "  The  theologians 
of  the  past  have  never  been  serious  in  thinking 


11  "The  God  of  Science,"  The  Monist,  April,  1904. 


•9- 

out    these   qualities   of   God   to   their  very  last 
conclusions."     Without  speculating  on  what  led 
to  this  statement,  or  inquiring  into  the  author's 
acquaintance    with    the  writings   of   mediaeval 
theologians,  I  will  simply   remark  that  had  he 
sat    in    the    lecture -hall    of   Aquinas    and    was 
determined  to  swear  by  his  word,  he  could  not 
have  followed   more    faithfully,   in    essence,    the 
method   of  Aquinas  than  he  gives  signs   of   in 
the  present  article,  especially  in  the  paragraph 
beginning,    "God's   thoughts  are  not   transient 
successive    representations."      The    method    of 
Aquinas  in  this  problem  is  golden,  and  its  main 
import  is   to  be   'serious  in   the  purification  of 
the  God  idea'.     As   Dr.  Carus  acknowledges  no 
allegiance   to  the  formulator  of  this  method,  it 
may   be  advantageous  to  consider  that    when 
the  human  mind  is  serious,  no  matter  at  what 
age    it    lives,   it   will  be  true  to   itself,   and   its 
methods  will  be  commendable  though  the  result 
reached  may  vary.     Dr.  Carus  violates  his  own 
dictum    in    dealing    with    the    mediaeval    theo- 
logians; he  says,  "in  my  opinion  it  is  the  duty 
of    the    philosopher    to    judge    every    religion 
according    to    the    best  interpretation  that  its 
best  representatives  have  given  it."    His  attitude 
is  sufficient  warrant  for  our  recalling  the   Con- 
ception  of  God   according  to   Aquinas,  for  it  is 
certainly  a   Conception   of  a  worthy    represen- 
tative of  the  mediaeval  theologians. 


io  — 


HISTORICAL. 


Before  we  take  up  the  problem  directly,  we 
say  a  few  words  on  the  principal  works 
of  St.  Thomas  in  which  he  treats  this  question, 
and  also  point  out  briefly  the  position  of  this 
subject  in  his  writings,  as  w^ell  as  the  influence 
that  affected  his  view  and  presentation.  The 
works  that  \ve  shall  outline  are:  Summa  Theo- 
logica,  Summa  Contra  Gentes,  Commentary  on 
the  Lombard,  Quaestiones  Disputatae,  Com- 
pendium Theologiae. 

"The  Summa  Theologica  is  the  first  system  of 
Theology  scientifically  carried  out.  The  theo- 
logical and  speculative  works  of  his  predecessors 
and  elder  contemporaries  as  well  as  his  own 
numerous  works  of  many  sorts  are  but  a  great 
and  massive  preparation  for  this  work."  The 
development  of  theological  science  from  the  days 
of  Anselm  to  those  of  Aquinas  here  finds  com- 
prehensive and  systematic  expression.  We  find 
the  purpose  of  the  work  stated  in  its  prologue : 
"Our  intention  in  this  work  is  to  present  the 
teaching  of  the  Christian  Religion  in  a  way 
suited  for  the  instruction  of  beginners."  He, 


1  Werner,  Der  hcilige  Thomas  von  Aquino,  v.  1,  p.  801. 


II 


therefore,  proposes  to  avoid  questions  and 
distinctions  that  confuse  the  beginner,  and  to 
give  a  connected  view  of  the  whole  field  of 
sacred  knowledge.  There  are  three  parts  to 
the  work;  the  first  treats  of  God  in  Himself, 
the  second  of  man  in  his  relation  to  God,  the 
third  of  Christ  as  the  way  that  leads  to  God. 
The  parts  are  made  up  of  questions ;  each 
question  is  divided  into  a  number  of  articles, 
and  each  article  opens  with  a  few  objections 
against  the  special  point  to  be  discussed;  then 
there  is  a  positive  statement  of  doctrine  with 
accompanying  arguments;  and  finally,  the 
previously  proposed  objections  are  answered. 
The  first  part  is  the  one  that  interests  us 
especially  and  only  that  portion  which  tells  us 
what  the  human  reason  can  know  of  God. 
This  portion  is  well  set  forth  in  the  following 
diagram  taken  from  Werner.2 

DE    ESSENTIA   DIVIXA. 

a)  num  sit; 

.  sit  vel  potius  non  sit: 

1.  simplicitas, 

2.  perfectio  (bonitas)  retnota  omni 

imperfectione  creaturarum, 

3.  infinitas, 

b)  quomodo  *'  immutabilitas, 

5.  aeternitas, 

6.  unit  as; 

j8.  a  nobis  cognoscatur, 

7.  a  nobis  nominetur; 
Loc.  tit.,  p.  803. 


12 


ad  intra: 


c)  quomodo 
operetur{ 


[1.  de  scientia  Dei, 
a.  cognos-  j  2.  de  ideis, 

cendo    j  3.  de  vero  et  falso, 
[4.  de  vita  Dei; 


1.  de  voluntate  divina, 

2.  de  iis,  quae  absolute  ad 

voluntatem  pertinent: 


/3.  volendo 


aa.  amor 


/3/S.  justitia  et  miser- 

icordia, 

3.  de  iis,   quae  simul  ad 
intellectum  pertinent: 
aa.  providentia. 
/3/3.  praedestinatio 
(liber  vitae) ; 
ad  extra:     de  potentia  Dei. 


This  diagram  comprises  questions  2-26  of  the 
Summa  Theologica.  It  is  completed  for  our 
purpose  by  adding  questions  44-49,  relating 
specifically  to  the  First  Cause  of  all  things, 
duration  and  distinction  of  created  things,  evil 
and  its  cause. 

The  Summa  Contra  Gentes  is  an  Apology  for 
the  Christian  Religion.  The  title  given  it  by 
St.  Thomas  himself  shows  this:  Summa  de 
Yeritate  Fidei  Catholicae.  It  was  written  at 
the  request  of  St.  Ra3rmond  of  Pennafort,  who 
wished  to  have  a  systematic  presentation  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Church  as  a  defence  against  the 
Moors  in  Spain.  The  work  is  divided  into  four 
books  and  each  book  is  made  up  of  chapters. 
The  first  three  deal  with  doctrine  in  the  light  of 
reason,  the  fourth  is  concerned  with  the  data  of 
revelation  as  beyond  reason.  The  question  of 


__lr_      J  >} ._.__ 

God  is  paramount  in  these  pages :  God  in  Him- 
self, His  essence  and  attributes,  are  treated  of  in 
the  first  book,  God  as  the  efficient  and  final 
cause  of  all  things  make  up  the  second  and 
third,  as  named. 

"It  is  the  first  work  in  which  he  (Aquinas) 
presented  his  system  as  a  coherent  whole",' 
though  not  entirely  complete,  for  the  final 
expression  of  his  thought  is  found  in  the  Summa 
Theologica.  These  two  works  have  much  in 
common,  yet  differ  in  scope  and  method.  The 
former  is  practically  philosophical  throughout,4 
the  latter  is  principally  theological,  though  in 
each  there  are  philosophical  and  theological 
discussions  according  to  the  topic  treated.  In 
method,  the  former  is  almost  entirely  positive  in 
in  its  treatment,  at  least  objections  are  seldom 
formally  presented  and  answered,  in  the  latter 
each  article  begins  with  a  number  of  objections ; 
again,  in  the  former  there  are  a  number  of 
arguments  advanced  to  support  each  question, 
in  the  latter  there  is  usually  but  one.  This  is 
due  to  the  fact,  no  doubt,  that  St.  Thomas 
wished  to  make  the  Summa  Theologica  as  clear 
and  as  easy  as  possible,  since,  in  his  own  words, 
he  wrote  it  for  beginners.  In  the  Summa  Contra 
Gentes,  "It  is  much  more  a  question  of  basis 

3  Werner,  loc.  cit.,  p.  403. 

4  Hence  often  cited  as  Summa  Philosophica. 


for  the  points  raised  than  a  development  of 
them,  hence  the  desire  to  vindicate  in  severe  brief 
presentation  the  right  value  and  necessarily 
concise  acknowledgment  of  the  truth  contained 
in  the  question  by  means  of  as  large  a  number 
of  reasons  as  possible."0  We  shall  shortly  recur 
to  the  position  of  God  in  these  works. 

In  his  Commentary  on  the  Lombard,  St. 
Thomas  followed  the  division  of  the  work  of 
the  author.  There  are  four  books  containing 
in  a  systematic  form  the  theology  of  the  Church- 
God,  Angels,  man,  creation,  the  saints,  and  like 
questions  are  discussed.  Each  book  is  made  up 
of  a  number  of  distinctions,  and  these  again  are 
divided  into  questions  and  articles.  The  text  of 
the  Lombard  served  as  a  basis  for  the  Com- 
mentators to  give  their  own  solution  to  the 
subject  under  consideration.  These  commen- 
taries are  rather  works  on  the  Lombard  than 
simple  expositions  of  his  meaning.  This  is 
sufficiently  evidenced  for  by  the  diversity  of 
opinion  of  the  various  commentators.  This  was 
the  first  comprehensive  \vork  of  St.  Thomas,  and 
it  4<  formed  a  mighty  foundation  for  the  further 
extension  of  theological  efforts.  The  Commen- 
tary on  the  Lombard  contains  his  whole 
teaching  .  .  .  though  not  in  the  thoroughly 


6  Werner,  loc.  cit*,  p.  404. 


constructed  form  of  an  independent  system6." 
The  Quaestiones  Disputatae  comprise  the 
lectures  delivered  by  St.  Thomas  in  the  University 
of  Paris  after  he  had  finished  his  Commentary 
on  the  Lombard.  "  These  are  concerned  with 
the  most  important  and  the  most  excellent  ob- 
jects of  theological  speculation,  namely,  with 
those  matters  which  are  treated  of  in  the  first 
and  second  parts  of  the  Summa  TheologicaV: 
They  contain  in  rounded  form  the  treatment  of 
certain  questions  that  a  commentary,  following 
a  given  plan,  forbids  one  attempting.  There  are 
sixty-three  questions  in  all  with  four  hundred 
articles ;  all  these  are  given  under  a  few  general 
heads:  De  Potentia,  De  Malo,  De  Spiritualibus 
Creaturis,  De  Anima,  De  Unione  Verbi,  De  Virtu- 
tibus,  De  Veritate.  The  articles  are  preceded  by 
numerous  objections,  sometimes  as  many  as 
thirty,  under  the  form  quod  videtur  non.  St. 
Thomas  gave  his  "best  and  most  active  atten- 
tion to  their  elaboration.  .  .  It  has  been  remarked 
that  Thomas  wished  to  bring  the  art  of  the 
Scholastic  Dialectic  to  its  highest  perfection  in 
these  Quaestiones  Disputatae."  They  were  writ- 
ten rather  for  the  trained  philosopher  than  for 


6  Ibid.,  pp.  358-359. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  360. 

8  Werner,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  360-1. 


the  beginner.9  Under  the  heading  De  Veritate, 
the  question  of  knowledge  and  of  God  are 
handled  in  detail. 

The  Compendium  Theologiae  was  written  for 
his  dear  companion,  Bro.  Reginald.  Its  original 
plan  was  to  embrace  briefly  all  theology,  in  three 
books,  based  on  the  virtues,  faith,  hope,  and 
charity.  The  first  book  alone,  containing  two 
hundred  and  forty-six  chapters,  was  completed. 
The  chapters  are  short  and  concise.  "  The  whole 
work  is  an  intelligible  and  succinct  summary 
view  of  the  system  of  St.  Thomas."  This  is 
strikingly  true  on  the  points  of  God,  man's 
nature,  and  man's  relation  to  the  First  Cause. 
4 'The  doctrine  of  one  God  and  the  necessity  of 
thinking  of  the  condition  of  His  existence,  is  de- 
rived in  a  strong  and  continuous  series  from  the 
proof  of  a  first  highest  mover  of  the  world." 

The  problem  of  God  occupies  the  first  place  in 
all  the  works  ot  Aquinas.  "  There  is  not  a  single 
one  of  St.  Thomas's  works  that  does  not  begin 
with  the  discussion  of  the  existence  and  at- 
tributes of  God."12  This  statement  shows  the 


9  A.  Portmann,  Die  Systematik  in  dfn  Quaestiones  Disputa- 
tae  des  hi.  Thomas  von  Aquino,  Jahr.  f.  Phil,  u  Spek  Tbeol., 
1892,  pp.  127-150. 

10  Werner,  loc.  cit.,  p.,  389. 

11  Ibid.,  loc.  cit.,  p.,  388. 

u  Jourdain,  La  Philosophic  de  St.  Thomas  d'Aquin,  v.  1, 
p.  184. 


importance  attached  to  the  question  of  God  in 
our  author's  system ;  a  glance  at  any  of  his 
greater  writings  wiJl  suffice  to  make  this  evident. 
God,  for  him,  is  the  creative  and  sustaining 
Power  of  all  things,  and  He  is  also  their  last  end. 
Creation  in  all  its  forms  gets  meaning  only  when 
viewed  in  relation  to  Him.  In  the  development 
of  our  subject  we  shall  see  how  all  comes  from 
the  hand  of  God,  how  everything  bears  some 
trace  of  His  operation,  and  how  He  is  the 
unifying  element  in  the  variety  about  us.  A 
knowledge  of  Him,  no  matter  how  meagre,  is 
worth  more  than  a  thorough  knowledge  of  all 
that  is  less  than  Him,  for  He  is  the  greatest 
object  that  the  human  intelligence  can  consider 
and  seek  to  know.  "Among  all  the  perfections 
found  in  created  things,  the  greatest  is  to  know 
God."  In  a  proem  to  the  second  question 
of  the  Summa  Theologica,  part  I,  St.  Thomas 
gives  his  attitude  on  this  question:  " Since  the 
principal  intention  is  to  give  a  knowledge  of 
God,  and  not  only  as  He  is  in  Himself,  but  also 
as  He  is  the  Source  and  End  of  things,  especially 
of  rational  creatures,  we  shall  first  treat  of  God, 
secondly,  of  the  tendency  of  the  rational  creature 
toward  God,  and  thirdly,  of  Christ  who  is  our 
way  in  tending  toward  God."  Here  we  have  his 

13  C.  G.,  1  1,  c.  47. 


—  i8  — 

principal  work  outlined,  and  its  basic  thought 
is  God. 

In  both  Summae,  God  is  the  all-embracing,  all- 
important  problem.  The  Idea  of  God  is  the 
pivotal  idea  in  these  works.  The  subsequent 
developments  and  deductions  are  so  intimately 
bound  up  with  it  that  all  stands  or  falls 
together  with  it.  This  is  seen  very  strikingly 
in  the  fact  that  St.  Thomas  considers  God  as 
the  cause  of  all  things  and  likewise  as  their  last 
end  —  thus  comprising  the  whole  realm  of  the 
actual  and  the  possible  under  all  aspects.  It  is 
not  an  arbitrary  measure  on  the  part  of  Aquinas 
to  give  this  prominence  and  preeminence  to  the 
God-question,  for  it  arises  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  subject  itself,  from  the  very  content  of  the 
Idea  of  God.  The  introductory  remarks  to  the 
main  divisions  of  the  questions  in  the  first  part 
of  the  Summa  Theologica  show  this  clearly;  the 
same  is  evident  in  the  other  Summa  where  he 
devotes  a  chapter  (1.  1,  c.  9)  to  outlining  his 
order  and  method,  saying,  he  will  first  treat  of 
God  in  Himself,  then  of  God  as  Creator,  and  fin- 
ally of  the  relation  of  creation  to  God  as  an  end. 

It  is  natural  to  ask  in  view  of  the  detailed 
presentation  of  this  problem  in  St.  Thomas,  how 
much  of  this  delicate  net -work  is  due  to  his 
workmanship.  Is  he  responsible  for  all,  or  is 
he  only  a  systematizer  ?  Neither,  exactly.  He 


-19- 

inherited  an  Idea  of  God  that  showed  signs  of 
the  thoughts  of  some  great  minds,  and  which 
had  been  growing  and  becoming  richer  under 
the  guidance  of  a  solicitous  tradition;  but  this 
Idea  was  fully  grasped  by  him  and  set  forth  in 
a  way  that  combined  all  previous  thought,  and 
yet  evidenced  a  selection  that  proclaims  the 
master  mind  and  gives  title  to  originality.  A 
cursory  view  of  the  principal  authors  he  drew 
from,  and  the  condition  of  philosophy  at  his 
time,  will  give  his  position  more  accurately. 

Among  the  Greeks,  the  influence  of  Aristotle 
and  Plato  is  unmistakable.  His  proofs  for  the 
existence  of  God  are  taken  from  them.  God  as 
Prime  Mover  and  Intelligence  are  found  in 
Aristotle,  and  "Thomas  derived  the  most 
incisive  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  and 
for  many  of  the  divine  perfections  from 
Plato."  That  Aquinas  went  beyond  the 
Conception  of  God  arrived  at  by  these  two 
philosophers  is  no  matter  for  surprise,  for  their 
Conception  had  been  enriched  by  modification 
and  addition  long  before  the  days  of  our 
author.  In  the  Christian  era,  St.  Augustine, 
and  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  and  Boethius  are 
largely  utilized.  They  are  quoted  frequently, 
and  some  of  their  statements  are  taken  as  a 

14  Schneider,  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol.,  1893,  p.  470. 


—  20  — 

basis  for  the  development  of  the  particular 
aspect  of  God  he  is  considering.  It  is  true,  St. 
Thomas  quotes  from  other  writers  both  before 
and  after  Christ,  yet  there  is  not  the  same 
practical  intimacy  betrayed  as  in  the  case  of 
the  writers  just  mentioned.  He  considered  of 
sufficient  importance  the  De  Divinis  Nominihus 
of  Dionysius  and  the  De  Trinitate  of  Boethius 
to  write  a  commentary  on  them.  His  presen- 
tation however,  is  rather  the  outcome  of  his 
assimilating  the  various  elements  that  attended 
the  growth  of  the  Conception  of  God  than  a 
conscious  borrowing  from  different  sources;  he 
brought  his  synthetic  and  selective  mind  to  bear 
on  the  materials  the  past  had  gathered,  and 
threw  these  into  the  form  that  Christian 
Philosophy  has  recognized  as  its  own  since  his 
time.  The  synthesis  is  partly  due  to  the  stimu- 
lation of  his  age,  and  partly  to  the  actuality 
of  certain  problems  at  that  epoch.  Werner 
points  out  that  the  fundamental  thoughts  or 
axioms  in  the  questions  2-26  of  the  Summa 
Theologica  are  derived  from  some  philosopher, 
some  philosophical  writing,  or  Father  of  the 
Church,  and  thus  concludes  the  acquaintance  of 
Aquinas  with  the  learning  of  the  past  and  his 
leaning  toward  tradition;  we  might  add,  it  is 
a  characteristic  of  the  work  of  St.  Thomas 
to  assimilate  all  the  good  he  knew  of  in  the 


21  — 

efforts  of  others,  no  matter  who  they  were. 
The  question  of  God  was  given  especial  con- 
sideration in  the  generations  immediately 
preceding  Aquinas.  The  attitude  of  St.  Anselm, 
who  thought  about  the  subject,  with  a  view 
of  giving  it  a  simple  yet  comprehensive  basis, 
until  he  was  wearv  and  about  to  desist  from 

Wf 

his  inquiries,  is  a  worthy  introduction 
to  the  attention  it  received  at  the  hands 
of  Scholasticism  during  its  growing  da}^s. 
"Theodicy  was  always  regarded  by  the  Scho- 
lastics as  one  of  the  most  important  chapters  in 
philosophy  .  .  .  Theodicy  (and  it  alone)  remained 
faithful  to  the  proper  genus  of  Scholasticism."15 
The  close  connection  between  Theodicv  and 

mt 

Religion  in  those  days  made  this  a  practical 
necessity.  Before  St.  Thomas  took  up  the 
question,  the  Schools  had  witnessed  the  Con- 
troversy about  the  Universals ;  Eclecticism, 
Mysticism,  Pantheism,  in  turn  passed  by;  the 
Arabian  and  Jewish  Thinkers  had  given  their 
version  of  Greek  Philosophy  that  called  for 
attention ;  his  contemporaries  or  immediate 
predecessors,  Alexander  of  Hales,  Bonaventure, 
Albert  the  Great,  wrote  and  influenced  thought. 
There  was  certainly  activity  from  the  Pantheism 
of  Scotus  Erigena  to  the  Angel  of  the  Schools. 


16  DeWulf,  H>s£o/re  de  la  Philosophic  Medieval,  p.  155. 


22 


The  merit  of  Aquinas  consists  in  the  fact  that 
he  was  not  bewildered  by  the  divergent  views 
of  previous  thinkers,  and  that  he  did  not  branch 
off  into  a  particular  view  of  his  own  but 
accepted  the  truth  contained  in  each,  refuted 
fearlessly  what  he  considered  error,  and  out 
of  it  all  gave  us  a  conception  that  justly 
appreciates  the  careful  efforts  of  many  minds 
and  ages. 

If  we  specify  in  greater  detail  the  condition  of 
thought  at  the  time  of  St.  Thomas,  we  shall  be 
in  a  better  position  to  judge  the  value  of  the 
statement  so  frequently  made  that  Aquinas  was 
little  else  than  an  imitator.  Philosophy  in  the 
Middle  Ages  was  not  a  unit;  there  was  much 
diversity  in  the  opinions  held  and  defended. 
Scholasticism  was  but  one  form  of  philosophic 
thought,  and  thus  does  not  stand  for  Mediaeval 
Philosophy  as  a  whole,  as  DeWulf  and  Lindsay 
very  well  point  out.  "The  philosopher  of  scho- 
lasticism should  be  tmderstood  as  really  not  the 
same  thing  as  mediaeval  philosophy."  This 
distinction  is  important  in  the  sense  that  it  re- 
calls the  fact — too  often  overlooked — that  there 
was  great  mental  activity  in  those  times,  with 
the  consequence  that  a  thinker  had  to  choose 
one  view  among  many.  Aquinas  chose  pure 

16  Dr.  Lindsa}-,  Scholastic  and  Mediaeval  Philosophy, 
Archiv  f.  Gesch.  der  Phil,  v.  15,  p.  42. 


—  23  — 

Aristotelianism,   and   gave  form   to  the  system 
that  honors  him  as  its  chief  exponent. 

This  choice  implied  a  discrimination  and  an  in- 
dependence of  thought  that  modifies  to  a  large 
extent  the  imputation  of  a  mere  follower.     His 
attitude  toward  the  Pantheism  of  his  time  and 
the    Arabian    Philosophy    are    instances   to  the 
point.  The  statement  of  W.  T.  Harris— "Panthe- 
ism versus  Christian  Theism  was  on  trial"  in  the 
days  of  Aquinas,  is  true.     None  the  less  true  is 
his  tribute  to  the   way    St.    Thomas    met    the 
issue  of  his  day  regarding  the' problem  of  God. 
Aquinas  "  stated  the  Christian  Idea  so  clearly  in 
the  language   of  the  Intellect  that  the  develop- 
ment of  six  hundred  years  has  not  superseded  his 
philosophical  forms.     In  fact,  his  comprehension 
is  confirmed  by  the  profoundest  thought  of  our 
own  time.     The  necessity  of  a  philosophical  sys- 
tem that  shall  make  personality  its  central  prin- 
ciple, and  exhibit  the  true  difference  between  the 
beings  of  nature  and  human  souls  should  revive 
in    our    theological    seminaries    the    study     of 
Aquinas."  1T   It  is  noteworthy  that  the  discussion 
of  the  question  of  God  during  the  last  century 
was  carried  on  along  the  same  lines  as  were 
prominent  in  the  Middle  Ages,  according  to  the 
view  of  Janet  and  Seailles.     "The  progress  made 

17  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  v.  9,  p.  621, 


—  24~ 

in  our  century  consisted  in  sifting  more  precisely 
than  ever  the  problem  of  God,  in  putting  in 
presence  of  each  other,  for  the  first  time,  in  an  al- 
together direct  manner,  Theism  and  Pantheism. 
To  limit  this  problem,  to  measure  with  accuracy 
the  merits  and  defects  of  the  personal  and  imper- 
sonal theory  as  such,  has  been  the  work  of  our 
century."18  St.  Thomas  had  to  meet  the  Panthe- 
ism of  Erigena,  that  of  Bernard  of  Tours, 
Amaury  of  Bene,  and  David  of  Dinant.  The 
last  named  identified  God  with  first  matter 
and  provoked  the  only  severe  condemnation 
uttered  by  the  ever  mild  and  calm  Angel  of  the 
Schools. 

Pantheism  was  also  taught  by  the  Arabians. 
Creation  out  of  nothing  was  unknown  to  them, 
matter  was  eternal.  Their  dualism,  however, 
admitted  of  emanation,  and  was  thus  Panthe- 
istic. They  did  not  wish  to  separate  God  and 
matter  absolutely,  so  they  held  that  God  created 
a  first  intelligence  and  from  it  all  else  proceeded. 
The  source  of  this  emanation  was  the  thought  of 
God,  not  His  will.  They  taught  the  unity  of 
the  divine  nature;  finally,  they  denied  to  God 
a  knowledge  of  individual  and  contingent 
things.19  Ueberweg  says  of  their  philosophy: 

18  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic,  p.  288. 

19  Stockl,  L     -h.  der  Phil,  des  Mittelalters,  v.  2-1,  pp.  124- 
130. 


—  25  — 

"  The  whole  philosophy  of  the  Arabians  was 
only  a  form  of  Aristotelianism,  tempered  more 
or  less  with  Platonic  conceptions."  And  this 
characterization  is  common  with  the  historians 
of  philosophy;  to  quote  another.  "In  their 
method  however,  in  their  principles  by  which 
they  apprehend  the  universe,  and  in  their  entire 
system  of  philosophical  conceptions  they  stand, 
so  far  as  our  information  on  the  subject  reaches, 
entirely  under  the  combined  influence  of  Aristot- 
elianism and  Neo-Platonism ;  and  the  same  is 
true  of  the  Jews."21  Aquinas  has  these  philoso- 
phers in  mind  throughout  his  work,  and  refutes 
them  as  occasion  offers,  and  he  is  also  careful  to 
show  by  explicit  argument  that  his  own  position 
is  not  open  to  a  Pantheistic  interpretation. 

Perhaps  the  question  of  God  is  the  portion  of 
the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  that  shows  best  that 
his  undoubted  admiration  for  Aristotle  did  not 
prevent  him  from  being  an  independent  thinker. 
No  one  that  has  contrasted  his  theodicy  with 
that  of  the  Stagyrite  can  fail  to  note  the  larger 
and  more  thorough  treatment  of  Aquinas,  and 
the  presence  of  ideas  wholly  absent  from  the 
work  of  the  Philosopher.  These  additions  are 
due  to  the  development  of  the  Divine  Idea  in 
Christianity,  but  their  full  comprehension  and 

20  Hist,  of  Phil,  v.  1,  p.  246.  trans. 

21  Windelband,  A  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  316. 


—  26  — 

expression  are  the  work  of  Aquinas,  and,  to 
repeat  the  words  of  Harris,  'his  comprehension 
is  confirmed  by  the  profoundest  thought  of  our 
time.'  Some  writers  also  remark  that  St. 
Thomas  never  got  beyond  the  teaching  of  his 
master,  Albertus  Magnus.  "Thomas  of  Aquin 
is  led  and  determined  by  Albert,  and  it  would  be 
a  great  mistake  to  consider  him  an  independent 
thinker.  .  .  .  For  the  historian  of  philosophy 
Thomas  is  but  a  very  secondary  person- 
age." The  relation  of  master  and  pupil  in 
this  case  is  of  course  very  close,  yet  we  can 
recognize  the  specific  work  of  each.  Windelband 
says  justly:  "  The  intellectual  founder  of  this 
system  (Scholasticism)  was  Albert  of  Bollstadt. 
It  owes  its  organic  completion  in  all  directions, 
its  literary  codification,  and  thus  its  historical 
designation  to  Thomas  Aquinas."  On  the 
question  of  God  itself,  the  exprofesso  treatment 
of  St.  Thomas  is  much  more  extended  and  com- 
plete than  that  of  his  master,  who  only  wrote  as 
much  of  his  Summa  as  we  have,  at  earnest 
solicitation. 

Eucken  says  of  Aquinas:  "He  was  certainly 
no  thinker  of  the  first  order,  yet  he  \vas  not  on 
this  account  a  mind  of  no  consequence  or  a  fana- 
tic. He  was  not  much  ahead  of  his  times,  but  he 

22  Prantl.  Geschichte  der  Logik,  v.  3,  p.  107. 
23Loc.  cit.,  p.  311. 


—  27  — 

synthesized  and  reconstructed  what  the  age 
offered,  and  thus  satisfied  a  pressing  need  of  the 
historical  situation."  Dr.  Lindsay,  in  the 
article  referred  to,  though  he  says  Scholasticism 
has  received  undue  contempt,  yet  refers  to  the 
"servility  of  Aquinas  before  Aristotle."  Prof. 
Dewey,  in  an  article  on  Scholasticism,  seems  to 
think  that  Albertus  and  Thomas  were  wholly 
dependent  on  Aristotle.  He  says:  "In  spite  of 
(or  better,  because  of)  the  conviction  of  Albertus 
and  St.  Thomas  as  to  the  relation  of  Aristotle  to 
Church  dogma,  they  are  compelled  to  set  aside 
certain  doctrines  as  simply  the  products  of  reve- 
lation, utterly  inaccessible  to  the  natural  mind- 
it  being  clear  that  Aristotle  had  not  taught  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity  or  the  Incarnation, 
&c."25  In  contrast  we  have  the  words  of  Prof. 
Royce,  "He  (Thomas)  also  vindicated  for  phil- 
osophy a  certain  limited,  but  very  genuine, 
freedom  of  method  and  of  opinion,  within  its 
own  province.  As  a  result,  Thomas  stands  from 

24  Die  Lebensanscbauungen  der  grossen  Denker,  pp   245-6, 
also,    Thomas    von    Aquino    und    Kant.Ein    Kampf  zwei<r 
Welten,  Kant-Studien,  v.  6. 

25  Diet,   of  Phil,    and   Psychol.,    Baldwin,   vol.   2,  p.  494. 
Prof.  Dewey  seems  to  forget  that  Albertus  and  St.  Thomas 
believed  in  the  Trinity  and  the  Incarnation  before  they  knew 
of  Aristotle.    They  used  the    Stagyrite   as   an  instrument; 
they  explained  these  myteries,  as  far  as  human  reason  could 
go,  by  principles   derived  from    Aristotle.      This    is    rather 
evidence  of  independence   of  thought. 


—  28  — 

any  fair  point  of  view,  Catholic  or  non-Catholic, 
decidedly  high,  not  only  as  a  theologian,  but 
also  as  a  rational  inquirer." 

If  we  take  for  granted  that  St.  Thomas  was  a 
thinker  of  note  and  did  good  service  to  his  day, 
can  we  hold  that  he  has  a  message  for  our  day  ? 
Opinion  ouside  the  Church  is  not  of  a  nature  to 
warrant  an  affirmative  answer.  What  Pope 
Leo  intended  by  restoring  the  Philosophy  of  St. 
Thomas  was  not  an  imitation  in  the  letter  of  the 
teaching  of  Aquinas,  not  the  defending  of  specific 
doctrines  whereon  opinion  is  legitimately 
divided,  not  the  adhering  to  statements  that 
further  knowledge  has  shown  to  be  untenable; 
this  much  is  held  in  a  practical  manner  by  all 
who  are  engaged  in  interpreting  anew  to  our 
age  the  teaching  of  Aquinas.  What  the  Pope 
desired,  and  what  all  true  Neo-Scholastics  hold 
as  solid,  are  the  essential  principles  that  underly 
the  Philosophy  of  St.  Thomas.  These  are 
sound  and  have  not  yet  been  superseded.  The 
Neo- Scholastic  Movement  is  a  school,  if  you 
will,  as  the  followers  of  Descartes,  Spinoza, 
Kant  constitute  a  school;  in  this  light  it  is 
entitled  to  as  rational  a  consideration  as  any 
other  philosophical  movement  recognizing  a 
given  thinker  of  the  past  as  its  head.  Its  fitness 

26  Pope  Leo's  Philosophical  Movement  and  its  Relations  to 
Modern  Thought — Boston  Evening  Transcript,  Juh-29, 1903. 


-29- 

is  not  a  matter  of  a  priori  judgment,  but  must 
find  its  justification  in  meeting  as  well,  if  not 
better,  the  problems  that  our  times  are  trying 
to  solve 

The  fitness  of  the  Philosophy  of  St.  Thomas, 
in  its  essentials,  for  our  day  is  not  admitted 
by  non-Thomists.  "The  philosophy  of  the 
Middle  Ages  with  its  highest  point  of  develop- 
ment, Thomas  of  Aquin,  we  considered  con- 
quered and  buried,"  says  Eucken.  "  Its  growth 
in  individual  places  seemed  rather  a  souvenir 
of  the  past  than  a  condition  of  the  present, 
or  even  a  germ  of  the  future,  but  now  it  has 
forced  itself  again  with  its  world -embracing 
power  in  the  fore-front  of  life  and  asks,  not  for 
toleration,  but  for  domination."  He  repeats 
the  thought  with  more  detail,  showing  wherein 
he  considers  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas 
insufficient  for  our  time:  "for  his  dav  Thomas 

•/ 

was  the  leader  of  all  Christendom,  to-day  he 
can  be  but  the  leader  of  a  party."28  Paulsen 
is  similarly  minded,  for  in  the  preface  to  his 
Philosophia  Militans,  he  sets  up  the  Philosophy 
of  Kant  as  the  true  one,  and  says,  Kant  not 
only  destroyed  Materialism  and  Naturalism, 

27  Die  Philosophic  des  Thomas  von  Aquino  und  die  Cultur 
der  Neuzeit,   Zeitschr.   f.  philosophische  Kritik,   vol.   87-88, 
p.  161. 

28  Die  Lebensanscb.,  p.  249. 


—  30- 

but  likewise,  "dogmatic  Supernaturalism  or 
Scholastic  Metaphysics."  We  will  end  with  a 
statement  of  Prof.  Royce.  His  article  already 
referred  to  is  very  appreciative  of  Scholasticism 
and  St.  Thomas,  yet  he  thinks  the  fundamental 
positions  of  the  Philosophy  of  Aquinas  call  for 
readjustment  if  they  are  to  meet  the  modern 
view  of  these  problems.  To  quote  him  on  the 
two  points  that  bear  on  our  work.  "His 
(Thomas')  theory  of  the  nature  and  limits  of 
human  knowledge,  a  theory  derived  from 
Aristotle,  especially  calls  not  merely  for  restate- 
ment, but  for  readjustment,  as  soon  as  you  try 
to  apply  it  to  the  interpretation  of  our  modern 
consciousness."  We  shall  state  the  theory  of 
Aquinas  in  the  following  chapter,  and  try  to 
show  that  it  is  still  applicable. 

The  other  point  bears  still  more  directly  on 
the  subject  we  are  handling,  so  we  shall  cite 
it  at  length.  "The  problem  of  the  relation 
between  God  and  the  world,  as  St.  Thomas 
treats  that  topic,  is  one  which  has  only  to  be 
reviewed  carefully  in  the  light  of  modern  science 
and  modern  philosophy,  to  secure  an  alteration 
of  the  essentially  unstable  equilibrium  in  which 
Thomas  left  this  heaven -piercing  tower  of  his 
speculation.  Here  I,  of  course,  have  no  space 
to  speak  of  a  philosophical  problem  to  which 
as  a  student  of  philosophy  I  have  directed  so 


much  of  my  attention  —  namely,  the  problem 
about  the  conception  of  God.  But  when  I  read, 
in  more  than  one  recent  philosophical  essay  of 
Catholic  origin,  expressions  that  admit  the 
decidedly  symbolic  and  human  character  of  the 
language  in  which  even  the  dogmas  of  the 
Church  have  to  be  expressed  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  the  nature  of  God,  when  stress  is 
also  laid,  very  rightly,  upon  that  aspect  of 
St.  Thomas'  teaching  which  emphasizes  this 
very  inadequacy  of  even  the  traditional  formulas 
to  the  business  of  defining  divine  things,  when 
I  meet  at  the  same  time  with  admissions  that 
St.  Thomas'  positive  theory  of  the  divine 
attributes  involves  these  or  these  apparent 
contradictions,  which  still  need  philosophical 
solution — then,  indeed,  I  see  not  that  our  more 
modern  thinking  is  \vholly  right  and  Thomas 
wrong — but  that  Catholic  Theology  is  nowa- 
days in  a  position  where  it  is  bound  either  to 
progress,  or  to  abandon  the  whole  business  of 
reviving  the  spirit  of  serious  philosophical  think- 
ing, so  that  they  like  the  rest  of  us  are  living 
in  an  age  of  transition." 

These  are  but  a  few  of  the  statements  of  the 
many  that  might  be  cited  — Froschammer, 
Hermes,  Giinther,  and  others  might  be  quoted. 
We  hope  to  show  in  this  study  that  the 
estimates  given  against  the  value  of  the  view 


of  St.  Thomas  are  incorrect,  and  that  the 
treatment  of  the  question  of  God  by  Aquinas— 
a  question  of  prime  importance  with  him  and 
all  philosophy — is  not  a  thing  of  the  past. 


—  33  — 


CHAPTER  I, 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


SECTION  I.— GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

Knowledge  is  a  fact.  What  is  the  process  of 
knowledge,  and  what  is  the  value  of  knowledge, 
are  the  important  considerations.  What  makes 
a  thing  knowable,  how  do  we  know  it,  and 
what  is  the  validity  of  our  knowledge?  An 
answer  to  these  questions  gives  the  psychology 
and  epistemology  of  knowledge.  There  is  a 
sentence  in  one  of  the  works  of  Aquinas  that 
contains  the  factors  involved  in  the  problem  of 
knowledge.  "There  are",  says  he,  "but  three 
requisites  for  knowledge,  namely,  the  active 
power  of  the  knower  by  which  he  judges  of 
things,  the  thing  known,  and  the  union  of 
both."1  Before  we  can  have  knowledge,  there 
must  be  something  knowable,  some  one  capable 
of  knowing,  and  both  the  knowable  object  and 
the  knowing  subject  must  come  into  some 
union  or  relation.  Knowledge  is  only  realized 

1  De  Veri.,  q.  2,  a.  1,  praeterea. 


-34- 

when  the  object  and  the  subject  enter  into  a 
determined  relation.  These  elements  are  admit- 
ted by  all  philosophers  as  necessary  for  a  theory 
of  knowledge.  We  shall  now  consider  their 
organic  connection  in  the  theory  of  St.  Thomas, 
and  also  the  objective  value  of  our  knowledge 
as  resulting  from  this  theory. 

It  is  a  Scholastic  axiom  that  all  knowledge 
or  every  cognition  is  in  the  knower  through  an 
assimilation  of  the  knower  to  the  known.2  The 
nature  of  this  assimilation  and  how  it  is 
brought  about  forms  the  problem  of  knowledge 
for  the  Scholastics.  This  assimilation  runs 
through  all  knowledge  and  is  its  basis.  There 
are  two  sorts  of  knowledge  distinct  in  kind- 
sensory  and  intellectual.  From  the  external 
senses  that  receive  the  forms  of  material  things, 
without  matter  indeed,  but  yet  with  many 
material  conditions,  up  through  the  internal 
senses  which  retain  and  combine  the  images 
of  these  forms,  the  human  intellect,  the  angelic 
intellect,  the  Divine  intellect,  there  is  a  steady 
rise  and  the  attainment  of  more  perfect  knowl- 
edge on  the  basis  of  immateriality.  The  assimi- 
lation or  likeness  that  is  brought  about 
between  the  knowing  power  and  the  object  is 
not  simply  according  to  the  nature  of  the  object 

a  Omnis    cognitio   tit   per  assimilatiouem    coguoscentis    et 
cogniti.     C.  G.,  1.  1.,  c.  65. 


-35  — 

in  itself,  but  rather  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  knowing  faculty.  Hence  the  object  is  in 
the  knower  not  according  to  its  natural  form 
as  it  exists  in  its  real  being,  but  through  a 
representative  form,  through  a  form  which  the 
Scholastics  called  intentional.  This  represen- 
tative or  intentional  form  was  also  known  to 
them  as  species.  The  species  in  itself,  as  an 
entity,  agrees  in  nature  with  the  power  in 
which  it  is,  in  representing  it  agrees  with  the 
object  it  stands  for.  It  is  sensible  or  intellectual 
(species  sensibilis,  species  intelligibilis )  according 
to  the  knowing  faculty  —  senses  or  intellect. 
"For  sensible  vision  as  well  as  for  intellectual, 
two  things  are  required,  viz.,  the  power  of 
vision  and  the  union  of  the  seen  with  the  one 
who  sees.  For  there  is  no  actual  vision  except 
the  things  seen  be  in  some  way  in  the  one 
seeing."  This  cognitive  assimilation  further 
demands  from  the  object  to  be  known  some 
degree  of  immateriality,  for  the  concept  of 
knowledge  and  the  concept  of  materiality  are 
opposites.4 
This  is  a  brief  statement  of  the  question  of 

3  Ad  visiouem  tarn    sensibilem    quam    intellectualem    duo 
requiruntur ;  scilicet,  virtus  visiva,  et  unio  rei  visae  cum  visu. 
Non  enim    fit    visio    in    actu,   nisi    per    hoc    quod  res    visa 
quodammodo  est  in  vidente.    Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  12,  a.  2. 

4  Ratio    cognitionis    ex    opposito    se    habet    ad    rationem 
niaterialitatis.    De  VerL,  q.  2. 


—  36- 
knowleclge  as  set  forth  by  St.  Thomas.  It  can 
be  reduced  to  three  fundmenial  principles,  that 
we  shall  examine  in  detail,  and  thus  arrive  at  a 
clearer  view  of  the  psychology  of  this  system  and 
the  critical  value  given  it  by  Aquinas. 

These  principles  are:  First,  knowledge  is  the 
result  of  the  union  of  the  subject  and  object; 
second,  the  object  known  is  in  the  knowing  sub- 
ject according  to  the  nature  of  the  knower; 
third,  the  perfection  of  knowledge  is  in  propor- 
tion to  the  immateriality  of  the  knowing  sub- 
ject. In  other  words,  the  essence  of  knowledge 
consists  in  the  intrinsic  presence  of  the  object  in 
the  knower  in  such  a  way  that  the  knower  is 
aware  of  it,  and  this  recognition  is  due  to  an  act 
that  contains  in  itself  the  object  as  a  known 
terminus.  In  knowledge  the  knowing  subject 
and  the  known  object  must  be  one ;  this  unity  is 
attained  by  an  assimilation  based  on  imma- 
teriality. The  words  unity,  assimilation,  imma- 
teriality, comprise  the  whole  question. 

The  truth  of  the  first  principle  is  be}rond  doubt, 
if  we  do  not  seek  to  determine  the  nature  and 
origin  of  this  resemblance  or  assimilation.  It  is  a 
iact  that  we  possess  knowledge,  and  it  is  equally 
clear  that  we  have  not  the  object  according  to 
its  natural  or  physical  being,  for  the  nature  of 
the  knowing  power  forbids  this — hence  there 
must  be  some  means  by  which  the  object  is  made 


—  37  — 

knowable  and  the  union  between  the  knower 
and  the  known  takes  place.  This  assimilation 
or  union  is  of  the  essence  of  knowledge ;  the  ob- 
ject must  be  in  the  knower  in  such  a  way  that  it 
makes  the  subject  know  the  object,  and  this  is 
what  is  meant  by  saying  that  it  is  in  the  knower 
representatively.  There  is  a  two-fold  similitude 
or  likeness :  there  is  one  according  to  the  nature 
of  things  and  there  is  a  representative  one. 
This  latter  ''likeness  of  the  knower  to  the  known 

is  required  for  knowledge."  The  subject  and 
the  object  concur  in  one  common  action — the 

known  object  must  be  present  to  the  knowing 
subject,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  knowing 
subject,  and  the  knowing  subject  by  its  activity 
must  respond  to  the  specific  determination  of  the 
object.6 

The  part  of  the  object  in  this  union  is  to  deter- 
mine the  knowing  faculty  \vhich  of  itself  is 
indifferent  and  indeterminate ; 7  and  this  deter- 


5  This  representative  likeness  is  the  same  as  image,  for  it 
implies  some  imitative  reproduction  of  another  thing,  of  the 
object  to  be  known. 

6  The  unity  of  action  in  knowledge  is  due  to  two  co-prin- 
ciples.    On  the  side  of  the  subject,  there  is  no  complete  act 
without  the  co-operation   of  the   object,   and  the  object  is 
incapable   of  effecting  a  complete  act  without  the   work   of 
the  subject. 

7  Sic  etiam  intellectus,  si  haberet  aliquam  naturam  deter- 
minatam,  ilia    natura    connaturalis    sibi    prohibet    eum    a 
cognitione    aliarum    naturarum.     De  Anima,  1.   3,  lect.    7. 
The  soul  is  quodammodo  omnia. 


-38- 

mination  is  brought  about,  as  noted  above,  by 
some  representative  presence  of  the  object,  which 
the  Scholastics  called  by  the  special  name  of 
species.  This  species  is  synonymous  with  the 
words  forma  and  similitude,  and  is  a  special 
determination  coming  from  the  object  by 
which  the  subject  is  aroused  and  directed 
to  know  the  object  itself.  When  the  mind 
is  not  engaged  in  any  actual  cognition,  it 
is  inactive  and  indetermined ;  the  object  acting 
on  the  mind  determines  the  mind  to  know 
it.  The  element  by  which  the  object  is  in  con- 
nection with  the  subject,  which  is  its  substi- 
tute, is  called  by  the  Scholastics  species  im- 
pressa ;  excited  by  this  determination  the  mind 
acts,  and  the  result  is  given  in  the  species 
expressa  by  \vhich  the  mind  knows  the  object. 

This  word  species  is  of  constant  occurrence  in 
the  Scholastic  theorj^  of  knowledge,  so  an  under- 
standing of  it  will  obviate  misinterpretations, 
and  will  likewise  simplify  the  problem  as  pre- 
sented in  these  terms.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say  that  the  word  species  has  no  community  of 
doctrine  with  the  floating  images  of  Democritus 
and  Epicurus  which  Aristotle  rejected,  and  which 
is  not  to  be  found  in  the  best  Scholastic  writ- 


—  39- 

ings.8  The  true  meaning  is  simply  this :  the  mind 
is  affected  or  modified  by  objects  acting  on  the 
knowing  power,  sense-organ  or  intellect.  The 
mind  is  in  a  peculiar  attitude  or  modified  to  per- 
ceive an  object,  The  species  has  no  independent 
existence,  but  is  bound  up  with  the  state  or  con- 
dition of  the  mind  viewed  at  the  time  of  cogni- 
tion ;  it  is  due  to  the  action  of  objects  on  sense- 
organs  or  intellect.  There  are  no  pre-existing 
species,  for  the  "  knowing  soul  is  in  potentia  to 
the  species  which  are  the  principles  of  sensation, 
as  well  as  to  the  species  which  are  the  principles 
of  intellection... In  the  beginning,  it  is  in  potentia 
to  all  the  species  by  which  it  understands."9  It 
is  the  condition  by  which  activity-sensory  and 

8  Though  so   recent  an  article  as  that  of  Dr.  Lindsay,  al- 
ready referred  to,  has  the  following  misconception  of  species : 
"Both  Thomas  and  Duns  Scotus  held,  each  in  his  own  way, 
to  the  doctrine  of  intelligible  species,  by  which  a  copy  of  the 
object  was  supposed,  in  the  process  of  knowledge,  to   arise 
and  be  seen  by  the  soul."     "In  their  doctrine  of  the  "species 
intelligibiles"  the  two  "Realists,"  Thomas  and  Duns  Scotus, 
had   alike  followed,  through  some  variations,  the  old  Greek 
idea,  that  in  the  knowing  process,  by  means  of  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  soul  and  the  external  object,  a  copy  of  the  latter 
arises,   which  is  then  apprehended  and  beheld  by  the  soul." 
Windeband,  A  Hist,  of  Phil.  p.  325.    This  thought  is  quoted 
by  Ladd  in  a  note  of  his  Phil,  of  Knowledge,  p.  53. 

9  Anima  cognoscitiva  sit  in  potentia  tarn  ad  similitudines 
quae  sunt  principia  sentiendi,   quam  ad  similitudines  quae 
sunt  principia  intelligendi.  .  .  Est  in  principio  in  potentia  ad 
hujusmodi  species  omnes.    Sum,  TheoL,  I.  q.  84,  a  3. 


—  40- 

intellectual,  is  actualized.  The  intellect  is  act- 
ually intelligent  through  the  intelligible  species, 
as  the  sense  is  actual  through  the  sensible 
species.10  "  The  intelligible  species  is  the  formal 
principle  of  intellectual  operation,  as  the  form  of 
any  agent  is  the  form  of  its  specific  operation." 
Through  it  the  object  becomes  known.  The 
mind  does  not  perceive  it  primarily,  but  it  is  the 
means  of  perception — "that  which  is  understood 
is  the  very  concept  of  things  existing  outside  the 
mind."11  It  is  the  object  that  is  understood,  but 
by  means  of  the  species.  "The  intelligible  species 
is  not  that  which  is  understood  but  that  b}^ 
which  the  intellect  understands."  The  object 
is  not  inferred  from  the  species,  as  though  it  were 
an  intermediate  representation,  but  the  species  is 
simply  the  means  that  brings  about  the  union  of 
subject  and  object  resulting  in  knowledge. 

The  species  expressa  was  sometimes  called 
intentio.  Very  often  this  word  was  made  an 
adjective--intentionalis--in  conjunction  with 
species.  This  intentio  in  us  is  "neither  the  thing 
itself  which  is  understood,  nor  is  it  the  very 

10  Species  intelligibilis  se  habet  ad  intellectual  sicut  species 
sensibilis  ad  sensum.     Ibid.,   2.  85,  a  2.     There  is  a  parallel 
between  both  species. 

11  Id  vero  quod  intelligitur  est  ipsa  ratio  rerum  existentium 
extra  anitnam.     C.  G.,  1.  2,  c.  75. 

12  Species  intelligibilis   mm  est  id  quod  intelligitur,  sed  id 
quo  intelligit  intellectus.    Sum.   TheoL,  I.  q.  85,  a.  2. 


-41- 

substance  of  the  intellect,  but  it  is  a  certain  like- 
ness conceived  in  the  intellect  of  the  thing  that 
is  understood."  It  was  also  known  in  intel- 
lectual knowledge  as  verbum  mentale.  It  is  the 
terminus  of  the  intellectual  activity  aroused  by 
the  intelligible  species.  This  word  intentional 
was  used  to  show  in  what  way  the  object  was 
present  to  the  knowing  subject,  to  show  the 
nature  of  the  resemblance  between  the  knower 
and  the  known.  It  offsets  the  view  that  the 
object  is  present  in  knowledge  in  its  real  and 
physical  being;  it  is  present  really,  but  not  ac- 
cording to  the  condition  in  which  it  is  found  in 
nature.  This  leads  us  to  our  second  principle: 
The  object  known  is  in  the  knower  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  knower. 

We  have  now  seen  the  meaning  of  the  word 
species,  and  its  fundamental  importance  in  the 
Scholastic  system.  The  first  principle  gives  the 
nature  of  the  species  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  object,  as  representative  of  the  object;  the 
second  princple  views  the  nature  of  the  species 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  subject,  as  it  exists  in 
the  knower.  It  exists  in  the  knower  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  knower. 

The  second   principle  strictly   taken  is  but   a 

13  Quae  quidem  in  nobis  neque  est  ipsa  res  quae  intelligitur 
neque  est  ipsa  substantia  intellectus,  sed  est  quaedam  simili- 
tudo  concepta  intellectu  de  re  intellecta.  C.  G.,  1.  4,  c.  11. 


-42- 

corollary  of  the  first  rightly  understood,  for  if 
knowledge  is  but  the  union  of  the  subject  and 
the  object,  both  must  be  of  the  same  nature  or 
reduced  to  it  before  the  union  can  be  effected. 
"All  knowledge  is  according  to  some  form, 
which  is  the  principle  of  knowledge  in  the 
knower.  This  form  or  species  can  be  viewed 
in  a  twofold  light :  in  its  relation  to  the  know- 
ing subject,  and  also  in  its  relation  to  the  object 
whose  likeness  it  is.  In  the  former  it  arouses 
the  knowing  faculty  to  cognitive  activity,  and 
in  the  latter  it  points  out  a  definite  object  of 
knowledge.  Hence  the  manner  of  knowing  a 
thing  is  according  to  the  condition  of  the 
knower,  in  whom  the  form  is  received  according 
to  his  nature.  But  it  is  not  necessarv  that  the 

t* 

thing  known  exist  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  knower  or  according  to  that  manner  by 
which  the  form,  which  is  the  principle  of  know- 
ing, has  existence  in  the  knower.'1  The  manner 
of  knowing  must  be  that  of  the  knower,  but 

14  Omnis  cognitio  est  secundum  aliquam  formam,  quae  est 
in  cognoscente  principium  cognitioois.  Forma  autem 
hujusmodi  potest  considerari  dupliciter:  uno  modo  secun- 
dum esse,  quod  hahet  in  cognoscente,  alio  modo  secundum 
respectum  quern  habet  ad  rem,  cujus  est  similitude.  Secun- 
dum quidem  primum  respectum  tacit  cognoscentem  actu 
cognoscere ;  sed  secundum  secundum  respectum  determinat 
cognitionem  ad  aliquod  cognoscibile  determinatum.  Et  ideo 
modus  cognoscendi  rem  aliquam  est  secundum  conditionem 
cognoscentis,  in  quo  forma  recipitur  secundum  modum  ejus. 
Non  autem  oportet  ut  res  cognita  sit  quae  est  cognoscendi 
principium,  habet  esse  in  cognoscente.  De  Veri.,  q.  10,  a.  4. 


-43- 

the  thing  itself  in  rerum  natura  need  not  be  one 
with  this  mode,  for  knowledge  is  not  "by  means 
of  identity,  but  by  means  of  a  certain  represen- 
tation ;  whence  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
nature  of  the  knower  and  the  known  be  the 
same."  This  conformity  of  the  subject  and 
object  is  "not  a  likeness  of  conformity  in  nature 
but  a  likeness  of  representation  only,  as  we 
are  reminded  of  some  man  through  a  golden 
statue."16  In  fact,  "the  perfection  of  knowl- 
edge consists  in  this,  that  the  thing  be  known 
to  exist  in  that  nature  in  which  it  is,  and  not 
that  the  nature  of  the  thing  known  be  in  the 
knower." 

The  truth  of  this  principle  is  emphasized 
indirectly  or  negatively  by  St.  Thomas  when 
he  criticises  the  views  of  those  who  went  astray 
on  this  point.  Some  of  the  ancient  philosophers 
misapplied  the  axiom — "like  is  known  by  like" 
and  landed  in  a  position  the  extreme  opposite 
of  that  held  bv  Plato.  They  understood  this 

V*  •/ 

principle  to  mean  that  the  "soul  which  knows 
all  things  is  naturally  made  up  of  all :  earth 

15  De  Veri.,  q.  2,  a.  5,  ad  7. 

16  Ad  cognitionem  non  requiritur  similitude   conformitatis 
in  natura,  sed  similitude  repraesentationis  tantum ;  sicut  per 
statuam  auream  ducitur  in  cognitionem  hominis.    De  Veri., 
q.  2,  a.  5,  ad  5. 

17  Ibid.,  ad  6. 


-44- 

that  it  may  know  earth,  fire  to  know  fire,  and 
so  of  the  rest."  This  of  course  would  make 
the  soul  corporeal,  since  it  knows  corporeal 
things ;  in  fact,  it  would  make  it  a  compound 
of  all  things  since  it  can  know  all  things,  and 
not  only  made  up  of  the  elements  these  philoso- 
phers considered  as  contained  in  their  first 
matter.  If  their  interpretation  of  this  principle 
were  true,  then  the  possibility  and  diversity  of 
knowledge  would  be  at  an  end. 

St.  Thomas  likewise  sets  aside  the  theory  of 
Plato  regarding  this  principle.  "Plato",  he 
says,  "seems  to  deviate  from  the  truth  in  this 
matter,  for  since  he  considered  all  knowledge 
to  take  place  by  means  of  likeness,  he  believed 
that  the  form  of  the  known  is  of  necessity  in 
the  knower  in  that  manner  in  which  it  is  in 
the  known.''  This  led  Plato  to  conceive  the 
independent  reality  of  general  concepts  to  bring 
about  the  requisite  conditions  for  knowledge  as 
they  appeared  to  him ;  ideas  and  not  corporeal 
things  would  be  the  object  of  our  intellectual 
representations,  according  to  Plato.  This  theory 
results  in  an  arbitrary  knowledge,  neglecting 

J8//?/<7.,  a.  2. 

19  Videtur  autem  in  hoc  Plato  deviare  a  veritate,  quia  cum 
acstimaret  0111110111  cognitionem  per  inodum  alicujus  simili- 
tudinis  cssc  crrdidit,  quod  forma  co^tiiti  ex  necessitate  sit 
similitudinis  csse  modo,  quo  est  in  cognito.  Sum.  TheoL, 
q.  84,  a.  1. 


-45- 

things   as  they   are  and   failing  to  account  for 
our  knowledge  of  corporeal  things. 

St.  Thomas  rejected  these  two  views  because 
they  did  not  accord  with  what  he  conceived  to 
be  the  basis  of  conformity  between  object  and 
subject.  His  critical  spirit  is  shown  by  his  put- 
ting aside  the  Naturphilosophen  and  Plato, 
and  embracing  a  principle  contained  in  the 
book  De  Causis:  That  everything  received 
is  received  according  to  the  nature  of  the  re- 
ceiver.20 This  principle  is  important  for  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  embracing  as  it  does  our 
second  principle.  We  know  the  object  directly, 
as  noted  before,  and  the  object  also  has  the 
prior  activity  in  knowledge,  yet  it  must  adapt 
itself  to  the  conditions  of  the  knowing  power. 
Subject  and  object  must  be  so  intimately  con- 
nected as  to  form  one  sole  principle  of  knowledge 
according  to  the  axiom:  Ab  utroque  notitia  pari- 
tur  a  cognoscente  et  cognito.  In  this  union  the 
object  conies  under  the  conditions  of  the  know- 
ing power,  for  the  object  is  knowable  only  when 
it  has  entered  the  field  of  consciousness  by  being 
assimilated  by  the  subject.21  This  assimilation 

20  Omne  quod  recipitur  in  aliquo,  est  in  eo  per  modum  re- 
cipientis.    De  Causis  is  a  work  of  Proclus  the  Platonist. 

21  This  assimilation  is  a  vital  assimilation.    In  the  cognitive 
life  there  is  exactly  the  same  process  of  assimilation  as  in  the 
organic   life,  the  process   of  nutrition ;  it  is  but  a  special  and 
higher  degree  of  assimilation. 


-46- 

makes  it  an  integral  part  of  the  knowing  power, 
and  thus  a  partaker  of  its  nature.  The  subject 
also  is  modified  by  the  object  to  the  extent,  that 
it  is  knowing  under  this  condition  and  for  this 
object.  From  the  psychological  point  of  view 
this  principle  presents  no  great  difficulties,  but 
it  is  important  in  the  question  of  the  objectivity 
of  knowledge. 

The  third  principle  flows  easily  from  the  two 
preceding.  If  knowledge  depends  on  the  assimi- 
lative union  of  object  and  subject,  and  if  the 
object  is  known  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
knower,  it  follows  readily  that  the  knowableness 
of  the  object  depends  on  its  immateriality.  The 
concept  of  knowledge  and  the  concept  of  materi- 
ality are  opposites";  "the  more  immaterial 
things  are,  the  more  knowable  they  are."  'This 
principle  or  axiom  is  very  important;  in  a  way, 
it  underlies  the  whole  question  ol  knowledge,  it  is 
the  condition  that  makes  a  thing  knowable,  and 
makes  knowledge  the  possession  of  a  particular 
class  of  beings.  Immateriality,  in  general,  is  the 
capacity  a  thing  has  to  be  itself  and  to  become 
something  else.  In  knowledge,  the  object  must 
be  immaterial  in  itself  or  else  immaterialized,  and 
the  subject  must  be  immaterial — the  object  is 
assimilated  and  the  subject  assimilates.  This 

22  Secundum    ordinem    immuteriulitatis  in  rebus,  secundum 
hoc  in  eis  natura  cognitionis  itivenitur.     De  Wr/.,  q.  2,  a.  2. 


—  47- 

double  aspect  is  brought  out  clearly  by  St. 
Thomas  —  immateriality  on  the  part  of  object 
and  subject.  The  distinction  between  a  knowing 
being  and  one  that  does  not  know  is  based  on 
immateriality.  The  non-knowing  has  simply  the 
one  form  of  its  own  being,  whereas  the  knowing 
is  capable  of  receiving  the  form  of  another  thing, 
for  the  species  or  form  of  the  known  is  in  the  one 
knowing.  The  non-knowing  can  be  assimilated 
but  cannot  assimilate;  the  knowing  has  the 
power  to  assimilate  and  thus  become  more  and 
more.  Hence  the  nature  of  the  non-knowing  is 
more  restricted  and  limited,  whereas  the  know- 
ing has  greater  amplitude  and  extension.  It  is 
for  this  reason  Aristotle  said  the  soul  is  quodam- 
modo  omnia.  It  is  because  of  the  universality  of 
the  knowing  power,  that  matter,  which  is  the 
principle  of  individuation  and  restricts  the  form 
to  one  condition  or  result,  cannot  be  admitted 
into  it;  rather  in  proportion  to  the  absence  of 
materiality  will  the  knowledge  be  the  freer  and 
more  perfect.23  If  the  soul  were  naturally  deter- 
mined in  one  direction,  to  one  set  of  activities, 
all  its  operations  would  be  influenced  by  this 
specific  bent,  just  as  all  things  taste  bitter  to  an 
unhealthy  tongue.  The  soul  must  then  be  capa- 

23  Quanto  autem  aliquid  immaterialius  habet  formam  rei 
cognitae,  tanto  perfectius  cognoscit.  Sum.  TheoL,  I.,  q.  84, 
a.  2. 


-48- 

ble  of  adjusting  itself  to  receive  the  various 
cognitions  we  know  it  actually  possesses,  it 
must  have  in  its  nature  none  of  those  things  it 
seeks  to  know  and  can  know."4 

St.  Thomas  has  knowledge  graded  on  the  scale 
of  immateriality— the  knowableness  of  the  object 
and  the  knowing  capacity  of  the  subject  rest  on 
the  same  basis.  A  thing  is  knowable  in  propor- 
tion to  its  immateriality,  and  a  subject  knows  in 
proportion  to  the  extent  of  the  immateriality 
of  its  nature.  There  is  a  passage  in  the  Summa 
Theologica,  Part  I,  q.  84,  a.  2,  that  brings 
out  this  fact  clearly.  Knowledge  is  per 
formam,  and  its  concept  is  the  opposite  of 
the  concept  of  materiality.  When  forms  exist 
materially  only- -immersed  in  matter  —  there  is 
no  power  of  knowledge,  as  is  the  case  in 
plants;  but  in  proportion  as  the  form  of  the 
thing  is  possessed  more  immaterially,  the  more 
perfect  is  the  knowledge.  Thus  the  intellect 
which  has  the  form  of  the  object  freed  from 
matter  and  all  individuating  conditions  is  more 
cognoscitive  than  the  senses  which  possess  the 
form,  without  matter  it  is  true,  yet  with  mate- 
rial conditions.  Even  among  the  senses  them- 
selves this  principle  is  verified,  for  vision  is  the 

>24  Quod  autem  potest  cognoscere  nliquu,  oportet  ut  nihil 
eorum  habeat  in  sua  natura,  quiu  illud  quod  int-sset  ei  natur- 
aliter,  irupediret  cognitionem  aliorum.  Ibid.,  q.  75,  a.  2. 


-49- 

most  cognoscitive  because  it  is  the  least  mate- 
rial ;  likewise  among  concepts  the  degree  of 
immateriality  regulates  the  degree  of  perfection. 
There  is  no  break  in  the  application  of  this 
axiom,  it  leads  straight  up  to  the  highest  know- 
able  and  the  most  perfectly  knowing  —  God  Him- 
self. The  idea  of  immateriality  as  here  under- 
stood, contains  the  idea  of  activity  ;  potentia 
and  matter  are  pratically  one  and  are  the  op- 
posites  of  immateriality  and  actuality.25  In  God 
there  is  an  utter  absence  of  potentia  and  matter, 
He  is  characterized  by  the  possession  of  their 
contraries,  and  thus  he  is  especially  knowable 
and  knowing.  "Since  God,  therefore,  is  the 
opposite  extreme  of  matter,  since  He  is  entirely 
immune  from  all  potentiality,  it  follows  that  He 
is  especially  knowable  and  especially  know- 
ing."26 
There  are  objects  that  are  immaterial  in 


25  St.  Thomas  uses  the  phrase,  non  enim  cognoscitur  ali- 
quid  secundurn  quod  in  potentia  est,  sed  secundum  quod  est 
in  actu,  very  frequently.  He  uses  this  quality  of  actuality 
as  a  proof  for  the  immateriality^  of  the  soul.  "The  species  of 
material  things  as  they  are  in  themselves  are  not  intelligible 
actu,  because  they  are  in  matter.  But  as  they  are  in  the 
intellective  human  soul  they  are  intelligible  actu."  Quodlibe- 
tum  3,  a.  20. 

^  Quia  Deus  est  in  fine  separations  a  materia,  cum    ab 

omni  potentialitate  sit  penitus  immunis,  relinquitur,   quod 

ipse  est  maxime  cognoscitivus  et   maxime  cognoscibilis.    De 
Veri.,  q.  2,  a.  2. 


-5o- 

thcmselves  and  are  knowable  so  far  as  they 
are  concerned,  and  there  are  objects  that  do 
not  possess  this  quality  but  must  be  brought 
to  this  condition  before  they  are  propria  of  the 
mind.  God,  the  spirit  \vorld--including  Angels 
and  the  souls  of  men,  our  own  thoughts  and  the 
thoughts  of  others  as  thoughts,  come  under  the 
first  class ;  the  second  class  embraces  what  we 
ordinarily  understand  by  material  objects.  We 
shall  take  up  the  question  of  God  shortly. 
That  Angels  come  under  this  term  is  evident  to 
all  who  accept  the  doctrine  about  Angels - 
"some  essences  are  sine  materia  as  separated 
substances  which  we  call  Angels."  The  mind 
knows  itself,  and  the  content  of  the  mind 
together  with  the  mind  itself  is  immaterial. 
From  the  fact  that  we  perceive  ourselves  to 
understand  we  know  that  we  have  an  intel- 
lectual soul,  but  to  understand  the  nature  of 
this  soul  there  is  need  of  a  careful  consideration 
-a  subtilis  inquisitio.  In  this  latter  quest  many 
have  erred  through  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
principle --like  is  known  by  like.  They  perceived 
that  they  had  a  knowledge  of  material  things 
and  at  once  concluded  that  these  objects  were 
present  to  the  soul  materially,  not  recognizing 
that  the  concepts  of  knowledge  and  immaterial- 

27  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  87,  a.  1,  ad  3. 


ity  are  opposites.  Plato,  as  St.  Thomas  notes, 
rightly  conceived  the  soul  to  be  immaterial  and 
its  knowledge  to  be  likewise  immaterial,  but 
his  explanation  of  this  truth  was  not  satis- 
factory. He  introduced  unnecessary  elements 
to  account  for  this  doctrine;  he  did  not  give 
the  intellect  the  power  to  render  a  material 
object  immaterial,  but  held  there  were  imma- 
terial ideas  independent  of  the  object,  and  that 
it  was  these  ideas  or  forms  the  mind  knew. 
This  theory  is  unlike  that  of  St.  Thomas,  who 
says,  "everything  intelligible  is  immune  from 
matter  in  se,  or  is  abstracted  from  matter  by 
the  operation  of  the  intellect,"28  yet  it  is  the 
actual  recognition  of  immateriality  as  a 
requisite  for  knowableness. 

The  knowledge  the  soul  has  of  itself  empha- 
sizes further  this  requisite  of  immaterialit}'. 
St.  Thomas  holds  that  we  have  a  two -fold 
knowledge  of  the  soul  —  an  actual  and  habitual 
one.  We  can  simply  know  of  its  existence,  and 
we  can  also  know  of  its  nature  —  two  distinct 
points,  "for  many  know  they  have  a  soul  who 
do  not  know  what  the  soul  is,"29  do  not  know 
its  nature.  The  soul  becomes  aware  of  itself 
through  its  acts — "one  perceives  that  he  has 
a  soul,  and  lives,  and  is,  because  he  perceives 


28  De  Yen'.,  q.  13,  a.  3. 
™Ibid.,q.  10,  a.  9. 


—  52  — 

himself  to  feel  and  understand  and  to  exercise 
the  other  functions  of  a  life  of  this  nature."  This 
reveals  its  existence;  "what  the  nature  of  the 
mind  itself  is,  the  mind  can  only  perceive  from 
a  consideration  of  its  object."  From  a  knowl- 
edge of  its  object,  the  soul  conies  to  know  its 
own  nature.  "Our  mind  can  not  so  understand 
itself  that  it  can  immediately  apprehend  itself, 
but  from  apprehending  other  things  it  comes 
to  a  knowledge  of  itself.  .  .  From  the  fact  that 
the  human  soul  knows  the  universal  natures  of 
things,  it  perceives  that  the  species  by  which 
\ve  understand  is  immaterial ;  otherwise  it 
would  be  individualized  and  thus  never  lead 
to  a  knowledge  of  the  universal."  The  soul 

30  Aliquis  percipit  se  animam  habere  et  vivere  et  esse,  quod 
percipit  se  sentire  et  intelligere  et  alia  hujusraodi  vitae  opera 
exercere.  De  Veri.,  q.  10,  a.  8. 

1  //>/,/.,  q.  10,  a.  8,  ad  1. 

St.  Thomas  appreciated  the  difficulty  of  arriving  at  a 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  "  Each  one  experiences 
in  himself  that  he  has  a  soul  and  that  the  acts  of  the  soul 
take  place  within  him,  but  to  know  the  nature  of  the  soul  is 
most  difficult."  /v  I'r/-/'.,  q.  10,  a.  8  ad  8.  The  same 
applies  to  our  knowledge  ot  the  nature  of  God. 

*  Unde  mens  nostra  11011  potest  se  ipsani  intelligere,  ita 
(juod  se  ipsam  immediate  apprehendat ;  sed  ex  hoc  quod  ap- 
prehendit  alia,  devenit  in  suam  cognitionem.  .  .  Kx  hoc  enim 
quod  species  qua  intelligimus  est  immaterialis;  alias  estset 
individtiata,  et  sic  non  duceret  in  cognitionem  universalis. 
De  Veri.,  q.  10,  a.  8. 


r*  >>    _ 

53 

knows  the  universal,  the  proper  object  of  the 
intellect  is  the  essence  of  material  things,  this 
essence  is  immaterial,  and  the  soul  perceiving 
this  immaterial  essence  recognizes  its  own 
immaterial  nature,  for  operation  follows  being, 
the  act  is  in  accord  with  its  source. 

The  idea  running  through  these  principles  is 
-knowledge  is  a  vital  act,  an  assimilation  of 
subject  and  object.  The  degree  of  activity  regu- 
lates the  degree  of  knowledge,  of  perfection;  this 
goes  on  without  a  break  until  \ve  reach  the  most 
perfect  knowledge  in  God.  Before  we  consider 
the  know^ableness  of  God,  we  must  outline  the 
factors  involved  in  the  activity  of  intellectual 

»/ 

knowledge  in  man.  There  is,  therefore,  a  per- 
fect and  supreme  grade  of  life,  that  of  the  intel- 
lect, for  the  intellect  reflects  upon  itself  and 
knowrs  itself."  The  human  intellect  though  it 
can  know  itself,  begins  its  knowledge  with 
external  things ;  it  is  inferior  to  the  Angelic  and 
Divine  Intellects,  but  leads  to  a  knowledge  of 
them. 


33  Est  igitur  supremus  et  perfectus  gradus  vitae,  qui  est 
secundum  intellectum ;  nam  intellectus  in  seipsum  reflectitur, 
et  seipsum  intelligere  potest.  C.  G.,  1.  4,  c.  11. 


—  54- 

SECTION   II. — THEORY   OF  INTELLECTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  knowledge  in  man 
arising  from  two  sets  of  cognitive  activity — the 
sensorv  and  the  intellectual.1  The  latter  is  of 

mJ 

especial  importance  in  arriving  at  a  knowledge 
ol  God,  so  we  shall  present  the  stages  of  intel- 
lectual knowledge  as  found  in  St.  Thomas. 

The  human  intellect  is  primarily  and  directly 
concerned  with  being  in  its  widest  acceptation. 
More  specificiall}7,  it  is  busied  with  the  essence  of 
material  things,  the  universal.  This  essence  as 
it  exists  in  material  things  is  not  in  an  imme- 
diate condition  to  be  known,  so  there  is  a  power, 
an  intellectual  activity,  required  to  make  it 
actually  knowable  or  intelligible.  This  power 
is  the  active  intellect,  which  b}^  its  abstractive 
power  immaterializes  the  corporeal  object  and 
brings  to  light  the  intelligible  species.  This 
species  is  the  likeness  of  the  object  in  its  specific 
nature;  it  makes  the  object  actually  intelligible 
and  determines  the  intellect  proper  to  know. 
This  summary  statement  can  now  be  viewed 
in  its  parts. 

"What  is  primarily  and  per  se>  known  by  a 

1  Homo  cognoscit  diversis  viribus  COgnoscitivis  omnia 
rerum  genera,  intellectu  quidem  univcrsalia  et  immaterialia, 
sensu  singularia  et  corporalia.  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  57,  a.  2. 


55 

cognitive  power  is  its  proper  object."  "But 
being  is  primarily  in  the  conception  of  the 
intellect,  for  everything  is  knowable  in  so  far 
as  it  is  actual.  .  .  Whence  being  is  the  proper 
object  of  the  intellect,  and  thus  it  is  the  first 
intelligible  as  sound  is  the  first  audible."  Being 
is  here  taken  for  actual  and  possible  existence, 
11  it  comprehends  all  the  differences  and  possible 
species  of  being,  for  whatever  can  exist  can  be 
understood."  As  we  are  now  constituted  we 
are  not  concerned  with  all  being  directly,  but 
with  being  as  found  in  material  things.  "The 
first  object  of  our  intellect  in  our  present  exist- 
ence is  not  being  and  true  of  any  sort,  but 
being  and  true  viewed  in  material  things, 
through  which  we  come  to  a  knowledge  of 
all  other  things."  This  passage  contains  the 


2  Id  quod  est  primo  et  per  se  cognitum  a  virtute  cognosci- 
tiva  est  proprium  ejus  objectum.    Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  85,  a.  7. 

3  Primo    autem    in    conceptione    intellectus  est    ens :   quia 
secundum  hoc  unumquodque  cognoscibile  est,   in  quantum 
est  actu.  .  .  Unde  ens  est  proprium  objectum  intellectus ;  et 
sic  est  primum  intelligibile  sicut  sonus  est  primum  audibile. 
Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  5,  a.  2. 

4  Est  enim  proprium  objectum  intellectus  ens  intelligibile, 
quod    quidem    comprehendit    omnes    differentias    et    species 
entis  possibililis  ;  quidquid  esse  potest  intelligi  potest.     C.  G., 
1,  2.  c.  98. 

5  Nee  primum   objectum  intellectus  nostri  secundum  prae- 
sentem  statum  est  quodlibet  ens  et  verum,  sed  ens  et  verum 
consideratum    in    rebus    materialibus,    ex  quibus    in  cogni- 
tionem    omnium    aliorum    devenit.    Sum.    Theol.,   I,   q.  87, 
a.  3  ad  1. 


-56- 

fundamental  and  oft-repeated  truth  that  we 
start  from  material  things  as  a  basis  and 
rise  gradually  to  our  most  immaterial  and 
metaphysical  concepts.*1 

The  specific  or  connatural  object  of  the 
intellect  is  then  the  essence  of  material  things. 
Through  the  intellect  it  is  connatural  to  us 
to  know  natures  that  exist  only  in  individual 
matter,  but  not  as  they  are  in  individual 
matter  but  as  they  are  abstracted  from  it  by 
intellectual  consideration.  Thus  the  intellect 
enables  us  to  know  things  of  this  nature  as 
universal.  And  this  is  beyond  the  po\ver  of  the 
senses."  The  intellect  deals  with  the  universal 
which,  however,  is  found  in  sensible  objects, 
and  this  power  makes  it  superior  to  the  senses. 
'Sensitive  cognition  is  occupied  with  external, 
sensible  qualities,  but  intellectual  knowledge 


6  Proprium    autetn    intellcctus    cst    quidquid    est  in    sub- 
stantia  rci.  Igitur  quidquid  intellcctus  de  aliqua  re  cognoseit, 
cognoscit  per  cognitionem  substantiae  illius  rei.  .  .  Cognitio 
intellectus   oritur  a  sensu.  .  .  Quidquid  igitur  est  in  re,  quod 
non   potest  cognosci   per  eognitionem  substantiae  ejus,  op- 
ortet  esse  intellcetm  ignotum.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  56. 

7  Unde  per   intellectum  connaturale  est    nobis  cognoscere 
naturas    quae    quidem    non    habent    esse    nisi    in     tnateria 
individuali;     non    tatnen    secundum   quod  sunt    in   materia 
individual;    serl    secundum    quod    abstrahuntur  ab  ea   per 
considerationem    intellcctus.      Unde    secundum    intellectum 
possumus  cognoscere  hujusmodi  res  in  universal!;   quod  est 
supra  facultatem  scnsus.     Sum.   TheoL,  I,  q.  12,  a.  4. 


-57- 

penetrates  to  the  very  essence  of  the  thing,  for 
the  object  of  the  intellect  is  the  quiddity  of  a 
thing."  "The  proper  object  proportioned  to 
our  intellect  is  the  nature  of  a  sensible  thing." 
This  principle  rests  upon  the  very  nature  of 
man,  his  relation  to  matter.  The  knowable 
object  is  proportionate  to  the  knowing  power. 
This  power  varies  according  to  its  connection 
with  matter.  Man  makes  use  of  a  bodily  organ 
in  knowing,  thus  he  knows  matter,  but  only 
what  is  essential  to  it  reaches  his  intellect  as 
its  proper  concept.  Essence  is  intelligible  for  us 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  actualized,  and  it  is 
actualized  only  in  material  things.  Our  mind 
has  a  natural  tendency  to  know  the  intelligible 
essence,  but  it  reaches  it  only  through  sensuous 
images.  "Operation  is  proportioned  to  power 
and  essence,  but  the  intellectual  in  man  rests 
on  the  sensitive,  and  thence  its  proper  operation 
is  to  understand  the  intelligible  in  the  phantas- 
mata  (images)." 

8  Cognitio  sensitiva  occupatur  circa  qualitates  seusibiles 
exterioris,   cognitio   autem    intellectiva    penetrat    usque    ad 
essentiam  rei ;    objectum  enim  iutellectus  est  quod  quid  est. 
Sum.  TheoL,  22%  q.  8.  a.  1. 

9  Proprium  objectum    intellectui    nostro  proportionatum, 
est  natura  rei  sensibilis.     Ibid.,  I,  q.  84,  a.  7. 

10  Operatio    proportionatur    virtuti  et  essentiae ;    intellec- 
tivum   autem   hominis  est   in  sensitive  et  ideo   propria  ejus 
est  intelligere  intelligibilia  in  phantasmatibus.     De  Memoria 
et  Reminiscentia,  lect.  4.' 


-58- 

How  is  the  mind  to  get  at  the  universal,  the 
intelligible  in  things,  for  this  is  its  object. 
This  question  is  answered  by  the  theory  of 
abstraction.  The  mind  possesses  a  power 
called  active  intellect  by  which  it  brings  in 
evidence  the  universal  or  the  intelligible  in  the 
thing  considered.  The  existence  of  such  a 
power,  its  relation  to  what  is  called  the  passive 
intellect,  its  function,  and  the  result  of  its  opera- 
tion, are  all  clearly  set  forth  by  St.  Thomas. 

Nothing  is  changed  from  the  potential  to  the 
actual  save  through  something  that  is  actual. 
Intelligibility  requires  the  object  to  be  actual, 
individualizing  matter  is  opposed  to  this  know- 
ableness,  thus  there  must  be  an  activit}r  in  the 
mind  to  dra\v  from  material  things  the  essence 
they  contain.  This  is  the  active  intellect.  If 
universals  had  an  existence  independent  of 
matter,  as  Plato  held,  then  this  power  would 
be  unnecessary,  for  its  sole  purpose  is  to  make 
actually  intelligible  the  universal  existing  in 
material  things.  This  power  is  then  dependent 
on  the  doctrine  that  universals  have  a  funda- 
mentum  in  re,  in  things  themselves,  and  must 
be  abstracted  before  they  can  become  propria 
of  the  mind.  This  power  is  so  necessary  that 
"without  it  man  can  understand  nothing."  Yet 


11  De  Yen'.,  q.  1,  a.  1  ad  3. 


-59- 

it  is  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  constitute 
\vhat  we  might  call  a  distinct  mind ;  it  is  rather 
closely  associated  with  the  passive  intellect. 
The  latter  is  the  intellectual  faculty  proper - 
"the  passive  intellect  is  that  by  which  man 
formally  understands/112 — the  former  is  intel- 
lectual activity.  They  are  distinct  in  the  sense 
that  we  can  ascribe  different  operations  to 
them,  but  not  in  the  sense  of  radical  separation 
and  totally  independent  action.  "In  every  act 
by  which  man  understands,  there  is  the  con- 
current operation  of  both  active  and  passive 
intellects."13 

The  basis  for  the  distinction  between  these 
two  powers  rests  on  the  relation  of  potency 
and  act  in  general.14  The  mind  is  viewed  as  a 
passive  power,  immaterial  and  destined  to  know 

12  De  Anima,  1.  3,  lect  7. 

15  In  omni  actu  quo  homo  intelligit,  concurrit  operatic 
intellectus  agentis  et  intellectus  possibilis  De  Mente,  a.  8, 
ad  11.  Ladd's  statement  that  the  power  that  apprehends 
the  universal  is  an  "intellective  soul"  is  incorrect,  and  leads 
him  to  the  following  misconception:  "This  results  in  a 
division  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul,  which  is  wholh'  incon- 
sistent with  his  (Aquinas')  maintenance  elsewhere  of  the 
true  view  of  the  soul  as  one,  but  gifted  with  diverse 
energies."  Phil,  of  Knowledge,  p.  53.  St.  Thomas  never 
abandons  the  "true  view  of  the  soul  as  one,  but  gifted 
with  diverse  energies." 

14  "The  active  and  passive  intellects  are  diverse  powers, 
as  in  all  things  there  is  an  active  and  passive  power."  Sum. 
Theol.,  I,  q.  79,  a.  10.  This  is  the  fundamental  thought 
in  the  Faculty  Theory  of  the  Scholastics ;  the  principle  itself 
is  very  extensive,  operating  throughout  their  whole  system. 


—  6o  — 

the  intelligible,  which  must  be  immaterial  and 
intelligible  actu  before  it  is  an  object  of  intel- 
lectual knowledge,  "but  the  intelligible  actu  is 
not  something  existing  in  rerum  natura,"  5  hence 
there  is  need  of  an  active  power  in  the  mind  to 
bring  about  this  intelligibility  and  actually 
account  for  the  knowledge  we  possess.  The 
act  of  the  passive  intellect  is  to  receive  the 
intelligible,  the  action  or  the  active  intellect  is 
to  abstract  the  intelligible."  In  discussing 
the  general  principles  of  knowledge,  we  saw 
that  there  was  both  passivity  and  activity 
in  the  operation  of  knowing,  that  both  subject 
and  object  played  a  part  in  effecting  knowledge. 
Here  we  have  the  object  in  the  phantasma  or 
imagination  acted  upon  by  the  active  intellect 
and  the  result  admitted  by  the  passive  intellect, 
as  the  intelligible  in  things.  "  The  active  intellect 
is  a  certain  power  of  the  soul  extending  itself 
actively  to  the  same  things  to  which  the  passive 
intellect  extends  itself  receptively."  The  former 
enables  the  soul  to  "do  all  things'  (omnia 


]i  Sum.  ThcoL,  I,  q.  79,  a.  3  ad  3. 

lt;  Actus  intellectus  possibilis  est  recipere  intelligibilia ; 
actus  intellectus  ageutis  est  abstrahere  intelligibilia.  Q.  Dd., 
De  Anima,  a.  4  ad  7. 

17  Intellectus  agens  est.  .  virtus  quaedani  animae  ad  eadem 
active  se  extendens  ad  quae  se  extendit  intellectus  possibilis 
receptive.  Sum.  Theol.,  1,  q.  88,  a.  1. 


—  6i  — 

facere),    the    latter    to     "become    all    things' 
(omnia  fieri). 

We  have  said  that  the  purpose  of  this  active 
intellect  is  to  bring  out  lor  the  mind  the  real 
object  existing  in  material  things,  to  abstract 
the  universal  from  them.  It  is  an  abstractive 
power  and  exercises  itself  solely  on  the  intelligi- 
ble in  sensible  things.  "Everything  is  under- 
stood in  so  far  as  it  is  abstracted  from  matter, 
because  the  forms  in  matter  are  individual 
forms  which  the  intellect  does  not  appiehend 
as  such."18  To  abstract  is  to  know  a  thing 
existing  individually  in  corporeal  matter,  but 
not  in  the  manner  in  which  it  there  exists.  "  To 
know  what  is  in  such  individual  matter,  but 
not  as  it  is  in  such  matter,  is  to  abstract  the 
form  from  individual  matter."19  Knowledge 
proceeds  from  the  more  indeterminate  to  the 
less  indeterminate,  from  the  imperfect  to  the 
perfect,  because  the  intellect  is  concerned  with 
the  universal  in  the  individual.  It  knows  the 
essence  at  once  as  constituent  of  the  thing, 
and  later  on  by  reflection  as  applicable  to 


18  Unumquodque    intelligitur    in   quantum  a  materia    ab- 
strahitur;   quia  formae  in  materia  suiit  individualis  formae 
quas    intellectus    non    apprehendit    secundum    quod    hujus- 
modi.    Ibid.,  I,  q.  50,  a.  2. 

19  Cognoscere    vero    id    quod    est  in    materia    individual!, 
non    prout    est    in  tali    materia,  est   abstrahere  formam   a 
materia  individual!.     Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  85,  a.  1. 


—  62  — 

many   others.     The  universal  is  not    the  result 

•/ 

of  a  comparison  between  many  objects  in  the 
sense  of  the  Empiricists,  and  then  recognized 
as  universal  because  found  in  many  or  all,  nor 
is  the  particular  or  individual  known  first  by 

A-  w 

the  intellect  and  then  the  universal. 

The  active  intellect  abstracts  the  universal 
from  the  image  in  the  imagination  or  phan- 
tasia.'0  The  image  is  the  instrumental  cause 
in  the  process,  the  active  intellect  is  the  prin- 
cipal cause.  The  result  partakes  of  the  nature 
of  both  causes.  Its  relation  to  the  image 
makes  it  the  representation  of  a  specific  object, 
its  relation  to  the  active  intellect  makes  it 
immaterial  in  nature.  We  have  finally  the 
intelligible  species  produced  in  the  passive 
intellect.  Sensation  from  which  our  knowledge 
takes  its  rise  is  not  the  full  explanation  of 
the  universal — "sensitive  cognition  is  not  the 
total  cause  of  intellectual  cognition."  ai  Abstrac- 
tion or  the  operation  of  the  active  intellect 
simply  brings  out  the  universal  existing  in 
the  given  individual  object.  "One  and  the 
same  nature  which  was  singular  and  made 


'20  The  phantasia  for  the  Scholastics  was  the  faculty  that 
retained  the  images  of  absent  objects.  It  is  now  known 
as  retentive  memory. 

21  Sensitiva    cognitio    non    est     tota    causa   iutellectualis 
j  ognitionis.     Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  84,  a.  6. 


-63- 

individual  in  each  man  through  matter,  after- 
wards becomes  universal  through  the  action 
of  the  intellect  refining  it  from  individuating 
conditions.22 

The  active  intellect  is  said  to  illumine  the 
phantasma,  and  thus  render  it  fit  to  arouse 
the  passive  intellect  to  an  act  of  knowledge. 
Though  the  phantasmata  or  images  of  them- 
selves cannot  act  on  the  intellect  because 
they  are  individual  and  exist  in  corporeal 
organs,  yet  since  they  are  in  the  soul  which 
is  intellective,  they  have  a  special  aptitude  to 
become  known  to  the  passive  intellect  through 
the  operation  of  the  active  intellect.  As  the 
senses  receive  greater  power  from  their  con- 
nection with  the  intellect,  so  the  phantasmata 
by  the  power  of  the  active  intellect  are  put 
in  a  condition  from  which  the  intelligible 
species  can  be  readily  abstracted.  This  illumi- 
nation is  simply  the  action  of  the  active 
intellect,  for  the  latter  is  not  supposed  "to 
imprint  anything  on  the  phantasma,  but  in 
union  with  the  phantasma  it  produces  the 
intelligible  species  in  the  passive  intellect." 

22  Una  et  eadem  natura,  quae  singularis  erat  et  individuata 
per    materiam  in  singularibus    hominibus,    efficitur    postea 
universalis  per  actionem  intellectus  depurantis  ipsam  a  con- 
ditionibus  quae  sunt  hie  et  nunc.    De  UniversaJibus.. 

23  The  Commentary  of  the  Conimbricen'ses,  De  Anima,  1.  3, 
c.  5,  q.  1,  a.  3  ad  1. 


-64- 

The  result  of  the  operation  of  the  active 
intellect  is  the  intelligible  species,  which  is 
immaterial  and  represents  the  thing  in  its 
specific  nature  abstracted  from  the  material 
object.  "What  pertains  to  the  specific  con- 
cept of  any  material  thing,  as  stone,  or  man, 
or  horse,  can  be  considered  without  the  in- 
dividual principles  which  are  not  of  the  concept 
of  the  species.  And  this  is  to  abstract  the 
universal  from  the  particular  or  the  intelligible 
species  from  the  phantasmata,  namely,  to  con- 
sider the  nature  of  the  species  without  con- 
sidering the  individual  principles  which  are 
represented  through  the  phantasmata."  The 
intelligible  species  is  received  in  the  passive 
intellect  and  determines  it  to  know.  The  intellect 
is  passive,  as  we  have  seen,  but  when  stimulated 
to  understand,  it  is  active.  What  produces  the 
action  is  related  to  the  intellect  as  its  form,  for 
form  is  that  by  which  an  agent  acts.  This  form 
is  the  intelligible  species,  the  intellectual  repre- 
sentation of  the  object  known.  WTe  might  recall 

>M  Ea  quae  pertinent  ad  rationem  specie!  cujuslibet  ivi 
materiaJis,  put  a  lapidis,  aut  honiiniis,  ant  eqni,  possnnt 
considerari  sine  principiis  individnalilms,  quae  mm  sunt  de 
ratione  speciei.  Et  hoe  est  ahstrahere  nniversale  a  par- 
ticular!, vel  speeiem  intelligibilem  a  phantasmatibus,  consid- 
erari scilicet  natnra in  speciei  aliaque  considerat  ione  individ 
ualiuni  principiorutn, quae  per  phantasmata  repraesentantur. 
Sum.  Theol.,  L,  q.  85,  a.  1  ad  1. 


\_/  I 

JNIVERSITY  I 
/ 


-65- 


here  that  it  is  not  the  species  that  is  known 
primarily  by  the  mind,  but  the  object  it  repre- 
sents ;  and  moreover,  the  species  is  of  the  nature 
of  the  knower,  and  hence  does  not  agree  in 
nature  with  the  physical  being  of  the  object. 
The  last  stage  of  the  act  of  knowledge  is  the 
mental  word,  the  recognition  of  the  object  and 
the  internal  expression  of  this  recognition,  and 
this  word  is  "  neither  the  thing  itself  which  is 
understood,  nor  is  it  the  very  substance  of  the 
intellect,  but  it  is  a  certain  likeness  conceived 
in  the  intellect  of  the  thing  which  is  under- 
stood," and  by  wrhich  we  understand  the 
object.  This  connects  us  at  once  with  what 
St.  Thomas  has  to  say  about  the  Validity  of 
our  Knowledge. 

SECTION   III.— VALIDITY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

It  is  evident  from  the  discussion  of  the 
general  principles  of  knowledge,  and  especially 
the  process  of  intellectual  knowledge,  that  the 
question  of  validity  is  practically  taken  for 
granted  in  the  system  of  our  author;  it  is  an 
undercurrent  directing  and  determining  the 
statements  and  developments  of  knowledge  in 
its  various  stages  as  set  forth  by  Aquinas  in 
detail.  The  reality  of  the  object,  of  the  external 


26 


C.  G.,  1.  4,  c.  11. 


—  66  — 

i 

world,  is  rooted  in  the  fundamental  state- 
ments of  knowledge  thus  far  expressed.  The 
union  of  subject  and  object,  the  manner  in 
which  the  object  is  present  to  the  knower, 
the  intellectual  process  that  gives  birth  to  the 
intelligible  in  sensible  objects,  all  look  to  some- 
thing extra  animam--"ihe  act  of  knowledge 
extends  itself  to  those  things  which  are  out- 
side the  knower,  for  we  also  know  those 
things  which  are  external  to  us."  According 
to  Gardair,  "St.  Thomas  seems  to  regard  as 
indubitable  the  prime  veracity  of  the  senses 
rather  than  to  demonstrate  it."  Farges  is 
in  accord  with  this  view.  "The  great 
Doctors  of  the  Middle  Ages  believed  in  the 
immediate  perception  of  bodies  by  the  external 
senses  as  a  primitive  fact  clearly  attested  by 
the  consciousness  of  each  man."  These  state- 
ments become  general  when  we  recall  that  for 
Aquinas  all  knowledge  takes  its  rise  in  the 
senses,  according  to  the  axiom:  Nihil  cst  in 

1  Actus    cognitionis    se    extendit    ad    ea    quae   sunt   extra 
cognoscentem.     Cognoscimus  enini  etiam  ea  quae  extra  n«.s 
sunt.    Sum   Theol.,  I,  q.  84,  a.  2. 

2  L'Objectivite   de   la  Sensation,    Arm-tics   ilc  Phil     Chret- 
tienne,   1895,   p.   17. 

3  Theorie  de  la  Perception  Immediate   d'apres    Aristote  et 
St.  Thomas.    Ibid.,   1891,  p.  441. 


-67- 

intellecttt  quod  prius  non  fuerit  in  sensu.4 
A  few  sentences  will  suffice  to  confirm  the 
above  view.  First,  as  regards  the  senses. 
"The  sense  is  a  certain  passive  power  capable 
of  being  changed  by  an  external  sensible  ob- 
ject." "The  sense  always  apprehends  the 
the  thing  as  it  is,  except  there  be  an  impedi- 
ment in  the  organ  or  in  the  medium."6  Because 
"sensible  objects  exist  actually  outside  the 
soul,"7  there  is  no  need  of  an  active  sense 
corresponding  to  the  active  intellect.  We  have 

4  It  is  true  to  say  as  Ladd  does— with  St.   Thomas   "the 
psj'chological  inquiry   as  to  the  nature,    results,    and    cer- 
tainty   of  its    (the   intellect)    functioning  is   thus  made  the 
most  important  of  epistemological  inquiries."   But  his  under- 
standing  of  this   product   is   inadequate,    as   his  conclusion 
evidences — "with  such    views   of  the    origin   of  knowledge 
as    the  foregoing,   the  validating  of  knowledge  becomes  a 
hopeless    puzzle.    Phil,    of  Knowledge,    p.   53.    That  there 
is  no  inconsistency  between  the  psychology   of  knowledge 
and    the    epistemology    of   knowledge    as    treated    by    St. 
Thomas,   will  be  clear,   we  think,    from    an    exposition    of 
his  views.     "The  theories   of  validity  ought  to  correspond 
to    the  theories   of   origin :     It  is    thus — Nominalism,    Con- 
ceptualism   and   Realism  correspond    perfectly    to    Sensism, 
Innatism,  and  Peripateticisrn.     Peillaube,    Theorie  des  Con- 
cepts, p  347. 

5  Est   autem  sensus  quaedam  potentia  passiva,  quae  nata 
est  immutari  ab  exteriori  sensibili.     Sum.  Theol.,   I,  q.  78, 
a.  3. 

6  Sensus  semper  apprehendit  rem  ut  est,  nisi  sit  impedi- 
mentum  in  organo,  vel  in  medio.    De  Veri.,  q.  1,  a.  11. 

7  Sum.  Theol. ,  I,  q.  79,  a.  3  ad  1. 


—  68  — 

seen  that  all  knowledge  is  by  species  and  that 
the  species  is  only  the  means  of  knowledge; 
what  is  primarily  and  immediately  and  actually 
known  is  the  object  the  species  represents. 
Moreover,  both  powers  of  cognition — sense  and 
intellect — are  passive  and  must  be  acted  upon 
by  the  objects,  to  which  they  add  nothing 
and  from  which  they  take  nothing,  before  there 
is  knowledge.  This  double  phase  of  activity 
and  passivity  in  knowledge,  presupposes  ex- 
ternal reality.  This  is  expressed  in  a  statement 
of  A.  Seth:  "  Knowledge  is  an  activity,  an 
activo-passive  experience,  of  the  subject,  whereby 
it  becomes  aware  of  what  is  not  itself." 

We  need  say  little  about  the  reality  contained 
in  intellectual  knowledge,  for  though  this  knowl- 
edge is  distinct  in  kind  from  sensory,  yet  it  rests 
on  sensitive  images  as  a  basis,  and  the  whole 
process  of  the  active  intellect  is  concerned  with 
extracting  the  intelligible,  the  essence,  wrapped 
up  in  the  image,  which  is  the  proper  object  of 
the  intellect.  There  is  a  twofold  aspect  of  the 
operation  of  knowing  in  man,  one  wholly 
internal  and  another  that  has  as  its  terminus 
"something  existing  outside  him,"  '  an  external 
object.  "The  first  object  of  the  human  intel- 

8  The    Problem    of   Epistemology,    Phil.    Review,    vol.    1, 
p.  513. 
»Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  14,  a.  2. 


-69- 

lect  is  not  its  own  essence,  but  something 
external,  namely,  the  nature  of  a  material 
thing.  Hence  what  is  primarily  known  by  the 
intellect  is  an  object  of  this  nature,  and 
secondarily,  the  act  by  which  the  object  is 
known."  To  multiply  quotations  would  be 
useless  and  would  largely  repeat  what  was 
said  when  speaking  of  intellectual  knowledge. 

We  can  then  say  we  know  the  object,  we 
know  it  as  something  external,  and  we  know 
it  at  once.  The  perception  of  reality  is  not  the 
result  of  an  inference  as  Descartes  and  many 
moderns  hold,  but  the  idea  represents  the  ob- 
ject at  once  without  any  intermediate  presenta- 
tions. But  how  does  the  idea  make  the  object 
known  to  us?  What  does  it  meant  The  idea 
is  a  state  of  the  mind,  and  it  is  also  representa- 
tive of  something.  In  this  second,  its  epistemo- 
logical  aspect,  as  representative  of  something, 
what  is  its  value?  Seth  admits  the  twofold 
aspect  of  the  idea  and  yet  holds:  "Immediacy 

10  Nee  sui  intelligere  est  objectum  primum  ipsa  ejus  essentia. 
sed  aliquid  extrinsecum,  scilicet  natura  materialis  rei.  Et 
ideo  id  quod  primo  cognoscitur  ab  intellectu  humano,  est 
hujusmodi  objectum ;  et  secundario  cognoscitur  ipse  actus, 
quo  cognoscitur  objectum.  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  87,  a.  3.  This 
statement  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  the  view  held  by 
Descartes  and  many  modern  psychologists,  for  whom  the 
sensation  is  the  only  and  the  first  immediate  object  of 
perception. 


—  70  — 

must  be  given  up  before  any  tenable  theory  of 
perception  and  amr  philosophical  doctrine  of 
Realism  can  be  established."  St.  Thomas 
maintains  that  the  idea  as  representation,  or, 
to  make  the  statement  general,  the  species 
which  is  the  likeness  or  representation  of  the 
thing  makes  the  thing  itself  known  at  once. 
If  we  hold  with  Berkeley  that  an  idea  can 
only  be  like  an  idea,  we  are  shut  off  from  a 
knowledge  of  the  real  existence  of  things 
material.  The  idea  as  an  idea,  as  a  state  in 
the  mind,  of  course,  can  only  be  like  another 
idea,  but  when  we  recognize  that  "knowledge 
means  nothing  if  it  does  not  mean  the  relation 
of  two  factors,  knowledge  of  an  object  by  a 
subject,"  'and  "that  we  are  never  restricted 
to  our  own  idea  as  ideas;  from  the  first  dawn 
of  knowledge  we  treat  the  subjective  excita- 
tion as  the  symbol  or  revealer  to  us  of  a  real 
world,"  we  see  the  aspect  of  the  idea  that 
looks  toward  something  other  than  its  presence 
as  a  mere  mental  state.  It  is  only  a  question 
of  what  this  something  other  is.  And  here  we 
meet  the  second  general  principle  of  knowledge 
-the  object  is  known  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  knower — from  the  critical  point  of  view. 


11  Loc.  cit.,  p.  515. 

12  A.  Seth,  loc.  cit.,  p.  513. 

13  A.  Seth,  Scottish  Philosophy,  p.  103. 


__  *7  T       - 

In  the  system  of  St.  Thomas  the  answer  to 
the  something  other  is  at  hand :  the  idea  repre- 
sents to  the  subject  some  real  object  that  is 
known  immediately  by  means  of  the  idea,  but 
known  according  to  the  nature  of  the  knower. 
The  fact  that  everything  the  subject  knows 
he  knows  according  to  his  nature,  renders  the 
objections  usually  made  on  the  score  of  incom- 
patibility of  the  nature  of  the  knowing  subject 
with  certain  objects  that  we  say  we  do  know, 
of  little  or  no  consequence ;  for  though  the 
intellectual  idea  as  such  is  wholly  immaterial, 
yet  the  image  from  which  it  has  been  derived 
is  material,  and  the  idea  is  simply  the  image 
considered  in  an  immaterial  way,  namely,  the 
essence  freed  from  material  conditions.14 

The  real  difficulty  from  the  modern  point  of 
view  is  to  explain  how  the  species  represents 
the  thing  in  itself,  since  the  species  is  in  the 

14  Quae  (aninia)  t  am  en  h  abet  duas  virtutes  cognoscitivas. 
Unam,  quae  est  actus  alicujus  corporei  organ! ;  et  huic  con- 
naturale  est  cognoscere  res  secundum  quod  sunt  in  materia 
individual! ;  unde  sensus  non  cognoscit  nisi  singularia.  Alia 
vero  virtus  cognoscitiva  ejus  est  intellectus,  qui  non  est 
actus  alicujus  organi  corporalis.  Unde  per  intellectum  con- 
naturale  est  nobis  cognoscere  naturas,  quae  quidem  non 
habent  esse  nisi  in  materia  individual!  rei,  non  tamen  secun- 
dum quod  sunt  in  materia  individual!,  sed  secundum  quod 
abstrahuntur  ab  ea  per  considerationem  intellectus.  Sum. 
Theol.,  I,  q.  14,  a.  4.  The  close  connection  between  the 
material  image  and  the  immaterial  idea  is  here  indicated. 


—  72  — 

knower  according  to  the  nature  of  the  knower. 
Kant  admits  a  relation  between  the  subject 
and  the  object,  but  this  relation  is  based  upon 
an  adaptation  of  the  object  to  the  subject, 
which  imposes  on  the  object  its  forms,  cate- 
gories, or  ideas;  we  know  appearances,  pheno- 
mena only;  all  knowledge  is  purely  subjective 
due  to  internal  elements,  and  hence  a  real 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things  is  excluded, 
things  in  themselves  cannot  be  known.  For 
St.  Thomas,  there  is  also  a  relation  between 
the  subject  and  the  object,  but  this  relation 
is  based  on  the  natural  proportion,  though 
relative,  of  the  object  and  the  subject.  This 
idea  of  a  natural  proportion  is  a  fruitful  and 
satisfying  one  in  the  S3rstem  of  Aquinas.  When 
we  consider  that  knowledge  is  a  fact,  and 
subject  and  object  are  brought  in  presence  of 
each  other  in  some  way,  the  first  natural 
suggestion  seems  to  be,  the  subject  and  the 
object  must  be  related  to  each  other  in  a  way 
that  will  account  for  this  knowledge,  there 
must  be  a  proportion  between  them  that  will 
enable  us  to  resolve  their  connection  if  we  go 
to  work  with  the  data  on  hand.  It  is  not  a 
great  concession  to  admit  with  Dogmatism  the 
reliability  of  our  faculties  in  the  quest  of  truth, 
and  on  this  basis  to  account  for  the  facts  we 


-73- 

possess;  it  is,   on  the  contra^,  rather  difficult 
to  see  the  wisdom  of  any  other  proceeding.15 

The  definition  of  truth  adopted  by  St.  Thomas 
is  familiar — adaequatio  rei  et  intellectus.™  Strict- 
ly, this  adequation  is  only  found  in  the  Divine 
Mind,  for  God  alone  knows  things  as  com- 
pletely as  they  are  knowable,  since  their  truth 
depends  on  His  Ideas.  Things  are  measured 
by  the  Divine  Ideas,  whereas  our  ideas  are 
measured  by  the  things.  Hence  we  simply 
have  a  proportional  or  relative  knowledge  of 
them,  though  it  is  true  as  far  as  it  goes.17  A 
faculty  in  normal  condition,  operating  upon 
reliable  data,  always  leads  to  truth.  Each 
faculty  has  a  specific  portion  of  reality  about 
which  it  is  especially  concerned,  and  when 
limited  to  this  sphere  it  never  gives  a  false 
report:  "if  the  faculty  is  present,  its  judgment 
about  its  proper  object  will  never  be  at 

15  To  all  appearances,   the   objection  so  commonly  urged 
against  the  proceeding  of  Kant  as  involving  a  vicious  circle 
or  leading  to  a  contradiction,  is  well  grounded.     He  seeks  to 
prove  that  our  faculties   are  incapable  of  arriving  at  truth, 
and  in  doing  so   uses   the   very  faculties    he    has  called  in 
question. 

16  Per   conformitatem    intellectus  et  rei,   veritas  definitur. 
Sum.  Tbeol ,  I,  q.  16,  a.  2. 

17  Res    naturales,    ex    quibus  intellectus   noster    scientiam 
accipit,  mensurant  intellectum  nostrum:  sed  sunt  rnensuratae 
aS  intellectu  divino,  in  quo  sunt  omnia  creata,  sicut  omnia 
artificiata  intellectu  artificis.     De  Veri.,  q.  1,  a.  2. 


-74- 

fault."  In  sensitive  knowledge  the  sense  is 
always  true  when  busied  with  its  specific 
object  —  sight  in  case  of  color,  hearing  for 
sound,  and  the  like,  unless  it  is  impeded  in 
its  normal  action.  Moreover,  it  seizes  the 
object  as  it  is.  "The  sense  always  appre- 
hends the  thing  as  it  is,  unless  there  is  an 
impediment  in  the  organ  or  in  the  medium. 
The  sense  is  not  the  dominus  of  falsitv,  but 

•/   ' 

the  imagination."19  If  there  is  error,  it  will 
be  found  in  the  imagination,  which  puts  to- 
gether the  various  elements  that  have  come 
through  the  senses.  The  intellect  works  on 
this  image,  \vhich  represents  an  objective 
reality,  and  extracts  the  idea  which  will  also 
be  objective,  since  it  is  the  deliverance  of  the 
image.  The  intellect  can  never  be  deceived 
about  the  essence,  simply  considered  as  appre- 
hended, for  this  is  its  specific  object;  but  error 
may  arise  in  the  further  processes  of  judg- 
ment and  reasoning,  owing  to  faulty  proceed- 
ing. "The  specific  object  of  the  intellect  is 


*  Ad  proprium  objectum  unaquaeque  potentia  per  se 
ordinatur  secundum  quod  ipsa:  quae  autem  sunt  hujus- 
modi,  semper  eodem  modo  se  hahent.  Unde  manente  po- 
tentia non  deficit  ejus  judicium  circa  proprium  objectum. 
Sum.  Theol,  I,  q.  85,  a.  6. 

11  Sensus  semper  apprehendit  rem  ut  est,  nisi  sit  impedi- 
mentum  in  organo,  vel  in  medio.  Sensus  non  est  dominus 
falsitatis,  sed  phantasia.  DC  Veri.,  q.  1,  a.  11. 


—  75  — 

the  essence  of  a  thing.  Whence  properly 
speaking,  the  intellect  is  never  deceived  about 
the  quiddity  of  a  thing,  but  it  may  be  deceived 
about  matters  connected  with  the  essence  or 
quiddity  while  it  relates  one  thing  to  another 
by  judgment  or  ratiocination."  Truth  or 
error  is  found,  strictly,  in  the  affirmation  or 
negation  of  the  judgment — in  the  componendo 
et  dividendo  of  Aquinas — and  in  the  reasoning 
based  on  these  judgments.  "In  the  intellect, 
truth  and  falsity  are  primarily  and  principally 
found  in  the  judgment  of  the  one  who  affirms 
or  denies."21  The  judgment  and  subsequent 
reasoning  are  true  and  have  objective  value 
if  not  impeded  in  their  normal  action,  for 
they  rest,  through  the  idea,  the  image,  the 
sense,  on  the  reality  of  the  object  itself." 


22 


20  Objectum  autem  proprium  intellectus  est  quidditas  rei. 
Unde    circa    quidditatem    per    se    loquendo    intellectus    non 
fallitur,   sed  circa  ea,   quae  circumstant    rei    essentiam    vel 
quidditatem,    intellectus    potest    falli,    dum    unum     ordinet 
ad  alterum  vel  componendo  vel  etiam  ratiocinando.    Sum. 
Theol.,  I,  q.  85,  a.  6. 

21  In  intellectu  autem  primo  et  principaliter    inveniuntur 
falsitas    et    veritas    in   judicio    componentis    et    dividentis. 
De  Veri.,  q.  1,  a.  11. 

22  It  is  not  surprising  that  this  conformity  or  proportion 
should  exist  between  things   and  the    human    mind,  when 
we  recall,   that,   according  to   Aquinas,   God  is  the  author 
of  both.    They  are  the  expressions  of  His  Ideas,  and  in  His 
Mind  there  is  the  most  complete  unity  and  harmony.      'In 
Deo   autem  tola  plenitude  intellectualis  cognitionis    conti- 
netur  in  uno."     Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  55,  a.  3. 


—  76  — 

The  idea,  however,  has  certain  qualities  that 
are  not  found  in  the  image  that  gave  rise  to 
it.  The  thing  represented  by  the  idea,  the 
essence — is  endowed  with  conditions  of  neces- 
sity and  universality,  whereas  the  image  is 
contingent  and  particular.  Whence  does  the 
idea  derive  these  attributes  ?  Are  they  given  in 
the  representation  of  the  object  or  are  they 
simply  due  to  the  intelligence  itself  operating 
on  the  object,  impressing  a  part  of  its  sub- 
stance on  the  object?  This  recalls  the  Con- 
troversy about  the  Universals,  and  the 
Critical  Theory  of  Kant.  The  position  of  St. 
Thomas — that  of  Moderate  Realism — is  well 
known.  For  him,  the  universal  did  not  exist 
separate  from  the  object  as  Plato  held,  nor 
was  it  simply  a  name  with  no  corresponding 
reality  as  Nominalism  maintained,  but  it  was 
the  result  of  mind  and  object.  It  existed  in 
the  mind  but  had  its  basis  in  the  thing. 
"There  is  a  threefold  diversit}^  of  objects 
signified  b}^  names.  There  are  some  which, 
according  to  their  whole  being,  complete  in 
themselves,  are  extra  animam,  as  man,  stone. 
There  some  that  have  no  extra-mental  exist- 
ence, as  dreams  and  chimerical  images.  There 
are  some  that  have  a  fund  amentum  in  re  extra 
animam,  but  their  formal  completion  is  due 
to  mental  activit}r,  as  is  the  case  with  the 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  } 

%£*t  •        ^ 

universal."  The  universal  is  the  result  of  the 
action  of  the  mind,  but  it  has  its  basis  in  the 
object.  "  Humanity  is  something  in  re,  yet 
as  there  found  it  is  not  the  formal  concept 
of  the  universal,  since  extra,  animam  there  is 
no  humanity  common  to  many.  .  .  I  say  the 
same  of  truth,  because  it  has  a  fundamentum  in 
re,  but  its  concept  is  completed  through  the 
action  of  the  intellect  when,  namely,  it  is 
apprehended  in  the  manner  in  \vhich  it  is."  The 
active  intellect  abstracts  the  universal  from 
the  mental  image  and  gives  it  the  final 
character  of  universality  which  existed  but 
in  germ,  in  potency,  in  the  singular,  contingent 
image.  "It  is  the  theory  of  the  Active  Intel- 
lect which  solves  the  question  so  often  agitated 
by  modern  philosophers:  Whence  comes  it 

23  Eorum,  quae  significantur  nominibus.  invenitur  trip- 
lex diversitas.  Quaedam  enim  sunt,  quae  secundum  esse 
totuni  completum  sunt  extra  animam,  et  hujusmodi  sunt 
entia  completa,  sicut  homo,  lapis.  Quae  autem  sunt,  quae 
nihil  habent  extra  animam,  sicut  somnia  et  imaginatio 
chimerae.  Quaedam  autem  sunt,  quae  habent  fundamentum 
in  re  extra  animam;  sed  eomplementum  rationis  eorum, 
quantum  ad  id,  quod  est  formale,  est  per  operationem 
animae,  ut  patet  in  universali.  Humanitas  enim  est  aliquid 
in  re,  non  tanien  ibi  habet  rationem  universalis  cum  non  sit 
extra  animam  aliqua  humanitas  multis  communis.  Simi- 
liter  dico  de  veritate,  quod  habet  fundamentum  in  re,  sed 
ratio  ejus  completur  per  actionem  intellectus,  quando 
scilicet  apprehenditur  eo  modo  quo  est.  Com.  on  Lotnb.,  I, 
Dis.  19,  q.  5,  a.  1. 


-78- 

that  the  laws  of  reason  accord  \vith  the  laws 
of  nature."  The  thought  contained  in  the  idea 
results  from  the  presence  of  the  image  acted 
upon  by  the  intellect,  the  image  is  the  out- 
come of  the  deliverance  of  the  sense,  which 
in  turn  connects  with  external  reality.  So 
fundamentally,  the  external  object  is  found 
in  the  highest  operation  of  the  intellect,  for 
we  can  trace  the  object  through  the  various 
stages  that  lead  to  the  final  act,  and  nowhere 
along  the  line  of  development  are  we  made 
aware  of  any  elements  that  come  from  a 
source  other  than  the  presence  of  the 
object  in  relation  to  the  knowing  faculty.  For 
Kant,  anything  that  is  universal,  necessary, 
is  subjective,  hence  if  we  apply  these  qualities 
to  ideas  they  can  only  have  an  internal  signifi- 
cance, and  do  not  relate  us  with  objective 
reality  as  it  is  in  itself.  For  St.  Thomas,  if  we 
begin  with  the  real --as  we  do  in  sensation - 
and  proceed  logically  with  normal  faculties, 
we  end  with  the  real;  hence  there  is  reality 
throughout  the  \vhole  process  of  knowledge. 
We  have  already  noted  that  all  our  ideas  betray 
signs  of  their  sensuous  origin,  for  if  a  sense  is 
wanting  or  injured  the  intellectual  data  that 
would  result  from  it  are  absent ;  moreover,  the 
image  is  also  required  when  we  wish  to  re-think 

24  Pint,  L' Intellect  Actif,  p.  LSI. 


—  79- 

what  we  have  already  thought  about  or 
known.  This  is  further  emphasized  in  our 
knowledge  of  immaterial  beings,  as  of  God ; 
for  we  can  know  an  object  separated  from  all 
materiality  only  by  analogy  of  sensuous  things 
or  bv  notions  derived  from  them. 

J 

The  consequence  of  Kant's  view  on  the 
question  of  the  vaildity  of  our  knowledge  in 
contrast  to  that  of  Aquinas  is  found  in  the 
Relativity  of  Knowledge  advocated  by  Hamil- 
ton and  Spencer,  and  in  the  position  of 
J.  S.  Mill,  who  also  allies  himself  closely  with 
Hume.  What  then  is  the  extent  of  our  knowl- 
edge? How  much  of  reality  can  we  know,  and 
do  all  men  know  the  same  amount  ? 

We  know  the  universal,  the  essence  in  the 
material  object,  not  exhaustively,  however,  but 
in  a  proportionate  way ;  that  is,  it  is  known 
by  us  in  so  far  as  our  knowing  power  will 
permit  us  to  know  it  —  for  the  object  is  known 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  knower.  Our 
make-up  as  man  necessitates  a  connection  with 
matter  that  renders  our  knowledge  dependent 
on  it  to  such  an  extent  as  to  exclude  a  perfect 
or  complete  grasp  of  the  object  itself.  The 
thing  to  be  known  is  the  same  for  all  men,  but 
the  intellectual  state  of  the  knower  in  the 
presence  of  the  object  depends  upon  his  bodily 
condition  and  likewise  on  the  good  form  of 


—  8o  — 

the  inferior  powers  of  knowledge  —  sense  and 
imagination  —  when  the  object  was  presented 
to  them.25  "The  higher  the  intellect  the  more 
it  knows,  either  a  greater  number  of  objects 
or  at  least  more  reasons  for  the  same  objects."26 
Again,  "Some  men  can  not  grasp  an  intelligible 
truth  unless  it  be  explained  to  them  part  by 
part  .  .  .  others,  who  have  a  stronger  intellect, 
can  sieze  much  from  few  data."27  All  men, 
however,  can  know  the  object  really,  its  essence, 

25  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q .85,  a.  8.      There  is   no    separation  of 
mind  and  matter  in  the  system  of  Aquinas  to  the  extent 
of  an  unbridgable  chasm  between  them.     Man  is  body  and 
soul,  and  it  is  man  that  knows.     The  aberrations  from  this 
view  from   the  time  of  Descartes  are  certainly  instructive, 
and  speak  favorably  for  the  d  'Ctrine  that  avoids  all  these 
apparent  difficulties—  such    as    psycho-physical    parallelism 
is    busied    with  —  by    interpreting    faithfully    the    facts    of 
consciousness.      "If    any    degradation    is    suffered    b\-    my 
cognitive    faculty  in   thus   being    dependent    on   the    causal 
efficiency  of  these  physico-chemical  processes  which  is  called 
'my   brain   states',  the  remedy  for  this   would  seem  to  be 
in   my   not  being  an   animal  at  all,  rather  than  resorting 
to  a  theory  which   makes   a  complete  breach  between   my 
mentality  and  my  animality."     Ladd,  Phil,  of  Knowledge, 
p.  553. 

26  Quanto  aliquis  intellectus  est   altior,   tanto   plura  cog- 
noscit.    vel     secundum     rerum     multidudinem,    vel     saltern 
secundum  earumdem  rerum  plures  rationes.     C.  G.,  1.  3,c.  56. 

27  Sunt  enim   quidam   qui    veritatem    intelligibilem  capere 
non  possunt,  nisi  eis  particulatim    per  singula  explicatur; 
et  hoc  ex   debilitate  intellectus  eorum  contingit.     Alii   vero 
sunt  fortioris   intellectus,  ex   paucis   multa  capere  possunt. 
Sum.  Theol ,  I,  q   55,  a.  3. 


—  8i  — 

by  a  consideration  of  its  manifestations.  This 
is  the  important  item  in  all  knowledge,  God 
not  excepted,  for  if  we  can  not  know  Him  from 
what  He  manifests  of  Himself,  then  truly  is 
knowledge  of  Him  impossible.  The  causal  idea 
here  involved  is  at  the  basis  of  all  validity  of 
knowledge;  it  bears  the  whole  burden  of  the 
knowableness  of  God  in  the  system  of  St. 
Thomas,  and  will  be  considered  at  length 
shortly. 

Hamilton  justly  argues  that  if  we  had  more 
means  of  knowledge,  had  better  faculties,  we 
should  know  more  and  better,  but  his  conclu- 
sion to  absolute  relativity  of  knowledge  based 
on  this  lack  of  powers  is  unwarranted.  "But 
were  the  number  of  our  faculties  coextensive 
with  the  modes  of  being — had  we  for  each  of 
these  thousand  modes  a  separate  organ  com- 
petent to  make  it  known  to  us,  —  still  would 
our  whole  knowledge  be,  as  it  is  at  present, 
only  of  the  relative.  Of  existence  absolutely 
and  in  itself,  we  should  then  be  as  ignorant 
as  we  are  now."28  This  position  is  answered 
in  the  statement  of  Straub:  "It  is  true  that  we 
do  not  attain  to  all  that  is  or  can  be  in 
rerum  natura,  by  the  senses,  but  it  is  one  thing 
to  say,  what  we  seem  to  know  in  things  is 


28 


Metaphysics,  Y.  1,  p.  153,  lect.  9. 


—  82  — 

really  in  them,  and  it  is  quite  another  to  con- 
tend, that  we  reach,  by  our  knowledge,  what- 
ever is  present  in  things."29 

Spencer's  conclusions  to  the  relativity  and 
inconceivability  of  wrhat  we  are  led  to  recognize 
as  the  legitimate  outcome  of  our  reasonings, 
rests  on  a  misapprehension  of  the  terms  used. 
The  statement  of  J.  S.  Mill:  "Experience  there- 
fore aifords  no  evidence,  not  even  analogies, 
to  justify  our  extending  to  the  apparently 
immutable  a  generalization  grounded  only  on 
our  observation  of  the  changeable",30  is  opposed 
to  the  view  of  Aquinas  — '  'Through  the  active 
intellect  we  know  immutable  truth  from  mut- 
able things,  and  we  discern  things  themselves 
from  their  likenesses."  True  objective  reality 
and  the  principle  of  causality  give  us  a  reliable 
knowledge  of  things  and  allow  us  to  arrive  at 
an  equally  valid  and  non- relative  view  — 
always  keeping  in  mind  the  limitations  of  our 
nature  —  of  what  really  transcends  the  senses, 
and  finally  a  view  of  the  systematic  relation 

J  J 

of  things.      Ladd  summarizes    his    chapter    on 


29  De  Objectivitate  Cognitionis  Humanae,  p.  39. 

30  Essays  on  Religion. 

31  Per    quod     (lumen     intellectus      agentis)    immutabiliter 
veritatem  in  rebus  mutabilibus  coguoscamus,  et  discernamus 
ipsas  res   a  similitudinibus   rerurn.     Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  84,  a. 
Gad  1. 


-83- 

b  . 

» 

Knowledge  and  Reality  in  these  \vords:  "All 
this  amounts  to  saying  that  the  very  existence 
of  our  cognitive  activities,  and  of  the  products 
which  mark  their  development,  whether  for 
the  individual  or  for  the  race,  rests  upon  the 
general  assumption  that  things  and  minds  do  so 
causally  determine  each  other  as  to  show  that 
they  belong  to  one  system  of  Reality."  Reality 
in  its  various  relations  and  interdependencies 
leads  back  to  one  author  of  all  in  whom  we 
see  the  final  and  complete  expression.  This 
will  come  to  light  in  the  portion  of  the  subject 
we  are  about  to  consider,  where  the  principles 
we  have  just  discussed  will  give  us  a  knowledge 
of  God,  of  whom  St.  Thomas  says:  "However 
meagre  be  our  intellectual  preception  of  divine 
knowledge,  this  will  be  more  for  us,  as  an 
ultimate  end,  than  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
inferior  intelligible  things." 

SECTION  IV. — CAUSALITY  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

As  we  have  just  intimated  the  principle  of 
causality  is  frequently  employed  in  the  discus- 
sion of  knowledge  in  general,  and  of  the  know- 
ableness  of  God  in  particular.  Despite  this  fact, 
"the  Scholastics  did  not  make  the  principle 

32  Loc.  eft.,  p.  554. 

33  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  25. 


-84- 

of  causality  art  object  of  special  study,"1  though 
it  is  used  by  them  continually.  The  power  the 
effects  have,  or  the  phenomena  that  begin  to 
be,  to  teach  us  about  the  nature  of  the 
something  that  gave  them  being  is  fully 
recognized,  and  elaborated  to  great  extent 
by  St.  Thomas.  And  we  might  say  this  is 
the  only  form  under  which  the  question  is 
presented.  The  idea  of  cause  for  Aquinas  was 
acquired  as  any  other  idea ;  it  was  the  result 
of  the  abstractive  power — the  active  intellect — 
at  work  on  the  deliverance  of  sense.  Ex- 
ternal reality  was  not  doubted  by  him ;  he 
was  aware  of  immediately  perceiving  phe- 
nomena coming  into  existence,  beginning  to 
be,  both  internally  and  externally ;  and  these 
beginnings  must  have  a  something  to  account 
for  them.  Internally,  the  power  of  thinking 
and  willing  was  open  to  immediate  view ; 
change  and  modification  were  visible  in  the 
world ;  external  objects  gave  rise  to  sensation, 
which  in  turn  led  to  intellectual  operation- 
the  knowing  power  is  passive,  the  object  is 
active;  all  these  factors  contribute  to  the  idea 
of  cause.  The  principle  was  analytic  for  him, 
possessing  the  universality  that  pertains  to 
every  contingent  existence  stripped  of  its 

1  Kleutgen,  La  Philosophic  Scolastique,  v.  2,  p.  46. 


-85  — 

individual  conditions;  like  all  ideas  it  had  its 
fundamentum  in  re,  and  in  conjunction  with 
the  active  intellect  received  its  final  form. 
Thus  it  was  ^not  Hume's  observed  uniformity 
of  sequence  due  to  custom,  nor  was  it  the 
subjective  principle  Kant  made  it  out  to  be. 
St.  Thomas,  therefore,  could  not  doubt  its 
validity  without  running  counter  to  his  sys- 
tem of  Moderate  Realism,  and  the  principle 
of  causality,  we  note  from  his  works,  gave 
him  no  special  alarm. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  Scholastics  after 
Aristotle  divided  all  causes  into  four  classes : 
formal,  material,  efficient,  and  final.  The 
formal  and  material  are  the  constituent  prin- 
ciples of  a  thing,  and  we  get  a  knowledge  of 
them  from  the  operations  and  qualities  of  the 
thing.  And  these  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  the 
final  cause  or  the  purpose  of  the  thing.  Effi- 
cient cause  is  a  principle  determing  by  its 
action  the  existence  of  a  contingent  thing ; 
it  produces  something,  and  thus  establishes 
a  nexus  or  connection  between  itself  and  the 
result  of  its  operation,  the  effect  or  thing. 
Action  is  its  basis — the  cause  is  the  principle 
or  source  of  action,  and  the  effect  is  the 
t'erminus'of  the  action.  Its  essential  character 
is  production.  Though  not  every  cause  is 
efficient,  yet  every  cause  looks  toward  ef- 


—  86  — 

ficiency  in  some  way.  We  shall  consider 
efficient  causality  especially,  though  the  argu- 
ments that  establish  its  validity  are  also 
valid  for  the  other  causes.2  The  product  or 
effect  of  the  cause  is  a  manifestation  of  the 
nature  of  the  cause  and  leads  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  cause;  and  it  is  this  point  we  wish 
to  consider. 

This  view  of  causality  is  based  on  the 
principle — omne  agens  agit  sibi  simile — every 
agent  produces  something  similar  to.  itself. 
The  action  of  the  cause  consists  in  calling 
forth  in  the  effect  its  own  form  which  is  a 
principle  of  activity — "for  the  active  po\ver  is 
a  principle  of  acting  on  something  else."  From 
this  similarity  between  the  two,  we  can  know 
something  of  the  cause  as  shadowed  in  the 
effect.  Similarity  is  an  agreement  in  form. 
The  cause  is  determined  to  some  result  either 
blindly,  if  a  physical  cause,  or  intelligently, 
if  acting  from  the  knowledge  of  a  proposed 
end.  The  effect  then  pre-exists  in  its  cause, 


2  The    Scholastics    did    not     limit    causality    to    efficient 
causality,   as   is  done  in  Modern  Philosophy,  but  the\-  con- 
sidered   it    in    all    its    aspects,    and    regarded    final   as  the 
most  important. 

3  Ratio  autem  activi  principii  couveuit  potentiae  activae. 
Nam  potentia  activa  est  principium   agendi   in   aliud.    Sum. 
TheoL,  I,  q.  25,  a.  1. 


-87  — 

and  thus  every  cause  produces  something  like 
to  itself;  the  closer  the  resemblance,   the  more 
perfect  our  knowledge  of  the  cause.     The  effect 
may  adequate   or  wholly  express  the  power  of 
the    cause,    or    it    may    be    but    a  far-off  hint. 
"Every  effect  not  equalling  the  power    of   the 
cause    receives    the    likeness    of   the  cause    defi- 
ciently- and  not  according  to  the  same  concept, 
so  that  what  is  divided  and    manifold  in  the 
effects,   is  simply  and  in  the   same  way  in  the 


cause."4 


The  agreement  may  be  specific,  generic,  or 
simply  one  of  proportion,  with  a  lessening 
knowledge  power  respectively.  The  effect  is 
but  the  manifestation  of  the  power  of  the 
cause  according  the  axiom  —  operatio  scquitur 
esse.  "The  effect  shows  the  power  of  the 
cause  only  by  reason  of  the  action,  which, 
proceeding  from  the  power,  is  transmitted  to 
effect*  The  nature  of  the  cause  is  known 
only  through  the  effect  in  so  far  as  its 
power,  which  is  in  accord  with  nature,  is 

4  Omnis  effectus  non  adaequans  virtutem  causae  agentis, 
recipit  similitudinem  agentis  non  secundum  eamdem  ratio- 
nem,  sed  deficienterj:  ita  ut  quod  divisim  et  multipliciter 
est  in  effectibus,  in  causa  sit  simpliciter  et  eodem  modo. 
Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  13,  a.  5. 


—  88  — 

known."  Moreover,  "there  is  the  same 
reason  for  the  effect  tending  to  the  likeness  of 
the  cause,  and  for  the  cause  assimilating  or 
rendering  the  effect  like  to  itself."  The  effect 
is  contained  in  the  cause  in  some  way,  and 
imitates  or  resembles  the  cause  in  some  par- 
ticular—  and  these  are  the  two  factors  in 
similarity.  "  Every  effect  represents  its  cause 
aliqualiter,  but  diversely :  For  some  effect 
represents  the  simple  causality  of  the  cause, 
but  not  its  form,  as  smoke  represents  a  fire. 
.  .  But  some  effect  represents  the  cause  even 
to  the  likeness  of  its  form,  as  produced  fire 
the  fire  which  produces  it."7  Smoke  and  fire 
both  represent  their  cause,  fire,  but  not  to 
the  same  extent;  and  each  in  its  wa}r  gives 
a  knowledge  of  its  cause.  There  is,  however, 


&  Non  effectus  ostendit  virtutem  causae  nisi  ratione 
actionis,  quae  a  virtute  procedens  ad  effectum  terrainatur. 
Natura  autem  causae  non  cognoscitur  per  effectum  nisi  in 
quantum  per  ipsum  cognoscitur  virtus  ejus,  quae  natura 
consequitur.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  21. 

6  Ejusdem  rationis  est  quod  effectus  tendit  in  similitudinem 
agentis,  et  quod  agens   assimilet  sibi  effectum.     C.  G  ,  1.  3, 
c.  21. 

7  Omnis    effectus    aliqualiter    repraesentat    suam    causam, 
sed  diversimode.     Nam   aliquis  effectus   repraesentat    solam 
causalitatem  causae,  non   autem  formam  ejus ;  sicut  fumus 
repraesentat  ignem.  .  .  Aliquis   autem  effectus    repraesentat 
causam  quantum  ad  similitudinem  forrnae  ejus;  sicut  ignis 
generatus  ignem  generantem.    Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  45,  a.  7. 


-89- 

a  distinction  between  the  cause  and  the  effect 
— "in  every  kind  of  cause,  there  is  always 
found  a  distance  (difference)  between  the  cause 
and  that  of  which  it  is  the  cause,  according 
to  some  perfection  or  power."  Mr.  Fiske, 
criticising  the  phrase  we  have  just  been  dis- 
cussing— the  cause  is  in  some  \vay  like  the 
effect — as  defended  by  Mr.  Adam  in  his  "  Inquiry 
into  the  Theories  of  History,"  says,  "Mr. 
Adam's  reply  savors  of  mediaeval  realism."  '  Mr. 
Fiske  seems  to  demand  a  total  likeness  in  all 
cases,  which  "mediaeval  realism'  exacted  of 
only  certain  causes.  With  the  distinctions  of 
St.  Thomas  regarding  the  knowledge  power  of 
the  effect,  on  the  basis  of  likeness  to  the  cause, 
the  position  of  Mr.  ^iske  has  no  weight. 

The  knowledge  power  of  the  effect  depends  on 
what  sort  of  expression  the  cause  has  given  of 
itself.  Thus  the  Scholastics  spoke  of  a  univocal 
and  an  analogical  cause.  In  general,  the  result 
of  the  operation  of  a  univocal  cause  is  a  likeness 
in  species  between  the  cause  and  the  effect,  as 
that  between  a  father  and  his  son — here  the 
effect  equals  the  power  of  the  cause.  In  the 
analogical  cause,  the  likeness  is  not  one  of 

8  In  omnibus  enim  causae  generibus  semper  invenitur  dis- 
tantia  inter  causam  et  id  cujus  est  causa,  secundum  aliquam 
perfectionem,  aut  virtutem.    Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  31,  a.  1  ad  1. 

9  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  v.  2,  p.  387. 


-90- 

quality,  but  one  of  proportional  relation 
between  cause  and  effect.  In  a  univocal  con- 
cept there  is  an  agreement  in  word  and  in  idea, 
and  everything  this  idea  expresses  must  apply 
equally  and  by  the  same  right  to  all  the  objects 
of  which  it  is  affirmed.  "  Every  effect  of  a 
univocal  cause  adequates  the  power  of  the 
cause,"10  and  hence  gives  the  most  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  cause  that  we  can  attain  to. 
We  do  not  mention  equivocal  cause,  since 
"  where  there  is  pure  equivocation  there  is  no 
likeness  in  things,  but  only  a  unity  of  name",11 
and  hence  it  is  not  a  source  of  knowledge. 
Truth  is  the  proportion  between  concepts  and 
things,  as  already  noted.  The  analogical  con- 
cept is  not  the  full  manifestation  of  the  cause 
as  the  univocal,  nor  is  it  a  mere  metaphor  as 
the  equivocal,  but  it  is  between  them  and  gives 
a  real,  though  proportional,  knowledge  of  the 
cause.  It  is  not  equivalent  to  a  metaphor  as 
Caldecott  quotes  St.  Thomas  as  holding,  \vhen 
speaking  of  the  applicability  of  certain  attri- 
butes to  God — "such  as  are  predicable  of  Him 
only  after  the  way  of  analogy  or  metaphor. 


M  12 


10  Omnis      effectus     agentis     univoci    adaequat    virtutem 
agentis.     Pot.,  q.  7,  a.  7. 

11  Ubi  est    pura    aequivocatio    nulla    similitude    in    rebus 
attenditur,  sed  solum  unitas  nominis.     C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  33. 

12  Selections  from  the  Literature  of  Theism,  p.  19. 


-91- 

Aquinas  recognizes  both  analogy  and  metaphor, 
but  with  a  great  distinction,  as  we  shall  see 
later  on.  There  is  real  knowledge  in  analogical 
predication.  The  proportion  or  relation  in 
analogy  may  be  based  on  the  comparison  of 
two  objects  to  an  independent  third,  or  one  of 
the  two  may  be  related  to  the  other.  This 
latter  is  the  one  of  cause  and  effect,  and  pre- 
supposes that  they  have  something  in  common 
in  a  way,  however  slight  that  may  be,  and 
thus  we  are  led  to  a  proportional  knowledge 
of  the  cause  by  a  consideration  of  the  relation 
of  the  effect  to  the  cause. 
St.  Thomas  has  summarized  brieflv  the  three 

»> 

ways  an  effect  can  lead  us  to  a  knowledge  of 
a  cause.  "One  way,  when  the  effect  is  taken 
as  a  medium  for  knowing  the  existence  and  the 
nature  of  the  cause,  as  takes  place  in  the 
sciences  which  demonstrate  the  cause  through 
the  effect.  Another  way,  when  the  cause  is  seen 
in  the  effect  itself  in  so  far  as  the  likeness  of 
the  cause  results  in  the  effect,  as  man  is  seen 
in  a  mirror  on  account  of  his  likeness  .  .  . 
The  third  way,  when  the  likenss  of  the  cause 
in  the  effect  is  the  form  by  which  its  effect 
knows  the  cause.  .  .  But  by  none  of  these  ways 
by  effect  can  the  cause  be  known,  unless  the 
effect  be  adequate  to  the  cause,  in  which  the 


-92- 

whole  power  of  the  cause  is  expressed."13  St. 
Thomas  here  refers  to  a  complete  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  the  cause,  not  a  partial  one.  An 
adequate  concept  gives  a  knowledge  of  a  thing 
as  it  is  in  itself,  in  as  far  as  it  is  knowable  — 
''a  thinsr  is  known  in  itself  when  it  is  known 

C5 

through  a  specific  likeness  adequate  to  the 
knowable  itself."  We  can  have  some  knowl- 
edge of  a  thing  without  having  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  it,  and  this  partial  knowledge 
is  given  us  by  all  effects.  "From  every  manifest 
effect  we  can  demonstrate  the  existence  of  the 
cause."14  The  producing  power  of  secondary 
agents  must  be  admitted,  says  Aquinas,  "or  else 
the  nature  of  no  created  thing  could  be  known 
through  the  eifect,  and  all  knowledge  of  natural 


13  Contingit    enim    ex    effectu    cognoscere    causam    multi- 
pliciter.      Uno    modo,   secundum    quod  effectus  sumitur    ut 
medium  ad  cognoscendum  de  causa  quod  sit,  et  quod  talis 
sit,  sicut  accidit  in  scientiis   quae  causam   demonstrant  per 
effectual.     Alio  modo,  ita  quod  in  ipso  effectu  videatur  causa 
in  quantum  similitude  causae  resultat  in  effectu:  sicut  homo 
videtur  in    speculo    propter    suam    similitudinem  .  .  .  Tertio 
modo,  ita  quod  ista  similitudo  causae  in  effectu  sit  forma 
qua  cognoscit  causam  suus  effectus  .  .  .  Nullo  autem  istorum 
modorum   per  effectum  potest  cognosci  causa  quid  sit,  nisi 
effectus    causae    adaequatus,    in    quo    tota    virtus    causae 
exprimatur.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  49. 

14  Ex  quocumque  effectu   manifesto   nobis    potest    demon- 
strari  causam  esse.    Sum  Theol.,  I,  q.  2,  a.  2  ad  3. 


-93- 

science,  which  relies  especially  on  demonstration 
through  effects,  would  be  taken  away.15 

The  degrees  of  knowledge  derived  from  the 
effect  vary.  "The  perfection  of  the  effect  deter- 
mines the  perfection  of  the  cause."  The  effect, 
however,  as  just  noted,  is  seldom  of  such  a 
character  as  to  adequate  the  nature  of  the 
cause,  hence  we  need  many  effects  to  make  our 
knowledge  more  stable.  Every  actual  effect  "can 
be  infallibly  submitted  to  certain  knowledge." 
"But  when  we  know  a  contingent  effect  in  its 
cause  only,  we  have  but  a  conjectural  knowledge 
of  it."  The  larger  the  number  of  manifesta- 
tions and  the  greater,  the  more  perfect  will 
be  our  knowledge  of  the  cause.  "It  is  manifest 
that  the  causality  of  a  cause  and  its  power  is 
known  in  proportion  to  the  number  and  great- 
ness of  its  known  effects."18  This  is  important 
in  determining  our  knowledge  of  God,  for  all 

16  Si  igitur  res  creatae  nou  habent  actiones  ad  producen- 
dura  effectus,  sequitur  quod  nunquam  natura  alicujus  rei 
creatae  poterit  cognosci  per  effectum,  et  sic  subtrahitur  nobis 
oranis  cognitio  scientiae  naturalis,  in  qua  praecipue  demon- 
strationes  per  effectual  sumuntur.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  69. 

16Perfectio  effectus  deterrainat  perfectionem  causae.  C.  G., 
1.  3,  c.  69. 

17 Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  14,  a.  13. 

loManifestum  est  quod  causalitas  alicujus  causae  et  virtus 
ejus  tanto  magis  cognoscitur,  quanto  plures  et  majores  ejus 
effectus  innotescunt.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  49. 


—  94  — 

creation  is  His  work,  it  contains  innumerable 
manifestations  of  His  Power,  and  the  more  we 
know  of  them  and  the  more  deeply  we  enter 
into  them,  the  more  complete  will  be  our  idea 
of  the  Supreme  Cause  in  whom  all  these  effects 
find  a  single,  harmonious  setting. 


—  95 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  KNOWABLENESS  OF  GOD. 

SECTION  I. —  EXISTENCE   OF  GOD. 

The  general  principles  of  all  knowledge  and 
especially  the  elements  involved  in  intellectual 
knowledge  find  their  application  in  the  question 
of  God.  This  is  quite  natural,  since  for  Aquinas 
there  is  a  unity  running  through  all  things, 
so  that  the  highest  product  of  a  given  genus 
is  practically  the  lowest  being  in  the  genus 
immediately  above  it,1  There  is  more  reason 
for  this  intimate  connection  between  knowledge 
in  general  and  the  knowledge  of  God  in  par- 
ticular; for  if  we  admit  that  we  can  know 
God  at  all,  the  natural  inference  is,  that  the 
process  that  leads  to  a  knowledge  of  Him 
should  follow  lines  similar  to  those  that  lead 
to  a  knowledge  of  anything.  In  both  cases, 
we  have  the  same  human  mind,  the  same  data, 
and  with  the  modifications  coincident  to  a 
certain  class  or  kind  of  objects,  the  same 

1C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  97. 


-96- 

principles  should  hold.  As  our  knowledge 
becomes  more  complex,  owing  to  the  nature 
of  the  thing  known,  it  admits  new  factors, 
though  the  fundamental  elements  are  always 
the  same.  Likewise  the  knowledge  we  have 
of  God  rests  on  the  general  basis  of  knowledge, 
though  there  are  and  must  be  factors  peculiar 
to  it,  else  it  would  not  really  be  an  addition 
to  our  cognitions. 

The  actual  application  of  the  principles  thus 
far  discussed  will  come  in  evidence  as  the  ques- 
tion is  developed.  We  may  at  once,  however, 
briefly  state  the  chief  points  of  contact : 

1.  All  knowledge  requires  a  relation  of  knower 
and  known,  thus  God  and  man  must  be  related 
in  some  way. 

2.  Man    knows  only  according    to    his    own 
nature,  hence  our  knowledge  of  God  will  be  in 
terms  of  our  intellect. 

3.  A  requisite  for  knowledge  is  actuality  or 
immateriality,  and  the  degree  of  knowledge  is 
regulated  by  the  degree  of    actuality ;     God  is 
supremely  actual,  and  hence  infinitely  knowable 
in  Himself. 

4.  All  knowledge  takes  its  rise  in  the  senses  — 
thus  excluding  innate  ideas  and  intuitions ;   but 
the  intellectual   idea  is   due  to    an    abstractive 
power,  the    active    intellect,   operating    on    the 
deliverance  of  the  sensitive  image.     The  idea  of 


—  97  — 

God  arises  from  the  same  source  as  material 
things  —  it  is  not  an  intuition  nor  innate  —  but 
receives  final  expression  only  after  we  have 
purified  it  from  imperfections,  by  a  process  that 
can  be  readily  likened  to  the  work  of  the  active 
intellect. 

5.  The  validity  of  all  knowledge,  that  of  God 
included,  depends  on  the  proper  relation  between 
the  reality  of  things  and  the  truthfulness  of  our 
faculties,  as  already  indicated. 

The  problem  of  God  raises  two  questions  at 
the  outset:  Is  there  a  God?  and  if  so,  What 
is  the  nature  of  God?  The  great  difference 
between  these  two  queries  in  the  light  of 
difficulty  of  solution,  and  also  of  importance 
in  the  conclusion  reached,  was  fully  recognized 
by  St.  Thomas,  and  the  Scholastics  generally. 
We  have  already  noted  the  attitude  of  Aquinas 
regarding  the  existence  and  the  nature  of  the 
soul, —  "many  know  they  have  a  soul  who  do 
not  know  what  the  soul  is";  and  again,  "each 
one  experiences  in  himself  that  he  has  a  soul, 
and  that  the  acts  of  the  soul  take  place  within 
him,  but  to  know  the  nature  of  the  soul  is 
most  difficult."2  He  is  similarly  minded  on 
the  points  of  God's  existence  and  of  God's 
nature.  Existence  and  nature  comprise  the 

De  Veri.,  q.  10,  a.  8  ad  8. 


-98- 

Scholatic  phrases  oi'  An  Sit  and  Quid  Sit.3 
There  is  no  doubt  that  if  we  prove  the 
existence  of  an  object,  we  must  as  a  consequence 
know  something'  about  it,  and  in  this  sense 
Prof.  Royce  is  right  when  he  says:  "A  really 
fruitful  philosophical  study  of  the  conception  of 
God  is  inseparable  from  an  attempt  to  estimate 
what  evidence  there  is  for  the  existence  of  God." 
The  further  statement — "the  proof  that  one 
can  offer  for  God's  presence  at  the  heart  of 
the  world  constitutes  also  the  best  exposition 
that  one  can  suggest  regarding  what  one  means 
by  the  conception  of  God,"4  is  not  sufficiently 
complete.  In  this  viewr,  existence  and  nature 
are  correlative.  If  we  have  proven  the  existence 
of  an  object,  we  know  its  nature  implicitly  or 
fundamentally,  but  not  explicitly;  thus  the 
mere  existence  is  not  the  "best  exposition'  of 
the  nature.  We  may  prove  the  existence  of  God 
and  still  have  but  a  vague  general  idea  of  what 
God  is,  as  the  proofs  St.  Thomas  offers  for  God's 
existence  show ;  it  is  only  after  a  process  of 
deduction  and  the  analysis  of  the  idea  given 
by  the  proofs  that  we  can  be  said  to  have  an 
exposition  wrorthy  to  be  called  a  satisfactory 
or  rounded  conception.  An  adequate  or  proper 
concept  of  God  can  not  be  arrived  at  by  the 

3C.  G.,1.  1,  c.  12. 

4  The  Conception  of  God,  pp.  6,  7. 


-99  — 

human  mind  in  its  present  condition  — and  to 
this  extent  the  essence  of  God,  His  nature  in  se, 
remains  unknown  to  us,  yet  there  is  a  concept 
of  God's  nature  that  we  can  truly  reach  by 
determined  methods,  and  this  we  hope  to 
establish. 

Existence  and  conception  can  be  considered 
independently.  Whether  we  handle  both  or  only 
one,  we  practically  travel  over  the  same  ground. 
In  a  conception  we  are  held  to  give  as  much  as 
the  human  intellect  can  attain  to  regarding  the 
idea  of  God ;  in  proving  the  existence  of  God 
we  are  only  bound  to  as  much  as  the  facts 
contain  that  lead  to  this  existence  —  we  have 
still  the  analysis  of  this  idea  on  hand.  The 
existence  alone  lacks  completeness,  the  concep- 
tion by  itself  is  a  mere  idea.  St.  Thomas 
combines  both,  and  onlv  when  both  are  treated 

mi 

is  our  quest  a  fruitful  one.  If  God  were  an 
intuition,  the  questions  of  existence  and  nature 
would  blend,  w^ould  be  one;  if  He  is  known 
only  by  demonstration  they  are  distinct, 
though  closely  connected. 

How  is  the  existence  of  God  kno  vvn  ?  It  is 
not  known  per  se,  says  Aquinas,  and  hence  it 
must  be  known  by  demonstration.  St.  Thomas 
considers  the  two  great  aspects  under  which 
a  thing  is  knowable,  before  he  advances  evidence 
for  God's  existence.  An  object  is  knowable  in 


IOO 


itself- -per  se  nota  —  and  it  is  knowable  rela- 
tively to  us --quoad  nos  nota.  A  proposition 
is  knowable  in  itself  when  the  predicate  is 
included  in  the  concept  of  the  subject  or 
immediately  connected  with  it.  The  propo- 
sition, man  is  an  animal,  is  knowable  in  itself, 
because  the  predicate  animal  is  included  in  the 
concept  man.  The  same  is  true  of  first  princi- 
ples ;  but  first  principles  are  not  only  knowable 
in  themselves  but  also  immediately  knowable 
to  us.  A  proposition  is  knowable  in  itself  and 
knowable  to  us  when  we  immediately  perceive 
the  necessary  connection  between  the  subject 
and  the  predicate  —  as  in  the  first  principle,  the 
whole  is  greater  than  a  part. 

When  we  come  to  the  proposition  God  exists  — 
Deus  est  —  we  have  a  proposition  per  se  nota 
to  one  who  understands  the  meaning  of  the 
words,  God  and  exists.  "But  as  we  do  not 
know  what  God  is,  this  proposition  is  not  per 
se  nota,  but  needs  to  be  demonstrated  through 
those  things  that  are  more  known  to  us,  and 
less  known  in  their  nature,  namely  effects."5  The 
existence  of  God  must  then  be  proven.  To 
know  a  proposition  per  se,  it  is  needful  that 

5  Sed  quia  nos  non  scinms  de  Deo  quid  est,  non  est  nobis 
per  se  nota,  sed  indiget  demonstrari  per  ea  quae  sunt  magis 
nota  quoad  nos,  et  minus  nota  quoad  naturam,  scilicet  per 
effectus.  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2,  a.  1. 


101  — 

its  terms  and  their  relation  be  known ;  if  either 
is  unknown  \ve  can  not  speak  of  per  se  nota. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  existence  of  God 
is  not  known  per  se  to  us,  "for  our  intellect 
is  related  to  objects  that  are  most  known  as 
the  eye  of  an  owl  to  the  sun."  Before  giving 
his  proofs  for  God's  existence,  St.  Thomas  shows 
the  insufficieny  of  the  Argument  of  St.  Anselm 
to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  and  in  general, 
of  all  positions  that  do  not  start  with  material 
things  as  a  basis,  and  from  them  rise  to  a 
knowledge  of  God. 

The  Ontological  argument  was  advanced  by 
St.  Anselm,  modified  by  Descartes,  and  supple- 
mented by  Leibniz.  It  has  likewise  been 

•J 

handled  by  some  other  philosophers,  either  for 
commendation  or  rejection,  such  as,  Spinoza, 
Locke,  Kant,  Hegel.  We  shall  give  briefly  the 
position  of  the  first  three  named,  before  we 
present  the  reason  for  its  rejection  by  Aquinas. 
St.  Anselm  tells  us  that  he  had  been  seeking 
a  long  time  for  one  argument  that  would  suffice 
to  establish  the  existence  of  God — "a  single 
argument  that  would  require  no  other  for  its 
proof  than  itself  alone ;  and  alone  would  suffice 
to  demonstrate  that  God  trulv  exists."7  After 


6  Ad  ea  quae  sunt  notissima  rerum,   noster  intellectus  se 
habeat,  ut  oculus  noctuae  ad  solera.  C.  G.,  1,  c.  11. 

7  Preface  to  Proslogium. 


102  — 

a  weary  struggle  in  thought  he  finally  reached 
the  following  argument:  Even  the  fool,  he 
says,  has  the  idea  of  the  being  than  which 
nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  though  he 
does  not  understand  it  to  exist.  "And  what- 
ever is  understood  exists  in  the  understanding. 
And  assuredly  that  than  which  nothing  greater 
can  be  conceived,  cannot  exist  in  the  under- 
standing alone.  For  siippose  it  exists  in  the 
understanding  alone,  then  it  can  be  conceived 
to  exist  in  reality,  which  is  greater.  .  .  There 
is  no  doubt  that  there  exists  a  being,  than 
\vhich  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  and 
it  exists  both  in  the  understanding  and  in 
reality.'3  Descartes  held  that  we  have  an 
idea  of  a  supremely  perfect  being.  The  idea 
which  is  clear  and  distinct,  contains  in  itself 
the  idea  of  existence,  for  if  we  think  of  a 
mountain  we  must  recognize  that  there  is  a 
valley,  for  the  two  are  inseparable;  so  if  we 
have  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  the  idea  of  existence 
necessarily  accompanies  it.  This  perfect  being 
must  contain  all  perfection,  but  existence  is  a 
perfection  and  thus  cannot  be  wanting  to 
it.9  Leibniz  gives  the  form  of  the  argument 
as  set  forth  by  Anselm  and  Descartes  thus : 
"God  is  the  greatest  or  (as  Descartes  says) 

*  Ibid  ,c.  2. 

9  Principia  Philosophise,  part  1,   14;  Med.  3. 


—  103  — 

the  most  perfect  of  beings,  or  rather  a  being 
of  supreme  grandeur  and  perfection  including 
all  degrees  thereof.  That  is  the  notion  of 
God."  He  goes  on  to  say,  "The  Scholastics, 
not  even  excepting  their  Doctor  Angelicus  have 
misunderstood  this  argument  and  have  taken 
it  as  a  paralogism ;  in  which  respect  they  were 
altogether  wrong.  It  is  not  a  paralogism,  but 
it  is  an  imperfect  demonstration  which  assumes 
something  that  must  still  be  proved  in  order 
to  render  it  mathematically  evident;  that  is, 
it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  this  idea  of  the 
All-great  or  All-perfect  being  is  possible,  and 
implies  no  con  tradition.  And  it  is  already 
something  that  by  this  remark  it  is  proved 
that  assuming  that  God  is  possible  He  exists, 
which  is  the  privilege  of  divinity  alone."  This 
element  of  possibility  is  what  Leibniz  added 
to  the  argument,  and  of  which  he  said,  "We 
have  the  right  to  presume  the  possibility  of 
every  being,  and  especially  that  of  God,  until 
someone  proves  the  contrary." 

We  may  be  easily  mislead  by  the  Ontological 
Argument,  and  any  position  in  fact,  that  seeks 
to  rest  simply  on  ideas  that  are  common  to 
mankind  as  a  result  of  circumstances,  and  that 
does  not  probe  into  the  history  and  develop- 

10  Nouveaux  Essais,  c.  10. 


—  IO4  — 

ment  of  these  ideas.  St.  Thomas  wisely  remarks 
that  "men  are  accustomed  to  hear  and  invoke 
the  name  of  God  from  infancy;  but  custom, 
and  especially  that  dating  from  childhood, 
has  the  force  of  nature;  whence  it  is  brought 
about  that  those  things  by  which  one  is  im- 
bued from  boyhood  are  as  firmly  held  as  if 
they  \vere  naturally  and  per  se  known.  More- 
over, this  happens  because  we  do  not  distinguish 
between  a  thing  known  in  itself  simply  and 
as  known  by  us."  Anselm,  of  course  was 
aware  of  the  difference  between  an  idea  and  the 
objective  existence  of  a  corresponding  thing — 
he  says,  "it  is  one  thing  for  an  object  to  be  in 
the  understanding,  and  another  to  understand 
that  the  object  exists."  He  also  admitted  the 
a  posteriori  argument  for  God's  existence,  as 
did  Descartes  likewise.  Yet  in  the  argument 
under  consideration,  he  lays  great  stress  on 
the  fact  that  from  the  idea  of  God  we  can  pro- 
ceed further  and  come  to  reality,  but  he  does 

•/    ' 

not  speak  of  the  origin  of  this  idea  or  its 
basis  in  anything  outside  the  mind.  And  this 
is  where  it  diverges  from  the  view  of  Aquinas, 

11  A   principle  homines  assueti  sunt   nomen   Dei  audire  et 
invocare.     Consuetude  auteni,  et  praecipue  quae  est  a  prin- 
cipio,  vim  naturae  obtinet;  ex  quo  contingit  ut  ea  quibus  a 
pueritia  animus  imbuitur,  ita  firmiter  teneantur  ac  si  essent 
naturaliter  et  per  se  nota.     C.  C,  1.  1,  c.  11. 

12  Pros.,  c.  2. 


who  first  traces  the  steps  that  lead  to  this 
idea  before  he  seeks  to  specify  it.  The  word 
God  does  not  awaken  the  same  idea  in  all 
men,"  for  some  believed  God  to  be  body"; 
granting  that  it  did,  "it  would  not  follow 
that  what  is  understood  by  this  name  is 
in  rerum  natura,  but  only  an  intellectual  idea." 

The  flaw  in  the  argument  is  the  passage  from 
the  ideal  to  the  real,  and  St.  Thomas  pointed 
this  out  clearly,  though  unfortunately  he  did 
not  go  further  and  tell  us  how  he  arrived  at 
this  distinction.  The  fact  that  he  made  this 
distinction  is  evident,  and  refutes  the  unwar- 
ranted imputation  of  naive  realism.  It  was 
perhaps  his  undoubted  trust  in  reality  that 
prevented  him  from  going  beyond  a  mere 
reference  to  the  distinction  between  the  ideal 
and  the  real.14 

St.  Thomas  regards  the  argument  as  a  petitio 
principii.  "His  (Anselm's)  argument  proceeds 
from  this  supposition  that  he  posits  some  being 

10  Dato  enim  quod  quilibet  intelligat  hoc  nomine,  Deus, 
significari  hoc  quod  dicitur  (scilicet  illud  quo  magis  cogitari 
non  potest);  non  taraen  propter  hoc  sequitur  quod  intelligat 
id  quod  significatur  per  nomen,  esse  in  rerum  natura,  sed  in 
apprehensione  intellectus  tantum.  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  2, 
a.  1  ad  2. 

14  Modern  philosophers,  as  a  rule,  when  they  refer  to  this 
argument,  give  Kant  the  credit  for  picking  the  flaw  in  it, 
though  he  simply  repeats  the  criticism  given  by  St.  Thomas. 


—  io6  — 

than  which  no  greater  can  be  thought."15  "Un- 
less we  concede  there  is  something  in  rerum 
natura  than  which  no  greater  can  be  thought",16 
we  can  think  something  greater.  The  fact  that 
we  can  think  God  not  to  exist  "does  not  arise 
from  the  imperfection  or  uncertainty  of  His 
existence,  but  from  the  weakness  of  our  intellect 
which  can  not  see  Him  through  himself,  but 
through  His  effects.  And  thus  we  are  lead  to 
know  His  existence  by  demonstration."17 

The  existence  of  God  is  then  a  matter  of 
demonstration.  There  are  two  kinds  of  demon- 
stration—  one  from  cause  to  effect,  the  other 
from  eifect  to  cause.  The  former  is  called 
propter  quid  or  a  priori,  the  latter  quia  or  a 
posteriori.  "  When  some  eifect  is  more  manifest 
to  us  than  its  cause,  we  proceed  through  the 
effect  to  a  knowledge  of  the  cause.  From  every 

15  Ratio  sua  procedit  ex   hac  suppositione,  quod  suppon- 
atur  aliquid  esse  quo  majus  cogitari  non  potest.     Com.  on 
Lomb.,  I,  Dis.  3,  q   1,  a.  2  ad  4. 

16  Non  enim  inconveniens  est,  quolibet  dato  vel  in  re,  vel  in 
intellectu,  aliquid  majus  cogitari  posse,  nisi  ei  qui  concedit 
esse  aliquid,  quo  majus  cogitari  non  possit  in  rerum  natura. 
C.  G.  1.  1,  c.  11. 

17  Nam    quod    (Deus)    possit    cogitari    11011    esse,    non    ex 
imperfectione    sui    esse  est,   vel    incertitudine,   quit  in    suuru, 
esse,   sit    secundum    se    manifestissimum,   sed    ex    debilitate 
intellectus  nostri,   qui    eum    intueri  non  potest  per  ipsum, 
sed  ex  effectibus  ejus.     Et  sic,  ad  cognoscendum  ipsum  esse, 
ratiocinando  perducitur.  C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  11. 


—  ioy  — 

effect  the  existence  of  its  specific  cause  can  be 
demonstrated,  provided  its  effects  are  more 
known  to  us,  for  since  effects  depend  on  a  cause, 
the  effect  given,  the  cause  must  necessarily  exist. 
Whence  the  existence  of  God,  as  it  is  not  per 
se  known  to  us,  is  demonstrated  through  effects 
known  to  us." 

The  existence  of  God  is  proven  from  effects. 
The  fundamental  statement  and  fact  in  this 
question  from  man's  standpoint  is  this:  God, 
as  all  other  objects,  is  known  from  material 
things.  u  Though  God  exceeds  all  sensible 
things  and  sense  itself,  yet  His  effects,  from 
which  v^e  prove  His  existence,  are  sensible.  As 
the  origin  of  knowledge  is  in  sense,  so  of  those 
things  which  surpass  sense."  "The  human 
intellect  by  its  natural  power  cannot  grasp  the 
substance  of  God,  since  our  intellectual  knowl- 

18  Cum  enim  effectus  aliquis   nobis  est  manifestior  quam 
sua  causa,  per  effectum  procedimus  ad  cognitionem  causae. 
Ex    quolibet    autetn    effectu    potest  demonstrari    propriam 
causam  ejus  esse,   si    tanien    ejus    effectus    sint  magis  noti 
quoad  nos ;    quia  cum  effectus  dependeant  a  causa,   posito 
effectu,  necesse  est  causam   praeexistere.     Unde  Deum  esse, 
secundum  quod  non  est  per  se  notum  quoad  nos,  demon- 
strabile  est  per  effectus  nobis  notos.    Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  2,  a.  2. 

19  Etsi  Deus  sensibilia  omnia  et  sensum  excedat,  ejus  tamen 
effectus,   ex  quibus    demonstratio    sumitur    ad    pro^andum 
Deum  esse,  sensibiles  sunt;  et  sic  nostrae  cognitionis  origo 
in  sensu  est,  etiam  de  his  quae  sensum  excedunt.   C.  G.,  1.  1, 
c.  12. 


—  io8  — 

edge  in  this  life  takes  its  rise  in  the  senses.  .  . 
Yet  from  material  things  our  intellect  rises  to 
a  divine  knowledge,  a  knowledge  of  God's 
existence  and  the  qualities  it  is  proper  to 
attribute  to  Him  as  the  First  Cause."  '  Material 
things  are  diverse,  and  a  rational  consideration 
of  any  class  of  them  will  lead  us  to  a  conclusion 
above  and  beyond  the  members  of  the  class, 
singly  or  collectively  taken.  We  seek  to  know 
as  much  of  them  as  can  be  known  and  while 
thus  engaged  we  are  brought  to  a  something 
that  agrees  with  them  in  a  way,  and  yet  sur- 
passes them  to  a  much  greater  extent.  We 
suspect  this  something  has  more  to  do  with 
the  material  things  before  us  than  a  simple 
view  of  them  seems  to  warrant. 

In  this  spirit,  a  spirit  that  allows  the 
reasoning  faculty  to  pursue  what  appears  its 
legitimate  course  in  dealing  with  phenomena, 
St.  Thomas  considers  five  lines  of  facts  and 
follows  them  back  to  what  is  for  him  an 
inevitable  logical  conclusion.  These  proofs  are 
so  many  evidences  of  his  basic  principle  of 

20  Ad  substantiatn  ipsius  capiendam,  intellectus  humanus 
non  potest  natural!  virtute  pertingere,  quum  intellectus 
nostri,  secundum  modum  praesentis  vitae,  cognitio  a  sensu 
incipiat  .  .  Ducitur  tamen  ex  sensibilibus  intellectus  noster 
in  divinam  cognitionem,  ut  cognoscat  de  Deo  quia  est,  et 
alia  hujusmodi,  quae  oportet  attribui  primo  principle, 
C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  3. 


—  109  — 

knowledge  —  that  all  our  knowledge  comes  from 
material  things,  takes  its  rise  in  the  senses. 

In  the  formation  of  the  concept  of  God,  then, 
there  are  two  factors — material  things  and 
the  reasoning  faculty.  We  perceive  objects 
about  us  the  reason  of  whose  existence  is  not 
self-evident  nor  self-explanatory,  and  there  is 
in  man  a  natural  desire  to  get  at  the  bottom 
of  things,  to  seek  an  explanation  of  what  he 
sees.  What  is  this  natural  desire  in  the  system 
of  Aquinas  ? 

St.  Thomas  admits  that  each  man  has  as  a 
natural  endowment,  a  tendency  to  God,  which 
affects  his  whole  being.  There  is  the  desire 
for  unlimited  happiness,  and  perfection  in  its 
fulness,  and  the  desire  for  a  completely  satisfied 
inquisitiveness.  "Man  naturally  desires  hap- 
piness," and  thus  God,  "in  so  far  as  God  is 
the  beatitude  of  man."  "There  is  a  certain 
general  and  confused  knowledge  of  God,  wThich 
is,  as  it  were,  present  to  all  men."  And  this 
is  true  "because  man  by  natural  reason  can 
readily  arrive  at  some  knowledge  of  God,  for 
men  seeing  that  the  things  of  nature  move 
according  to  order,  understand  that  there  is 
some  ordainer  of  these  things,  for  there  is  no 
ordering  without  an  orderer."  Yet  this  general 


21  Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  2,  a.  1  ad  1. 


I  10- 

view  does  not  reveal,  "  who  or  of  what  nature, 
or  if  there  be  but  one  orderer  of  nature."22  Those, 
therefore,  who  contend  that  God  is  immediately 
known  because  He  is  the  adequate  explanation 
of  things,  must  remember  that  our  concept  of 
this  adequate  principle  of  all  is  at  first  very 
vague.  It  exists  however,  and  resting  on  it 
St.  Thomas  builds  up  a  position  that  we  might 
call  the  Nature-God  Tendency,  "the  intellectual 
substance  tends  to  divine  knowledge  as  a  last 
end."23 

This  tendency  or  disposition  is  principally  an 
internal  affair,  a  spontaneous  expression  of 
our  nature,  yet  even  here  the  starting  point, 
the  basis  of  its  operation,  lies  in  things  with- 


22  Est  enim  quaedam  comraunis  et    confusa  Dei    cognitio, 
quae    quasi    omnibus    hominibus    adest.  .  .   Quia    naturali 
ratione  statim  homo  in  aliqualem  Dei  cognitionem  pervenire 
potest;  videntes  enim  homines  res  naturales  secundum  ordi- 
nem  creatum  currere ;  quum  ordinatio  absque  ordinatore  non 
sit.  .  .  Quis,  auteni  qualis,  vel  si  unus  tantura  est  ordinator 
naturae    nondum    stat    in  ex   hac  communi  consideratione 
haberur.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  38. 

23  Substantia  igitur  intellectualis  tendit  in  divinam  cogni- 
tionem sicut   in  ultimum  finem.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  25      Driscoll 
apty  calls  this  tendency  by  the  name  of  spontaneous  knowl- 
edge of  God.'     It  is  distinguished   by  two  important  charac- 
teristics, he  says,    "a)   It  arises  from  rational  nature  by  the 
use    of  faculties    connatural    to    all.     Hence    it    is    not    an 
intuition,   nor  is  it  the  result  of  a  special  faculty,    b)  It  is 
universal    with    human    nature.     God.     Pref    to    2nd    ed., 
p.   VIII. 


—  I II  — 

out,  in  sensible  objects.  The  mind  cannot  rest 
in  these  objects,  but  advances,  "for  nothing 
finite  can  quiet  the  desire  of  the  intellect."  Thus 
as  there  is  a  "  natural  desire  to  know  in  all 
intellectual  natures,  so  there  is  a  natural  desire 
to  dispel  ignorance  or  nescience."24  We  are 
therefore  lead  to  as  thorough  a  knowledge  and 
as  complete  an  explanation  of  things  as  our 
powers  admit.  The  imperfect  desires  to  attain 
perfection  in  a  given  sphere,  "for  he  who  has 
an  opinion  about  a  certain  thing,  which  is  an 
imperfect  knowledge  of  that  thing,  from  this 
very  fact  is  incited  to  desire  a  scientific  knowl- 
edge of  it.  .  .  We  do  not  think  we  know  an 
object  if  we  are  ignorant  of  its  substance, 
whence  our  principal  aim  in  knowing  a  thing 
is  to  get  at  its  nature  or  quiddity."  We  per- 
ceive that  men  act,  and  wre  attribute  their 
action  to  a  certain  cause  to  which  we  give 
the  name  soul,  though  we  know  not  as  yet  the 

24  Nihil  finitum  desiderium    intellectus    quietare    potest.  .  . 
Sicut    naturale    desiderium    inest    omnibus  intellectualibus 
naturis  ad  sciendum,  ita  inest  naturale  desiderium  ignorant  - 
iam  seu  nescientiarn  pellendi.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  50. 

25  Omne  enim  quod  est  imperfectum  in  aliqua  specie  desid- 
erat    consequi    perfectionem    speciei    illius ;  qui    enim    habet 
opinionem  de  re  aliqua,  quae  est  imperfecta  illius  rei  notitia, 
ex  hoc  ipso  incitatur  ad  desiderandum  illius  rei  scientiam,  .  . 
Noil  enim  arbitramur  nos  aliquid  cognoscere  si  substantiam 
ejus  non  cognoscimus.     Utide  et  praecipuum  in  cognitione 
alicujus  rei  est  scire  de  ea  quid  est.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  50. 


—    112 


nature  of  the  soul,  if  it  be  body,  or  how  it  affects 
the  operations  we  witness."26 

Philosophy  was  born  in  the  "  natural  desire  all 
men  have  of  knowing  the  causes  of  what  they 
see",  and  not  until  they  "have  the  cause,  are 
they  at  rest.  The  quest  however  does  not  cease 
until  they  have  reached  the  first  cause,  for  then 
only  do  we  consider  our  knowledge  perfect 
when  we  know  the  first  cause.  Man  naturally 
desires  to  know  the  first  cause  as  if  an  ultimate 
end."  It  is  easy  to  see  whither  this  thought 
leads;  this  desire  "tends  toward  something 
definite.  We  find  as  a  fact  in  this  desire  of 
knowing  the  more  one  knows,  the  greater  is 
one's  desire  to  know;  hence  this  natural  desire 
of  man  for  knowing  tends  toward  some  deter- 
mined end.  But  this  end  can  be  no  other  than 


26  Quam  videmus  hominen  moveri  et  alia  opera  agere,  per- 
cipimus  in  eo  quandam  causam  harum  operationum  quae 
aliis  rebus  non  inest,  et  hanc  causam  animam  nominamus, 
nondum  tamen  scientes  quid  sit  anima,  si  est  corpus,  vel 
qualiter  operationes  praedictas  efficiat.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  38. 

i7  Naturaliter  inest  omnibus  hominibus  desidcrium  cognos- 
cendi  causa  earum  quae  videntur;  unde,  propter  admira- 
tionem  eorum  quae  videbantur  quorum  causae  latebant, 
homines  primo  philosophari  coeperunt;  invenientes  autem 
causam  quiescebant.  Nee  sistit  inquisitio  quousque  per- 
veniatur  ad  primani  causam ;  et  tune  perfecte  nos  scire 
arbitramur  quando  primam  causam  cognoscimns.  Desiderat 
igitur  homo  naturaliter  cognoscere  primam  causan  quasi 
ultimum  finem.  C.  G.y  \.  3,  c.  2f>. 


the  most  excellent  that  is  knowable  which  is 
God."  Again,  in  accordance  with  the  general 
principles  of  knowledge  we  come  to  the  same 
conclusion.  "Man  naturally  desires  to  know 
the  cause  of  every  known  effect,  but  the  human 
intellect  knows  ens  universale,  therefore  it 
naturally  desires  to  know  its  cause,  \vhich  is 
God  only."29 

We  can  then  state,  that  there  is  innate  in  man 
a  faculty  or  power  which  abstracts  particular, 
general,  transcendental  concepts  from  the  data 
of  the  senses,  and  which  from  these  concepts,  by 
a  process  of  negation  and  combination,  forms 
other  concepts,  even  the  concept  of  God;  and 
finally,  a  natural  tendency  which  seeks  the 
cause  of  things  known,  and  is  not  at  rest  until 
it  finds  the  first  cause,  and  knows  its  nature 
in  some  way.30  To  this  extent  the  idea  of  God 

28  Quod   igitur  vehementius  in   aliquid  tendit  postea  quam 
prius,  non  movetur  ad  infinitum,  sed  ad   aliquid  determina- 
tum    tendit.     Hoc    autem    invenimus    in    desiderio    sciendi  ; 
quanto  enim  aliquis  plura  scit,  tanto  majori  desiderio  affec- 
tat    scire.     Tendit    igitur    desideriuni    naturale    hominis  in 
sciendo  ad   aliquem  determinatum  finem.     Hoc  autem  non 
potest  esse  aliud  quam  nobilissitnum  scibile,  quod  Deus  est. 
C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  25. 

29  Cujuslibet  effectus  cogniti  naturaliter  homo  causam  scire 
desiderat.     Intellectus  autem  humanus  cognoscit  ens  univer- 
sale.    Desiderat  igitur  naturaliter  cognoscere  causam  ejus, 
quae  solum  Deus  est.     C.  G. ,  1.  3,  c.  25. 

30  This  statemeut  is  taken  fromHontheim's  Theodicea,  p.  19. 


is  innate  in  us.  Hontheim  and  others  think  it 
better  to  refrain  from  speaking  of  this  innate 
idea  of  God  at  the  present  time,  on  account  of 
the  danger  of  abuse,  yet  it  exists  in  the  sense 
explained  and  is  so  admitted  by  St.  Thomas, 
and  it  is  but  just  to  those  who  hold  we  have 
an  immediate  or  innate  idea  of  God — as  this 
word  innate  is  usually  understood — to  admit 
the  amount  of  truth  their  view  contains.31 

This  concession  however,  does  not  do  away 
with  the  necessity  of  demonstration  and  analy- 
sis for  attaining  the  idea  of  God  in  so  far  as 
the  human  mind  can  attain  it.  Aquinas  does 
not  lose  sight  of  his- main  thesis— that  all  knowl- 
edge rises  from  the  senses.  "  There  is  a  certain 
confused  estimation  by  which  God  is  commonly 
known  by  all  or  most  men  .  .  .  and  there  is  also 
a  knowledge  of  God  by  way  of  demonstra- 
tion"32— the  former  is  the  knowledge  common 


31  Moreover,  this  shows  that  the  view  St.  Thomas  took 
of  the  problem  of  God  was  broad  and  flexible,  and  offsets 
the  impression  that  the  idea  of  God  for  him  was  a  rigid, 
formal  conception — Being  and  nothing  else,  and  this  even  in 
Pantheistic  sense,  as  we  find  stated  by  J.  W.  Hanne  in  Die 
Idee  der  Absoluten  Personlicbkeit,  pp.  486-494.  There  is 
much  material  in  Aquinas  to  lengthen  out  the  point  we 
have  just  touched  on  in  the  text. 

82  Communiter  ab  omnibus  vel  pluribus  (Deus)  cognoscitur 
secundum  quamdam  aestimationein  confusam  .  .  .  cognosci- 
tur (Deus)  per  viam  demonstrationis.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  48. 


to  all,  a  vague  knowledge;  the  latter  is  a  proper 
knowledge  of  God  resting  on  argument  and 
proof.  Moreover,  he  does  not  allow  a  greater 
certainty  to  conclusions  based  on  the  data  of 
consciousness  as  consciousness,  "for  although 
the  human  mind  has  greater  likeness  to  God 
than  inferior  creatures,  yet  the  knowledge  of 
God  which  is  derived  from  the  human  mind 
does  not  exceed  the  kind  of  knowledge  which 
arises  from  sensible  things,  since  the  soul  only 
knows  its  nature  because  it  understands  the 
natures  of  sensible  objects.  Whence  God  is  not 
known  through  this  source  in  a  higher  way 
than  the  cause  is  known  through  the  ef- 
fect."33 This  statement  bars  innate  ideas  from 
the  system  of  Aquinas,  as  well  as  what  is  now 
called  Personal  Idealism,  which  cuts  away  from 
the  sensible  world  and  tries  to  find  in  conscious- 
ness alone  its  view  of  God.  St.  Thomas  says  we 
gain  nothing  by  this  procedure,  for  whence  comes 
our  knowledge  of  consciousness  ?  From  sensi- 
ble things.  Hence  it  is,  that  after  the  admis- 

33  Quamvis  autem  mens  humana  propinquiori  Dei  similitu- 
dinem  repraesentat  quam  inferiores  creaturae,  tamen  cog- 
nitio  Dei,  quae  ex  mente  humana  accipi  potest,  non  excedit 
illud  genus  cognitionis  quod  ex  sensibilibus  sumitur,  cum  et 
ipsa  anima  de  seipsa  cognoscat  quid  est,  per  hoc  quod 
naturas  intelligit  sensibilium.  Unde  nee  per  hanc  viam  cog- 
nosci  Deus  altiori  modo  potest  quam  sicut  causa  cognoscitur 
per  effectum.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  4,7. 


—  n6  — 

sions  already  noted,  he  sets  out  to  prove 
the  existence  of  God  from  five  points  of  view, 
each,  however,  starting  from  material  things. 

The  first  argument  is  taken  from  the  fact  of 
motion.  This  St.  Thomas  calls  "the  more 
manifest  way'  or  fact  to  start  with.  "It  is 
certain  and  evident  to  sense  that  there  is 
movement  in  the  world,  but  what  is  moved  is 
moved  by  another,  for  nothing  is  moved  except 
it  is  in  potency  to  the  movement  it  undergoes. 
Naught  passes  from  the  potential  to  the  actual 
save  through  the  actual  .  .  .  for  the  same  thing 
cannot  be  potential  and,  actual  at  the  same  time 
under  the  same  aspect,  but  only  under  diverse 
aspects.  .  .  It  is  thus  impossible  that  from  the 
same  point  of  view,  and  in  the  same  manner, 
something  be  mover  and  moved,  or  something 
move  itself.  .  .  Therefore  whatever  is  moved  must 
be  moved  by  another."  Everything  in  motion 
is  moved  by  another,  but  we  cannot  admit  this 
"process  in  infinitum,  otherwise  there  would 
be  no  first  mover,  and  consequently  no  motion. 
.  .  Therefore  we  must  come  to  some  prime  mover 
that  is  moved  by  no  other,  and  all  understand 
this  to  be  God." 

The  second  argument  rests  on  the  "concept 
of  efficient  cause.  We  find  in  these  sensible 
things  an  .order  of  efficient  causes ;  yet  we  do 
not  discover,  nor  can  we,  that  anything  is  its 


own  efficient  cause,  for  thus  it  would  be  prior 
to  itself  which  is  impossible."  These  causes  are 
related  —  first,  intermediate,  and  ultimate;  the 
last  depends  on  the  intermediate,  and  these, 
whether  one  or  many,  depend  on  a  first,  or 
else  they  themselves  should  not  exist,  which  is 
contrary  to  fact,  and  we  should  be  obliged  to 
admit  an  infinite  regress.  "We  must  therefore 
posit  some  efficient  first  cause,  which  we  call 
God." 

We  have  then  the  argument  from  contingent 
or  possible  being  to  necessary  being.  We  find 
certain  things  that  are  indifferent  to  existence. 
They  may  or  may  not  exist ;  but  things  of  this 
nature  were  not  always.  If  all  things  were 
thus  indifferent,  there  would  have  been  a  time 
when  there  was  no  existence.  If  this  is  true 
then  there  would  be  no  existence  now,  which 
is  false,  for  "nothing  begins  to  be  except 
through  what  is."  There  must  then  be  some 
necessary  existence  in  things.  This  necessary 
being  or  existence  has  the  cause  of  its  necessity 
in  itself  or  from  without.  If  from  without  we 
are  again  on  the  path  of  efficient  causes,  and 
thus  can  not  proceed  in  infinitum.  'Therefore, 
we  must  posit  something  necessary  per  se, 
whose  necessity  is  not  caused,  but  which  is  the 
cause  of  necessity  to  others.  And  this  we  call 
God." 


—  u8- 

The  various  degrees  of  perfection  found  in 
things,  is  the  basis  of  the  fourth  argument.  In 
objects  we  find  that  we  can  apply  the  particles 
"more"  or  "less"  to  their  qualities  of  goodness, 
truth,  and  the  like.  This  comparison  rests  on 
agreement  with  a  standard  which  is  fully  what 
they  are  in  part.  In  a  given  line  of  perfection 
we  have  degrees  in  various  proportions,  there 
must  then  be  an  absolute  perfection  in  this 
line  which  is  the  basis  and  standard  of  these 
degrees.  "Therefore  there  is  something  which 
is  the  cause  of  the  being,  goodness,  and  every 
perfection  of  all  beings,  and  this  we  call  God." 

The  last  argument  leads  to  an  intelligent 
being  from  the  idea  of  order  in  things.  We  see 
objects  that  are  irrational  act  for  an  end,  and 
this  not  occasionally  but  always,  or  at  least 
most  frequently  they  act  to  attain  what  is 
best;  thus  this  action  is  not  due  to  chance. 
But  irrational  objects  can  not  act  tints  unless 
they  are  directed  by  some  rational  or  intellectual 
being.  "  Therefore  there  is  something  intelligent 
by  which  all  natural  things  are  ordained 
to  an  end.  And  this  we  call  God."34 

34  These  arguments  are  taken  from  the  Sum.  Theol., 
I,  q.  2,  a.  3. 


—  119  — 
SECTION  H. — THE  FIRST  CAUSE. 

The  principle  running  through  the  proofs  is 
that  of  causality.  The  result  of  each  line  of 
evidence  is  the  outcome  of  the  application  of 
this  principle.  The  facts  of  motion,  contingency, 
production,  and  the  like,  in  the  world,  call  for 
an  explanation;  an  ultimate  explanation  of  all 
phenomena  is  the  one  point  that  marks  off 
divine  causality  from  created  causes.  In  second- 
ary causes,  we  find  the  immediate,  partial 
reason  for  a  given  event,  in  divine  causality, 
the  principle  is  pushed  to  its  limit  and  we  reach 
the  final  reason  for  all  events.  This  final  ex- 
planation is  the  goal  of  every  philosophical 
system,  and  rests  on  the  amount  of  knowledge 
the  phenomena  about  us  can  give  us  of  their 
ultimate  cause. 

Whether  we  regard  the  principle  of  causality 
as  objective  with  St.  Thomas,  or  make  it  sub- 
jective as  Kant  and  his  followers  hold,  this 
much  at  least  is  certain:  we  perceive  things, 
phenomena,  that  call  for  an  explanation,  and 
there  is  in  man  a  natural  tendency  to  seek  the 
explanation  of  things  —  these  two  factors  com- 
bined lead  us  to  an  ultimate  ground  or  reason 
of  appearances.  A  Conception  of  God  might 
then  be  defined,  the  ultimate  explanation  of 
what  the  individual  or  conceiver  thinks  needs 


I2O 

explanation.  In  this  sense,  we  can  have  no 
contention  with  the  Conception  as  such,  but 
if  there  is  disagreement  it  must  be  looked  for 
much  further  back --in  the  theory  of  reality, 
which  depends  on  the  theory  of  knowledge. 
And  here  is  where  the  need  of  a  true  theory  of 
knowledge  is  absolutely  necessary.  Thus  the 
Agnostic  Unknowable  God  is  the  result  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable  in  general.  The 
Idealistic  Conception  of  God  is  the  logical 
outcome  of  the  denial  of  external  reality.  The 
Intuitionists  go  astray  in  considering  God  as 
primo  and  per  se  known.  Those  who  say  that 
God  is  a  necessary  Postulate,  deny  the  real 
proving  power  of  His  manifestations.  The 
position  of  Aquinas  is  based  on  the  principles 
already  discussed  —  the  consideration  of  phe- 
nomena, material  things,  lead  us  to  their  final 
explanation.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  argu- 
ments advanced  for  proving  God's  existence. 

Some  consider  the  first  four  proofs  as  instances 
of  efficient  causality,  and  the  fifth  as  teleological. 
Others  regard  the  four  kinds  of  causes  utilized  - 
first  and  second  proofs  represent  effiicient  cause, 
the  third,  material  cause,  the  fourth,  formal 
cause,  and  the  fifth,  final  or  exemplar  cause. 
Whatever  view  we  take,  the  result  is  practi- 
the  same  for  the  proving  power  of  the  effects. 
Though  efficient  causality  was  not  the  only 


121 


or  the  principal  one  for  the  Scholastics,  yet 
as  already  noted,  every  cause  looks  toward 
efficiency,  and  hence  the  effects  of  each  cause 
give  us  a  knowledge  of  the  cause;  and  this 
for  our  purpose  is  the  important  aspect  of 
causality. 

We  might,  as  an  instance,  consider  the  knowl- 
edge we  can  derive  of  the  nature  of  the  final 
or  exemplar  cause  from  a  consideration  of  its 
effects.  This  is  the  fifth  argument  that  leads 
to  God  as  Intelligence  —  the  other  arguments,  as 
arguments,  present  Him  as  Prime  Mover,  First 
Cause,  Necessary  Being,  Perfect  Being,  respec- 
tively. The  axiom — omne  agens  agit  sibi  simile — 
gets  a  higher  meaning  when  the  agens  acts  by 
intelligence.  Here  enters  the  idea  of  a  free 
agent,  and  unlike  an  agent  that  acts  with  its 
physical  being  only  and  is  limited  to  one 
determined  effect,  we  have  now  a  variety  of 
effects  depending  on  the  choice  of  the  intelligent 
cause.  "The  effects  proceed  from  a  cause  as 
they  preexist  in  a  cause,  since  omne  agens  agit 
sibi  simile.  But  the  effects  preexist  in  the  cause 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  cause."  Aquinas 
concludes  that  the  effects  of  human  and  divine 


1  Effectus  procedit  a  causo  agente,  secundum  quod  prae- 
existunt  in  ea ;  quia  omne  agens  agit  sibi  simile.  Praeexis- 
tunt  autem  effectus  in  causa  secundum  modum  causae. 
Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.,  9,  a.  4. 


—    122  — 


causality  are  present  to  these  causes  "according 
to  an  intelligent  nature."  The  effect  agrees 
with  the  idea  or  prototype  in  the  mind  of  the 
agent.  Here  we  meet  the  question  of  Divine 
Ideas  which  are  the  measure  of  things,  and  of 
which  we  receive  a  knowledge  from  a  consid- 
eration of  their  expression  in  nature. 

Ideas  or  forms  in  general  are  distinct  or  rather 
different  from  the  existent  objects,  and  can  be 
viewed  under  a  twofold  aspect.  They  may  be 
the  principle  of  knowledge  of  a  thing,  and  then 
we  have  the  idea,  form,  or  species  as  already 
discussed  —  for  the  thing  itself  must  be  known 
if  the  idea,  according  to  which  the  thing  is 
made,  is  known.  They  may  be  the  exemplars 
of  the  existent  things,  for  the  intelligent  agent 
acts  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  in  his  mind  the 
idea  or  model  of  what  he  is  to  produce,  and 
this  idea  must  be  a  determined,  specific  one  or 
the  result  would  be  fortuitous.  In  this  sense, 
the  idea  is  causal,  it  is  the  plan  the  agent 
follows  in  his  operations.  There  is  then  an 
agreement  between  the  idea  and  the  object 
based  on  it.  "  The  exemplar  forms  of  the  Divine 
Intellect  are  productive  of  the  whole  object, 
both  matter  and  form.  And  hence  they 
embrace  not  only  the  nature  of  the  species  but 
also  the  specific  character  of  the  individual  — 


—   123  — 

first,  however  the  nature  of  the  species."  All 
creation,  all  finite  effects,  have  their  originals 
in  the  Mind  of  God;  hence  by  a  knowledge  of 
these  effects  we  are  led  back  to  a  knowledge  of 
their  models,  and  through  the  models  we  learn 
something  of  the  nature  of  the  cause. 

These  ideas  in  the  Divine  Essence  constitute 
God's  knowledge  of  things  other  than  Himself, 
which  are  based  on  these  ideas.  "Idea  does  not 
signify  Divine  Essence  as  Divine  Essence,  but 
only  as  it  is  the  likeness  or  concept  of  this  or 
that  object.'  And  again,  "the  Essence  of  God 
is  the  idea  of  things,  not  indeed  as  essence,  but 
as  it  is  understood."  "Thus  God  by  knowing 
His  essence  knows  other  things,  as  effects  are 
known  through  a  knowledge  of  the  cause."  On 
the  basis  of  things  as  having  their  models  in 

2  Formae    exemplares    intellectus    divinae    sunt    factivae 
totius  rei,  et  quantum   ad   materiam,   et  quantum   ad  for- 
mam;  et  ideo  respiciunt  creaturam  non  solum  quantum  ad 
naturam    specie!,    sed    etiam    quantum    ad    singularitatem 
individui,   per  prius  tamen    quantum    ad  naturam    specie!. 
Quodl.  8,  q.  1,  a.  2. 

3  Idea  non  nominat  divinam  essentiam,    in   quantum  est 
essentia,  sed  in  quantum  est  similitude  vel  ratio  hujus  vel 
illius  rei.    Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  15,  a.  2  ad  1. 

4  Essentia  Dei  est  idea  rerum,  non  quidem  ut  essentia,  sed 
ut  est  intellecta.     De  Veri.,  q.  3,  a.  2. 

5  Sic  Deus  cognoscendo  suam    essentiam,   alia    cognoscit, 
sicut  per  cognitionem  causae  cognoscuntur  effectus.     C.  G. 
1.  1,  c.  68. 


124- 

the  Divine  Mind,  on  the  same  principle  that 
effects  give  us  a  knowledge  of  their  cause,  we 
rise  to  a  knowledge  of  God. 

''Creatures  lead  us  to  a  knowledge  of  God 
as  effects  conduct  to  the  cause.  Natural  reason 
can  know  of  God  only  what  is  proper  to  Him 
as  the  principle  or  cause  of  all  beings."  The 
manifestations  of  God  are  numerous,  and  must 
be  so,  since  "no  creature  can  be  equal  to  God," 
though  He  as  "every  cause  tends  to  produce 
His  likeness  in  the  effect  in  so  far  as  the  effect 
can  receive  it.  .  .  Hence  there  is  required  a  multi- 
plicity and  variety  in  created  things  so  that  a 
perfect  likeness  of  God,  according  to  His  nature, 
be  found  in  them."  Even  with  effects  that  are 
numerous,  and  that  vary  in  greatness,  "we  ex- 
perience daily  that  there  is  a  defect  in  our  knowl- 
edge, for  there  are  many  qualities  of  sensible 
objects  of  which  we  are  ignorant,  and  in  many  of 
those  qualities  which  we  do  apprehend  by  sense, 


6  Creaturae  ducnnt    in    Dei    cognitionem,  sicut  effectus  in 
causam.     Hoc  igitur  solum  ratione  naturali  de  Deo  cognosci 
potest,   quod  competere  ei  necesse  est,  secundum   quod  est 
omnium  entium  principium.    Sam.  Theol ,  I,  q.  32,  a.  1. 

7  Non    enim  creatura    potest    esse    Deo    aequalis.  .  .  Quitm 
enim  omne   agens  intendit  suam  similitudinem  in  effectum 
inducere,   secundum  quod  effectus  capere  potest.  .  .  Oportuit 
igitur  esse  multiplicitatem  et  varietatem  in   rebus  creatis,  ad 
hoc,  quod  inveniretur  in  eis  Dei  similitude  perfecta  secundum 
modum  suum.     C.  G.,  1.  2,  c.  45. 


—  125  — 

we  do  not  attain  to  perfect  knowledge.     To  a 
much   greater  extent   therefore  is  human  reason 


to' 


insufficient  to  investigate  all  that  is  intelligible 
about  that  most  excellent,  transcendant  sub- 
stance." We  are  capable  however,  of  attaining 
a  partial  knowledge,  which  though  not  ade- 
quate is  true  as  far  as  it  goes. 

There  are  a  few  misapprehensions  of  the  view 
of  Aquinas  about  the  nature  of  the  First  Cause 
that  ought  to  be  removed  before  we  take  up 
specifically  the  Quid  Sit,  or  what  we  can  know 
about  the  Nature  of  God.  God  is  a  universal, 
permanent,  continuous  cause,  present  in  each 
phenomenon  by  His  actuality,  and  contributing 
more  to  the  result  of  the  created  secondary 
activity  than  the  immediate  secondary  cause. 

St.  Thomas  says  that  the  very  unity  and 
simplicity  of  God  is  the  reason  why  He  can 
produce  many  and  diverse  effects,  just  as  he 
holds  that  the  soul  knows  all  things  precisely 
because  it  is  none  of  those  things  it  knows. 
''The  divine  power  is  not  limited  to  one  effect; 
and  this  comes  from  its  simplicity,  for  the 

8  Idem  manifeste  apparet  ex  defectu,  quern  in  rebus  cognos- 
cendis  quotidie  experimMr.  Rerum  enim  sensibilium  plurimas 
proprietates  ignoramus,  earumque  proprietatum,  quas  sensu 
apprekendimus,  rationem  perfecte  in  pluribus  invenire  non 
possnmus.  Multo  igitur  amplius  excellentisstnae  sub- 
stantiae,  transcendentis,  omnia  intelligibilia  humana  ratio 
investigare  non  sufficit.  C,  G.,  1.  1,  c.  3. 


—  126  — 

nearer  a  power  is  to  unity,  the  nearer  it  is 
to  infinity,  and  can  extend  itself  to  more  ob- 
jects." The  effects  are  in  proportion  to  their 
cause  and  get  their  character  from  their  most 
perfect  cause.  "Therefore  the  distinction  in 
objects,  in  which  consists  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse (but  the  order  of  the  universe  is  what  is 
best  in  all  created  beings),  is  not  the  result  of 
secondary  causes  but  rather  the  intention  of  the 
First  Cause."10  Moreover  the  First  Cause  con- 
tributes more  to  the  effect  than  the  immediate 
secondary  cause.  "  Every  cause  is  in  some  man- 
ner the  cause  of  being,  either  substantial  or 
accidental.  But  nothing  is  the  cause  of  being 
except  in  so  far  as  it  acts  in  the  divine  power. 
Therefore  every  cause  operates  through  the 
power  of  God."  "God  is  more  of  a  principal 
cause  in  each  action  than  even  the  secondary 


y  Virtus  diviua  non  limitatur  ad  unum  effectura;  et  hoc 
ex  ejus  simplicitate  provenit,  quia  quanto  aliqua  virtus  est 
magis  unita,  tanto  magis  est  infinita  et  ad  plura  se  potest 
extendere.  C.  G.,  1.  2,  c.  42. 

10  Non  igitur  rerum  distinctio,  in  qua  ordo  universali  (opti- 
mum autem  in  omnibus  creatis  est  ordo  universi)  consistit, 
causatur  ex  causis  secundis,  scd  magis  ex  intentione  primae 
causae.  C.  G.,  1.  2,  c.  42. 

1  Omne  enirn  operans  est  aliquo  modo  causa  essendi,  vel 
secundum  esse  substantiate  vel  accidentale;  Nihil  autem  est 
causa  essendi,  nisi  in  quantum  agit  in  virtute  divina.  Omne 
igitur  operans  operatur  per  virtutem  Dei.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  67. 


((    UNIVERSr 
—  127  — 

agents."12  There  is,  however,  true  secondary 
causality.  "The  causality  of  inferior  effects  is 
not  attributed  to  the  divine  power  in  such  a 
a  way  that  the  causality  of  the  inferior  causes 
is  taken  away."  Nor  is  the  effect  to  be  con- 
sidered "as  due,  partly  to  God  and  partly  to 
the  natural  agent;  but  the  whole  is  from  both 
under  a  different  aspect,  as  the  same  whole 
effect  is  attributed  to  the  instrument,  and  also 
the  whole  to  the  principal  cause." 

This  intimate  presence  of  God  in  all  activities 
will  help  us  to  understand  the  idea  of  the  First 
Cause  in  the  proofs  for  God's  existence.  There 
are  two  opinions  on  this  point  among  those 
who  hold  that  these  proofs  demonstrate  God's 
existence.  One  maintains  that  the  existence  of 
God  is  proven  from  the  fact  that  an  infinite  series 
of  causes  is  impossible,  and  hence  we  must  come 
to  a  First  Cause,  God.  The  other  holds  that 
the  idea  of  the  First  Cause  is  valid  independently 
of  the  series,  and  this,  to  our  mind,  is  the  view 

12  Deus    igitur    principalius    est    causa    cujuslibet  actionis 
quam  etiam  secundae  causae  agentes.     C.  G  ,  1.  3,  c.  67. 

13  Non  ergo  causalitas  effectuum   inferiorum  est  ita  attri- 
buenda  divinae  virtuti,  quod  subtrahatur  causalitas  inferi- 
orum agentium.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  69. 

14  Non  partim   a  Deo,   partim  a  uaturali  agente  fiat,  sed 
totus  ab  utroque  secundum  alium  modum  ;  sicut  idem  eftec- 
tus  totus  attribuitur  instrumento,  et  principali  agenti  etiam 
totus.    C.  G  ,  1.  3,  c.  70. 


—   128  — 

of  Aquinas,  gathered  from  his  general  treatment 
of  Causality.  It  might  be  called  the  intensive 
view.  According  to  it,  a  thorough  consideration 
and  complete  explanation  of  any  effect  will 
lead  us  to  a  knowledge  of  the  First  Cause, 
and  thus  we  need  not  go  through  a  series  to 
find  God  at  the  end,  and  then  only  the  First 
in  the  series.  He  is  in  every  activity  and  can 
be  known  as  the  full  explanation  of  the  event. 
To  the  mind  of  St.  Thomas,  the  proofs  have 
efficacy  even  were  there  an  infinite  series,  for 
he  gives  them  as  metaphysically  demonstrative, 
and  yet  he  admits  the  possibility^,  or  rather 
the  non -contradiction  of  the  eternity  of  the 
world.10  The  important  point  to  his  mind  is 
the  understanding  of  the  effect  or  effects  given, 
for  the  simple  but  complete  consideration  of  an 
effect  is  sufficient  to  reach  the  First  Cause. 
If  this  is  true,  then  the  objections  raised  on 
the  score  of  the  impossibility  of  conceiving 
an  infinite  series  fall  to  the  ground,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  existence  of  the  First 
Cause  in  the  view  of  Aquinas  is  not  bound  up 
with  the  infinite  series.  Prof.  Huxley  maintains, 
the  First  Cause  is  but  the  first  of  a  series, 
with  a  causal  character  similar  to  the  other 
members  of  the  series;  we  can  not  reach  a 


16  Cfr.  Sertillanges,  Preuve  de  1'existence  de  Dieu  et  l'eternit£ 
du  monde.     Revue  Thomiste,  Sept.,  1897. 


—  129  — 

true  First  Cause  according  to  him,  for  the 
process  is  one  ad  infinitum.16  Nor  is  God  a 
Cause  in  the  sense  of  Deism,  a  transcendant 
Cause  that  created  the  world  and  now  leaves 
it  to  itself.  God  is  both  transcendant  and 
immanent.  If  we  understand  the  meaning  that 
Aquinas  gives  to  the  First  Cause  it  will  not 
be  exact  to  say,  as  Caldecott  does,  that  by 
the  first  and  second  proofs,  "he  (Aquinas) 
reaches  only  an  initial  Cause  and  does  not 
bring  out  permanence  of  operations."17  Calde- 
cott says,  however,  that  immanence  is  contained 
in  the  remaining  arguments.  It  is  but  fair 
to  admit  that  the  two  proofs  as  given  say 
nothing  of  immanence,  but  their  implication 
takes  account  of  it.  The  proofs  of  St.  Thomas 
are  briefly  stated;  to  understand  their  full 
content  we  must  seek  for  light  in  other  portions 
of  his  works.  Any  of  the  proofs  carried  to 
its  complete  expression  would  not  only  give 
us  the  existence  of  God,  but  likewise  His  nature 
in  so  far  as  we  can  know  it.  This  close 
relation  between  existence  and  nature  is  often 
overlooked,  especially  by  the  Agnostic,  who 
arrives  at  existence  and  then  fails  to  use  the 
privilege  of  deduction  and  analysis  at  his 

16  Huxley's  Hume,  p.  149. 

17  Selections  from  the  Literature  of  Theism,  pp.  24,  26. 


—  130 


disposal   to   learn   something  of  the    nature    of 
God.    We  now  propose  to  utilize  our  birth-right. 

SECTION  III. — NATURE  OF  GOD. 

The  existence  of  God  found  as  the  result  of 
the  five  proofs  advanced  by  St.  Thomas  does 
not  give  us  all  we  can  know  about  Him,  and 
thus  it  is,  the  work  of  elaboration  just  begins 
at  this  point.  We  repeat,  that  what  follows 
is  implicitly  contained  in  the  proofs,  but  its 
detailed  exposition  is  the  outcome  of  deduction 
and  analysis.  The  same  principle --that  of 
causality  —  which  proved  there  was  a  God,  now 
goes  further,  and  shows  to  what  extent  we 
can  know  the  nature  of  God.  The  position  of 
St.  Thomas  and  Spencer  offer  a  great  contrast 
on  this  point,  and  it  will  be  well  to  show  in 
what  way.  Both  admit  a  First  Cause  as  the 
inevitable  conclusion  of  a  consideration  of 
causality  in  the  world,  both  admit  manifes- 
tations of  this  Frst  Cause;  but  here  the 
agreement  ends.  Spencer  says  God  is  unknow- 
able, though  He  manifests  Himself- -"the 
Power  which  the  Universe  manifests  to  us  is 
utterly  inscrutable'  -,  St.  Thomas  says,  God 
is  kriowable  because  of  His  manifestations - 
"whence  we  know  God's  relations  to  creatures 


1  First  Principles,  p.  46. 


because  He  is  the  Cause  of  all,  and  how  He 
differs  from  creatures  since  He  is  none  of  those 
things  He  has  caused."  This  divergence  is 
emphasized  at  various  points,  and  we  shall 
note  them  as  occasion  demands.  "Each  asser- 
tion respecting  the  nature,  acts,  or  motives  of 
that  power  which  the  Universe  manifests  to  us, 
has  been  repeatedly  called  in  question,  and 
proved  to  be  inconsistent  with  itself,  or  with 
accompanying  assertions.  Yet  each  of  them  has 
been  age  after  age  insisted  on,  in  spite  of  a 
secret  consciousness  that  it  would  not  bear 
examination."3  For  Aquinas,  notwithstanding, 
God  is  knowable.  He  is  knowable  in  Himself; 
and  He  is  knowable  relatively  to  us  in  a  given 
manner  and  to  a  certain  extent. 

We  do  not  know  God  in  himself,  we  do  not 
know  Him  comprehensively,  nor  intuitively,  yet 
we  know  Him  really,  to  a  certain  extent.  The 
proofs  have  given  us  some  idea  of  God ;  they 
have  shown  Him  to  be  an  existent  Something, 
a  Being  of  some  sort.  We  have  shown  that 
being  is  the  prime  and  adequate  object  of  the 
intellect,  hence  God  as  being  is  knowable  to  the 

2  Unde  cognoscimus  de  ipso  habitudinein  ipsius  ad  crea- 
turam,   quod    scilicet    omnium    est    causa;    et    differential!! 
creaturarum  ab  ipso,  quod  scilicet  ipse  non  est  aliquid  eorum 
quae  ab  eo  causantur.     Sum  Tbeol.,  I,  q.  12,  a.  12. 

3  Spencer,  Ibid.  p.  101. 


—  132  — 

human  intellect.  But  the  proportionate  object 
of  our  intellect  is  not  being  as  such,  but  the 
essence  of  material  things,  hence  our  knowledge 
of  God  must  be  based  on  a  consideration  of 
material  things.  A  thing  is  knowable  in  se  and 
it  is  knowable  in  relation  to  us.  "  Every  real 
existence  has  two  sides,  being  -  for  -  itself  and 
being -for -others."  This  distinction  in  our 
present  question  brings  to  view  two  of  the 
general  principles  of  knowledge:  Immaterialit}', 
which  determines  the  degrees  of  the  knowable- 
ness  of  an  object  in  se  considered;  and,  all  that 
is  known,  is  known  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  knower,  all  our  knowledge  is  in  terms  of 
our  own  intellect. 
God  in  Himself  is  infininelv  knowable,  because 

•A 

He  is  supremely  actual.  "  Because  God  is  the 
opposite  extreme  of  matter,  because  He  is 
entirely  immune  from  all  potentiality,  it  follows 
that  He  knows  and  is  knowable  in  the  highest 
degree."  The  role  of  immateriality  in  knowl- 
edge has  already  been  discussed ;  the  proofs 
give  us  God  as  Actus  Purus,  Pure  Actuality, 
and  thus  He  is  knowable  in  Himself  as  infiinitely 
as  He  knows  Himself.  "  Since  God  is  most 
immaterial,  it  follows  that  He  is  in  the  height 


4  A.  Seth,   Some   Epistemological   Conclusions,   Phil.   Rev., 
v.  3,  p.  57. 
*  De  Veri.,  q.  2,  a.  2.     Sum.  TheoL,  I,  q.  14,  a.  1. 


133  — 

of  cognition."  In  addition  to  what  has  been 
said  previously,  we  shall  refer  to  the  question 
of  matter  and  form  when  presenting  the  ideas 
contained  in  the  attributes  of  Infinity  and 
Omniscience. 

The  phrase  "  God  in  Himself  has  been 
criticised  by  Prof.  Flint  as  meaningless,  but  it 
has  a  real  significance  as  we  find  it  in  the 
works  of  Aquinas.  "We  can  not  know  the 
'God  in  Himself  of  sundry  sages  and  divines, 
for  the  simple  but  sufficient  reason  that  there 
is  no  such  God  to  know."  He  calls  this  "God 
in  Himself"  as  vain  as  Kant's  " thing-in-itself". 
When  he  states  what  He  considers  the  only 
intelligible  use  of  the  phrase,  he  simply  presents 
what  was  clear  to  the  mind  of  Aquinas  and 
those  who  follow  him  in  this  question.  "There 
is  no  God  without  powers,  affections,  attributes, 
relationships;  and  when  viewed  in  these  —  in 
His  omnipotence  and  omniscience,  His  holiness 
and  love,  His  Creatorship,  Fatherhood,  or 
Sovereignty  —  He  is  viewed  "in  Himself",  in  the 
only  true  and  reasonable  sense, —  that  is,  as 
distinct  not  from  His  own  characteristics,  but 
from  other  beings."  This  is  the  idea  of  God 
derived  from  created  things,  of  which  St. 


6  Flint,  Agnosticism,  p.  580. 
1  Ibid,,  p.  582. 


134- 

Thomas  says:  "We  can  know  God's  relation 
to  creatures,  because  He  is  the  cause  of  all;  we 
can  know  how  He  differs  from  creatures  because 
He  is  none  of  those  things  He  has  caused,  and 
He  is  none  of  them,  not  through  defect  on  His 
part  but  through  supereminence."  The  knowl- 
edge of  God  in  se,  of  God  in  Himself,  is 
unattainable  bv  us,  is  an  extent  bevond  us, 

*•'  m> 

of    which     St.    Thomas    says — "to    show    the 

*/ 

ignorance  of  this  sublime  knowledge  it  is  said 
of  Moses  that  '  he  approached  to  the  darkness 
in  which  God  was '  We  know  God  only  bv 

*•  •/ 

His  manifestations,  as  Prof.  Flint  says,  but 
this  does  not  preclude  other  means  of  knowl- 
edge, means  not  given  us  in  our  present 
condition. 

When  we  come  to  consider  our  actual  knowl- 
edge of  God,  we  see  it  is  neither  comprehensive 
nor  intuitive.  We  comprehend  a  thing  when 
"we  know  it  as  far  as  it  is  knowable."  "To 
comprehend  a  power  or  capacity  is  to  know 
its  complete  extension."11  There  is  nothing  that 


*Snm.  TheoL,  I,  q.  12,  a.  12 

0  Ad  hujus  sublimissiraae  cognitionis  ignorantiam  demon- 
strandam,  de  Moyse  dicitur  (Exod.,  20:  21)  quod  accessit 
ad  caliginem  in  qua  erat  Deus.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  49. 

10  Omne   auteni   quod   comprehenditur    ah    aliquo   cognos- 
cente, cognoscitur  ah  eo  ita  perfecte   sicut  cognoscihile   est. 
C.  G.,\.  3,  c.  35. 

11  Idem  igitur  est  cognoscere  omnia  in  quae  potest  aliqua 
virtus,  et  ipsam  virtutem  comprehendere.     C.  G  ,  1.  3,  c.  56. 


135  - 

can  exhaust  the  divine  nature  or  mirror  it 
perfecthr,  because  —  and  this  is  the  sole  and 
oft -repeated  answer --there  is  no  effect  that 
ad  equates  the  power  of  the  Cause,  no  creature 
is  a  full  copy  of  its  Creator,  no  creature  is 
God.  "It  is  impossible  for  any  created  likeness 
to  totally  represent  God.  There  is  something 
which  each  and  all  creatures  leave  unexpressed, 
and  yet  this  is  a  something  which  is  contained 
in  the  conception  God  in  Himself.  God  is  as 
truly  incomprehensible  as  He  is  truly  knowable. 
"God  is  knowable  but  not  to  the  extent  that 
His  essence  is  comprehended,  because  the  knower 
has  a  knowledge  of  the  object  known  not 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  object  but 
according  to  his  own  nature.  But  the  nature 
of  no  creature  attains  to  the  height  of  the 
Divine  Majesty  Itself.  Whence  it  follows,  no 
creature  knows  Him  perfectly  as  He  perfectly 
knows  Himself."  We  do  not  know  God 
comprehensively,  but  we  are  ever  getting  a 
clearer  and  a  wider  knowledge  of  Him,  con- 
scious, however,  that  there  will  always  be  a 

12  Deus  cognoscibilis  est  non  autem  ita  eognoscibilis,  ut 
essentia  sua  comprehend atur.  Quia  omne  cognosceus  habet 
coguitionem  de  re  cognita,  non  per  motum  rei  cognita  sed 
per  modum  cognoscentis.  Modus  autem  nullius  creaturae 
attingit  ad  altitudinetn  divinae  majestatis.  Unde  oportet 
quod  a  nullo  perfecte  cognoscatur,  sicut  ipse  seipsum  perfecte 
cognoscit.  Com.  on  Lomb.,  I,  Dis.  3,  q.  1,  a.  1. 


-136  — 

limit — the  necessary  distance  between  uncreated 
and  created  existence.  "Through  effects  we 
know  God's  existence,  that  He  is  the  Cause  of 
others,  above  others,  and  distinct  from  all. 
This  is  the  limit  and  most  perfect  stage  of  our 
knowledge  in  this  life,  whence,  as  Dionysius  says, 
we  are  united  to  a  God  as  it  were  unknown. 
This  is  true  even  when  we  know  what  God 
is  not,  for  what  He  is  remains  entirely  un- 
known."13 

This  last  thought  seems  a  discouraging  con- 
clusion, and  apparently  renders  further  quest 
useless.  Did  St.  Thomas  confound  a  simple, 
partial  knowledge  with  a  comprehensive  one  as 
do  Agnostics,  he  would  be  forced  to  stop  with 
Spencer  at  the  mere  existence  of  God  and  de- 
clare Him  unknowable  beyond  this  point.  Be- 
fore we  detail  the  actual  knowledge  that  man 
can  attain  of  God's  nature,  we  must  show 
that  Intuitionism  and  Ontologism  are  not  the 
means  of  acquiring  this  knowledge. 

Ontologism,  or  the  immediate  vision  of  God, 
held  by  Malebranche,  Gioberti,  and  Rosmini,  is 
practically  identical  with  the  Innate-idea  view 
when  there  is  a  question  of  our  knowledge  of 
God.  In  general,  it  brings  God  and  the  human 
mind  in  immediate  conscious  contact;  it  does 


13 


C.  G.,  1.  3,  c,  49. 


—  137  — 

away  with  all  intermediate  ideas  between  God 
and  the  human  soul;  it  considers  God  the 
first  object  of  our  thought  and  the  first  object 
that  we  know ;  it  holds  that  we  see  God  im- 
mediately, and  from  this  intuition,  as  origin 
and  source,  arises  all  our  intellectual  knowledge. 
According  to  Malebranche,  we  see  our  ideas 
or  universals  in  God.  Sensation  for  him  does 
not  constitute  the  first  stage  of  knowledge;  in 
fact,  it  has  no  direct  function  in  knowledge.  He 
maintains  that  we  know  all  things  in  their 
ideas,  that  these  ideas  are  particular  deter- 
minations of  the  idea  of  being  in  general,  and 
this  idea  of  indeterminate  being  is  the  idea 
of  God.  For  Gioberti,  God  is  the  first  object 
that  we  know,  and  we  know  Him  immediately ; 
He  is  both  the  primum  ontologicum  and  the 
primum  logicum  —  the  first  existence,  and  the 
first  known.  His  formula,  Ens  Great  Existentias 
— Being  creates  existences — details  this  imme- 
diate intuition.  We  know  Being — the  self-exist- 
ing Divinity,  we  know  It  as  creative,  and  we 
know  the  result  of  this  creative  action,  viz., 
existences.  For  him,  then,  our  "first  intel- 
lectual act  is  an  intuition  of  God  creating  the 
world."  Gioberti  distinguishes  direct  and 
reflex  knowledge,  and  is  followed  in  this  matter 
by  subsequent  Ontologists.  The  first  or  direct 
intuition  of  God,  who  is  the  first  object  known, 


-133- 
is   obscure  and   indeterminate,  but  bv  means  of 

m 

sensation  and  intercourse  with  men,  this  intui- 
tion becomes  clear,  determined,  and  then  we 
have  reflex  knowledge.  Rosmini's  theory,  that 
the  idea  of  being  is  innate  in  us  has  made  him 
an  Ontologist,  for  this  idea  is  the  "idea  of  God, 
the  creative  cause  of  finite  beings." 

The  view  of  Ontologism  is  in  opposition  to 
the  theory  of  Aquinas.  All  our  ideas  arise  from 
material  things ;  the  essence  of  material  things 
is  the  first  and  proper  object  of  the  intellect, 
and  it  is  only  bv  the  resemblance  and  contrasts 

*>•  •* 

of  these  sensible  objects  that  we  come  to  a 
knowledge  of  spiritual  things,  and  of  God. 
"  Since  the  human  intellect,  according  to  our 
present  condition  in  life,  cannot  understand 
created  immaterial  substances,  much  less  can 
it  understand  the  essence  of  an  uncreated  sub- 
stance. Therefore  we  must  simply  say  that 
God  is  not  the  primum  known  by  us,  but 
rather  we  come  to  a  knowledge  of  God  through 
creatures.  .  .  But  the  first  object  of  our  knowl- 
edge in  this  life  is  the  quiddity  of  a  material 
thing,  which  is  the  object  of  our  intellect,  as  has 
been  said  so  often."15  Our  manner  of  knowing 


14  Boedder,  Natural  Theology,  p.  14. 

1A  Cum  intellectus  humanus  sccundum  statuni  praesentis 
vitae  non  possit  intelligere  substantias  inmiateriales  creatas, 
multo  minus  potest  intelligere  essentiam  substantiae  in- 


139- 

which  must  be  in  accordance  with  our  nature 
— for  the  object  known  is  in  the  knower  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  knower — renders  it 
impossible  that  God  should  be  immediately 
known  to  us,  or  be  the  first  object  of  our 
knowledge.  Though  every  mind  is  concerned 
with  all  being,  yet  it  is  not  being  in  general 
which  is  the  specific  or  immediate  object  of 
ever\^  knower,  but  being  under  the  condition 
that  corresponds  most  nearly  with  the  nature 
of  the  knower.  Thus  man  who  is  a  composite 
of  soul  and  body  can  not  know  spirit  immed- 
iately or  primarily,  for  it  does  not  correspond 
the  most  readily  to  his  nature ;  he  can  only  form 
a  direct  concept  of  those  things  which  are  pro- 
portioned to  his  nature.  We  have  sensible  and 
intellectual  powers  of  knowledge,  and  our 
knowledge  comes  through  the  senses ;  thus  it 
is  impossible  that  we  should  have  an  immediate 
vision  of  God. 

St.  Thomas  rejects  Ontologism  in  express 
words.  "Some  have  said  that  the  first  thing 
which  is  known  by  the  human  mind  in  this  life 
is  God  Himself,  who  is  the  first  truth,  and  that 

creatae.  Unde  simpliciter  dicendum  est,  quod  Deus  non  est 
primum  a  nobis,  cognoscitur;  sed  magis  per  creaturas  in 
Dei  cognitionem  pervenimus.  .  .  Primum  autem  quod  intel- 
ligitur  a  nobis  secundum  statuni  praeseutis  vitae,  est  quid- 
ditas  rei  materialis,  quae  est  nostri  intellectus  objectum,  ut 
multoties  supra  dictum  est.  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  87,  a.  3. 


—  140  - 

through  this  all  other  things  are  known.  But 
this  is  manifestly  false,  for  to  know  God  through 
His  essence  is  the  beatitude  of  man,  whence  it 
would  follow  that  every  man  is  happy."  The 
seeing  of  God  in  His  essence  is  logically  con- 
tained in  Ontologism,  though  its  supporters 
explicitly  assert  we  do  not  thus  see  God.  In 
God  all  things  are  one,  there  are  no  distinctions 
— "one  is  the  first  of  beings  possessing  the  full 
perfection  of  all  being,  \vhichwe  call  God."  If 
Ontologism  were  true,  it  would  follow  that 
no  one  could  err — "since  in  the  Divine  Essence 
all  things  that  are  said  of  it  are  one,  no  one 
could  err  in  those  matters  which  are  spoken 
of  God ;  experience  proves  this  to  be  evidently 
false."  Experience  proves  that  we  have  no 
immediate  vision  of  God,  and  the  very  concept 
we  have  is  the  result  of  a  process  far  from  in- 
tuitive, or  identical  with  immediate  knowledge. 
"Moreover,  what  is  first  in  intellectual  knowl- 


16  Quidam  dixerunt  quod  primum   quod   a  mente  humana 
cognoscitur  etiain  in  hac  vita,   est  ipse   Deus  qui  est  veritas 
pritna,  et  per  hunc  onmia  alia  cognoscuntur.     Sed  hoc  aperte 
est  falsum  :  quia  cognoscere  Deuni  per  essentiam  est  hominis 
beatitudo,   unde  sequeretur    omnein   hominem  beatum  esse. 
Super  Boetium  De  Trinitate,  c.  1,  ad  3.     (Opusculum  68). 

17  Unum    est    primum    entium,     totius    esse    perfectionem 
plenam  possidens  quod  Deum  dicimus.     C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  1. 

18  Cum  in  divina  essentia  omnia  quae  dicuntur  de  ipsa  sint 
unum,  nullus  erraret  circa  ea,  quae  de  Deo   dicuntur,  quod 
experimento  patet  esse  falsum.     Opus.  68. 


edge  ought  to  be  most  certain";1  but  the  very 
discussion  and  divergence  of  opinion  regarding 
the  concept  and  nature  of  God  show  that  we 
have  no  immediate  vision  of  Him. 

We  are  now  ready  to  present  the  treatment 
that  Aquinas  has  given  the  nature  of  God,  in 
the  light  of  our  knowledge.  If  we  consider  the 
proofs  of  God's  existence  simply  in  their  formal 
character,  regard  only  the  explicit  ideas  they 
contain,  we  see  at  once  we  have  nothing  like  a 
satisfactory  or  complete  concept  of  God.  How 
indefinite  the  designation  at  the  close  of  each 
line  of  evidence!  The  words,  ens  or  aliquid, 
being  or  something,  are  as  close  as  we  are 
admitted  to  gaze  at  the  object  of  our  search. 
Though  it  is  true  there  is  specification  to  the 
extent  of  saying  this  ens  or  something  is  Prime 
Mover,  First  Cause,  Necessary  Being,  Perfect 
Being,  Intelligent  Bein^,  yet  there  is  not  the  con- 
fidence of  assertion  that  we  look  for  in  a  final 
statement  of  the  greatest,  most  interesting,  and 
most  far-reaching  of  problems.  Again,  he  simply 
says,  and  this  we  call  God.  There  is,  however, 
a  great  deal  implied  in  these  statements,  or 
more  correctly  in  the  underlying  thought  of 
the  proofs,  and  this  admits  of  an  explicit  unfold- 
ing, at  the  end  of  which  we  shall  have  our 

19  Iterum    ea,    quae    sunt    prima  in  cognitioiie  intellectus 
oportet  esse  certissima.     Opus.  68. 


142- 

concept  as  complete  as  it  left  the  hands  of 
Aquinas,  and,  to  our  mind,  as  satisfying  as  we 
can  hope  to  make  our  concept  of  God  in  this 
life. 

The  basic  thought  oi  the  proofs,  the  idea  that 
contains  in  itself  the  various  predications  that 
an  analysis  of  it  makes  clear,  has  been  given 
us  by  St.  Thomas  himself;  and  the  method 
used  in  developing  it  is  plainly  stated  and 
thoroughly  carried  out.  The  proofs  have  shown, 
says  Aquinas,  "that  there  is  some  ptimum  ens 
which  we  call  God.  We  must  consider  its  at- 
tributes,"20 we  must  analyze  it.  This  is  the 
general  idea,  and  the  method  used  in  specifying 
it  is  the  method  of  remotion  or  elimination.  In 
the  same  chapter  we  have  another  phrase  for 
the  primum  ens:  "In  proceeding  in  our  knowl- 
edge by  the  method  of  remotion,  we  shall  accept 
the  principle  (which  was  demonstrated  in  the 
proofs)  that  God  is  omnino  immobilis  (omnino 
immutabilis)." 

By  deduction  and  analysis,  by  the  a  priori 
method,  St.  Thomas  analyses  the  primum  ens 

20  Ostenso  igitur,  quod  est  aliquod  primum  ens,  quod  Deum 
dicimus,   oportet    ejus    condiliones   investigate.     C.   G.,  1.  1, 
c.    Ik 

21  Ad  procedendum,  igitur  circa  Dei  cognitionem  per  viam 
remotionis,  accipiamus  principium  (id,  quod  ex   superioribus 
jam  monstratum  est),  scilicet  quod   Deus  sit  omnino  immo- 
bilis.    C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  14. 


143- 

of  the  proofs  to  see  what  further  knowledge 
we  can  have  of  God.  He  realizes  fully  the  diffi- 

•/ 

culty  of  the  present  operation,  for  there  may 
be  error  at  each  step.  In  a  lew  introductory 
sentences  to  the  third  question  of  the  first  part 
of  the  Summa  Theologica,  he  maps  out  his 
position  very  well,  saying,  we  shall  rather  con- 
sider what  God  is  not  than  seek  to  know  what 
He  is.  The  same  attitude  is  shown  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  analysis  of  the  idea  in  his  Contra 
Gentes.  "It  is  the  way  of  remotion,  the  process 
of  elimination,  that  we  are  to  use  in  considering 
the  Divine  Nature.  For  the  Divine  Substance 
by  its  immensity  exceeds  every  form  which  our 
intellect  attains.  And  thus  we  cannot  appre- 
hend it  by  knowing  what  it  is,  but  we  have 
some  knowledge  of  it  by  knowing  what  it  is 
not."  True  to  the  theory  of  knowledge,  this 
question  is  pursued  in  terms  of  the  constitution 
of  our  minds,  it  is  what  our  intellect  can  attain 
through  a  consideration  of  things  about  us. 

What  is  this  method  of  remotion  ?  What  part 
does  it  play  in  our  knowledge  ?  It  is  one  of  the 
three  ways  employed  by  St.  Thomas  in  discus- 

22  Est  autem  via  remotionis  utendum,  praecipue  in  con- 
sideratione  divinae  substantiae.  Nam  divina  substantia 
omnem  formam,  quam  intellectus  noster  attingit,  sua 
immensitate  excedit ;  et  sic  ipsam  apprehendere  non  pos. 
sumus  cognoscendo  quid  est,  sed  aliqualem  ejus  haberaus 
notitiam  cognoscendo  quid  non  est.  C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  14. 


•  144  — 

sing  what  attributes  can  be  applied  to  God,  to 
find  out  what  is  contained  in  the  primum  ens. 
The  other  two  ways  are  called  ways  of  causality 
and  eminence.  Causality  is  the  most  universal, 
since  the  whole  question  of  God  is  discussed  in 
its  terms ;  eminence  implies  that  all  predications 
of  God  have  a  meaning  beyond  or  more  exten- 
sive than  the  words  themselves  denote  when 
applied  to  creatures,  or  our  understanding  of 
them  contains  —  in  God  their  full  connotation 
is  reached.  The  way  of  remotion,  however,  is 
characteristic  of  the  process  under  consideration, 
since,  as  Aquinas  says,  we  are  rather  seeking 
to  know  what  God  is  not  than  what  He  is. 
We  repeat,  it  is  included  under  the  way  of 
causality. 

The  method  of  remotion  might  be  likened  to 
the  work  of  the  active  intellect,  as  already 
suggested.  We  saw  that  the  active  intellect 
was  engaged  in  rendering  the  phantasma  or 
image  intelligible,  by  removing  from  it  the 
material  conditions  that  prevent  it  from  being 
known  by  the  intellect  proper;  it  eliminated 
the  elements  that  forbade  the  union  of  the 
knower  and  the  known,  it  brought  to  view  the 
essence,  the  real  nature  of  the  object,  which 
alone  is  knowable  directly  by  the  intellect.  In 
our  present  question,  the  process  is  negative, 
but  the  result  is  positive,  as  St.  Thomas  takes 


•  145  — 

care  to  point  out.  "The  more  we  can  remove 
from  an  object  by  our  intellect  the  nearer  we 
approach  to  a  knowledge  of  it;  the  more 
differences  we  see  in  an  object  in  comparison 
with  other  things,  the  more  perfectly  we  know 
it,  for  everything  has  a  specific  being  distinct 
from  all  others."  This  specific  being  is  reached 
by  knowing  the  genus  under  which  it  is  included, 
and  "by  the  differences  by  which  it  is  distin- 
guished from  other  things.'1 

In  the  case  of  God,  there  is  no  genus  under 
which  He  can  be  placed,  "nor  can  we  distinguish 
Him  from  other  things  by  anrmative  differences, 
but  only  through  negative  ones."  Every 
difference,  whether  affirmative  or  negative, 
contracts  or  limits  the  object,  and  allows  us 
"to  approach  nearer  to  a  complete  designation 
of  the  object."  This  method  is  thus  applied: 
'  If  we  say  that  God  is  not  accident,  we  dis- 
tinguish Him  from  all  accidents ;  then  if  we  add 
that  He  is  not  body,  we  mark  Him  off  from 


23  Tanto  enim  ejus  notitiae  magis  appropinquamus,  quanto 
plura  per  intellectum  nostrum  ab  eo  poterimus  removere; 
tanto  enim  unumquodque  perfectius    cognoscimus,   quanto 
differentias    ejus    alia    plenius    intuernur;    habet    enim    res 
unaquaeque    in    seipsa    esse    proprium    ab    omnibus    aliis 
distinctum.     C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  14. 

24  Nee    distinctionem    ejus    aliis    rebus     per    amrrnativas 
differentias    accipere    possumus,   oportet    earn    accipere    per 
differentias  negativas.     Ibid. 


I  id  O 

some  substances.  And  thus  we  might,  through 
negations  of  this  nature,  separate  Him,  step  by 
step,  from  all  that  is  not  Himself.  This  will 
indeed  give  us  a  specific  view  of  His  substance, 
since  He  will  be  known  as  distinct  from  all, 
yet  our  knowledge  will  not  be  perfect,  \ve  shall 
not  know  what  He  is  in  Himself."  Spencer 
declares  God  unthinkable,  because  we  can  find 
no  marks  or  characters  that  distinguish  Him 
from  objects  we  know.  He  lays  down  the 
canon:  "Whence  it  is  manifest  that  a  thing 
is  perfectly  known  only  when  it  is  in  all  respects 
like  certain  things  previously  observed;  that 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  respects  in 
which  it  is  unlike  them,  is  the  extent  to  which 
it  is  unknown ;  and  that  hence  when  it  has 
absolutely  no  attribute  in  common  with  any- 
thing else,  it  must  be  absolutely  beyond  the 
bounds  of  knowledge."  This  sounds  very  much 
like  the  statement  of  St.  Thomas  just  quoted, 
but  when  Spencer  applies  these  principles  to 

26  Si  dicimus  Deum  non  accidens,  per  hoc  quod  ab  omnibus 
accidentibus  distinguitur.  Deinde,  si  addamns  ipsum  non 
esse  corpus,  distinguemus  ipsum  etiatn  in  aliquibus  sub- 
stantiis ;  et  sic  per  ordinem,  ab  omni  eo  quod  est  praeter 
ipsum,  per  negationes  hujusmodi,  distiuguetur ;  et  tune  de 
substantia  ejus  erit  propria  consideratio,  quum  cognoscetur 
ut  ab  omnibus  distinctus.  Non  tamen  erit  perlecta  cognitio, 
quia  non  cognoscitur  quid  in  se  sit.  Ibid. 

i6  First  Prin.,  p.  80. 


•  147 - 

God  by  way  of  corollary  the  agreement  is  at 
an  end. 

"A  thought  involves  relation,  difference,  like- 
ness. Whatever  does  not  present  each  of  these 
does  not  admit  of  cognition.  And  hence  we 
may  say  that  the  Unconditioned,  as  presenting 
none  of  them,  is  trebly  unthinkable."27  For 
Aquinas,  the  Unconditioned  or  God  presents  all 
three  of  them  in  some  way,  and  thus  is  trebly 
thinkable.  We  have  just  shown  how  God  is 
known  on  the  principle  of  remotion,  by  differ- 
ences; relation  and  likeness  will  be  considered 
soon. 

The  method  of  remotion  or  elimination  is  but 
one  of  three,  as  already  remarked;  these  three 
supplement  each  other  to  such  an  extent  that 
they  are  practically  inseparable.  The  three 
conditions  of  thought  laid  down  by  Spencer 
are  fulfilled  in  this  three-fold  method,  and  thus 
make  the  Agnostic  unknowable  knowable. 
When  we  ascribe  an  attribute  to  God  which 
means  knowledge  of  God  to  the  extent  of  the 
attribute,  we  rest  on  the  fact  that  God,  as 
everything  else,  can  only  be  known  by  what 

27  Spencer,  Ibid.,  p.  82. 

Fiske  repeats  the  same  idea.  "Upon  what  grounds  did 
we  assert  the  unknowableuess  of  Deity  ?  We  were  driven 
to  the  conclusion  that  Deity  is  unknowable,  because  that 
which  exists  independently  of  intelligence  and  out  of  relation 
to  it,  which  presents  neither  likeness,  difference,  nor  relation, 
cannot  be  cognized.  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Phil.,  Y.  2,  p.  413. 


148- 

He  manifests  of  Himself.  His  manifestations 
appealing  "to  our  intellects  leads  us  to  know 
what  we  are  able  to  know  of  Him.  God  is 
known  to  us  from  creatures  by  the  relation  of 
cause,  by  way  of  eminence,  and  remotion."  We 
name  an  object  as  it  is  known  to  our  intellect, 
for  names  or  "words  are  referred  to  what  they 
signify  by  means  of  an  intellectual  concep- 
tion." How  does  God  manifest  Himself? 
Through  creatures,  through  the  objects  in  the 
world  about  us.  A  consideration  of  these  ob- 
jects leads  us  to  an  ultimate  explanation  of 
them,  to  their  cause — God.  If  we  are  to  know 
more  of  this  Cause,  \ve  must  learn  from  all  our 
experiences,  for  we  can  name  Him  only  as  these 
make  Him  known. 

We  can  not,  however,  rise  at  once  from  a 
consideration  of  a  given  class  of  objects  to  an 
attribute  appropriate  to  God.  The  knowledge 
we  derive  from  creation  does  not  lift  us  immedi- 
ately to  a  knowledge  of  the  final  Object,  Source, 
and  End  of  all.  St.  Thomas  lays  down  certain 
rules  which  are  to  guide  us  in  this  matter— 
they  have  been  called  Canons  of  Attribution. 


'2o  Deus  cognoscitur  a  nobis  ex  creaturis  secundum  habitu- 
dinem  principii,  et  modum  excellentiae  et  remotionis.  Sum. 
TheoL,  I,  q.  13,  a.  1. 

29  Voces  referuiitur  ad  res  significandas  mediaute  concep- 
tione  intellectus.  Ibid. 


149- 

They  safeguard  the  separate  existence  of  God, 
and  also,  as  Caldecott  points  out,  ward  off 
the  imputation  of  Anthropomorphism.  God, 
for  Aquinas,  is  infinite  perfection,  hence  we  can 
apply  no  name  to  Him  that  will  derogate  from 
this  character.30  Every  name  that  implies  per- 
fection without  connoting  imperfection,  is  ap- 
plied to  God  in  the  proper  and  the  full  sense 
of  the  word;  this  name,  however,  is  applied  to 
Him  in  an  eminent  way,  which  is  not  at  all 
applicable  to  creatures;  finally,  words  connot- 
ing imperfection  may  be  applied  to  God  meta- 
phorically. We  have  here  the  ideas  of  God  as 
Cause,  all  else  as  effects,  and  the  relation 
betwreen  the  two.  We  can  compare  God  and 
creatures  because  they  are  similar  in  some  way, 
but  the  result  of  our  comparison  can  only  be 
expressed  analogically. 

When  we  discussed  the  question  of  causality 
in  general,  we  saw  that  there  was  some  simi- 
larity between  the  cause  and  the  result  of  its 
operation,  based  on  the  axiom — omne  agens 
agit  sibi  simile.  This  similarity  may  be  one 
of  quality  or  one  of  proportion ;  in  the  former 
there  is  specific  or  generic  likeness,  in  the  latter 
there  is  an  analogical  likeness.  We  also  saw 

30  God  is  infinite  perfection,  since  as  Cause  of  all  things, 
He  contains  in  Himself  in  some  way  all  efiects.  Cfr.  Sum. 
Theol,  I,  q.  4,  a.  2. 


—  150  — 

that  the  cause  is  known  by  the  effect  it  pro- 
duces, and  this  is  the  only  way  we  know  it- 
thus  we  know  it  by  its  actual  exercise.  The 
activity  of  an  agent  is  its  forma,  and  this  is 
simply  the  divine  likeness  in  things;  "for  since 
the  form  is  that  which  gives  being  or  existence 
to  a  thing,  but  each  thing,  in  as  far  as  it  has 
being,  approaches  to  the  likeness  of  God  who 
is  simple  Being  itself,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
form  be  nothing  else  than  the  divine  likeness 
participated  in  things."  The  common  element 
of  likeness,  then,  between  God  and  creatures  is 
that  of  Being.  There  is  no  generic  or  specific 
agreement,  but  one  "according  to  some  analogy, 
as  being  is  common  to  all.  In  this  manner 
those  things  which  are  of  God,  as  First  and 
Universal  Cause  of  all  being,  are  likened  to  Him 
in  as  far  as  they  are  beings." 
The  idea  of  relation  is  closely  connectd  with 


31  Cum  enim  forma  sit  secundum  quam  res  habetesse:  res 
autem  quaelibet,  secundum  quod  habet  esse,  accedat  ad 
similitudinem  Dei,  qui  est  ipsum  suum  esse  simplex  ;  necesse 
est  quod  forma  nihil  est  aliud  quam  divina  similitudo  par- 
ticipata  in  rebus.  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  97. 

2  Si  igitur  sit  aliquod  agens,  quod  non  in  genere  continea- 
tur,  effectus  ejus  adhuc  magis  remote  accedat  ad  similitudi- 
nem formae  agentis :  non  taraen  ita  quod  participet 
similitudinem  formae  agentis  secundum  eamdem  rationem 
speciei  aut  generis,  sed  secundum  aliqualem  analogiam ; 
sicut  ipsum  esse  est  commune  omnibus.  Et  hoc  modo  ilia 
quae  sunt  a  Deo,  assimilantur  ei,  inquantum  sunt  entia,  et 
primo  et  universali  principio  totius  est.  Sum.  TheoL,  I, 
q.  4,  a.  3. 


similarity  in  this  question  of  analogy.  We  have 
seen  that  knowledge  implies  a  relation  or  union 
of  knower  and  known.  When  we  come  to  seek 
a  knowledge  of  God,  how  is  this  relation  to  be 
understood  ?  If  God  or  the  Absolute  is  defined 
as  the  unrelated,  then  we  are  at  a  standstill  in 
our  discussion;  and  Spencer  truly  remarks  — 
"It  is  impossible  to  put  the  Absolute  in  the 
category  with  anything  relative  so  long  as  the 
Absolute  is  defined  as  that  of  which  no  necessary 
relation  can  be  predicated."  St.  Thomas  dis- 
cusses this  point  by  means  of  a  distinction. 
He  says  there  are  two  kinds  of  relation — real 
or  actual,  and  conceptual.  In  a  relation  there 
are  two  terms  or  extremes,  the  subject  and  the 
object,  and  the  foundation  or  basis  that  con- 
nects them  both — the  reason  why  one  is  re- 
ferred to  or  related  to  the  other.  If  both  terms 
are  real,  the  relation  is  real — this  real  relation 
exists  in  things  independently  of  the  operation 
of  the  intellect.  The  relation  is  conceptual  or 
relatio  rationis  when  one  term  is  real  and  the 
other  only  a  concept — this  relation  depends  on 
the  consideration  of  our  mind.  On  the  basis 
of  this  distinction,  we  know  how  far  we  can 
attribute  to  God  what  we  see  in  creatures.  The 
real  relation  contains  the  idea  of  something  in 

First  Prin.,  p.  81.     Cfr.  Bowne,  Metaphysics,  p.  116. 


152- 

both  terms,  each  term  contributing  something 
to  the  relation,  as  the  relation  of  mover  and 
moved.  In  the  conceptual,  there  is  the  idea  of 
unchangeableness  in  one  term  and  change  only 
in  the  other.  St.  Thomas  says,  to  determine 
whether  an  animal  is  on  the  left  or  on  the  right 
side  of  a  column  does  not  depend  on  any  change 
in  the  column  but  on  the  changed  position  of 
the  animal.  This  element  of  fixedness  he  applies 
to  God — "Since  God,  therefore,  is  beyond  the  whole 
order  of  creatures,  and  all  creatures  are  ordained 
to  Him  and  not  conversely,  it  is  manifest  that 
creatures  are  related  to  God  Himself,  but  there 
is  no  real  relation  of  God"  to  creatures,  but  one 
of  concept  only,  in  so  far  as  creatures  are  related 
to  Him."  Thus,  whatever  names  we  apply 
to  God  are  not  based  on  u  any  change  in  Him, 
but  on  change  in  creatures."  Strictly  speaking 
then,  we  cannot  sa}^  that  God  is  like  creatures, 
though  the  reverse  is  true ;  and  this  rests  on  the 
fact  that  God  in  no  way  depends  on  creatures, 
He  receives  absolutely  nothing  from  them.  God 
is  like  a  standard  that  measures  the  perfections 
of  all  objects,  and  as  we  speak  of  objects  re- 

34  Cum  igitur  Deus  sit  extra  totum  ordinem  creaturae,  et 
omncs  creaturae  ordinentur  ad  ipsum,  et  non  e  converse ; 
manifestum  cst  quod  creaturae  realiter  referuntur  ad  ipsum 
Deum;  sed  in  Deo  non  est  aliqua  realis  relatio  ejus  ad 
creaturas ;  sed  secundum  rationem  tantum,  inquantum, 
creaturae  refernntur  ad  ipsum.  Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  13,  a.  7. 


—  As- 
sembling their  standard  more  or  less  closely, 
but  not  of  the  standard  resembling  the  objects 
— though  they  have  points  that  are  common  to 
a  certain  degree — so  God  is  not  spoken  of  as 
similar  to  creatures,  but  conversely. 

The  contradiction  that  Spencer,  quoting 
Mansel,  finds  in  the  ideas  of  Cause  and 
Absolute  and  Infinite,  are  not  born  of  a  proper 
understanding  of  the  terms.  If  the  meaning  he 
gives  them  were  true,  then  we  certainly  could 
not  know  the  Absolute.  Ladd  justly  remarks : 
"All  philosophy  or  attempt  at  philosophy, 
even  the  most  agnostic,  necessarily  assumes 
some  sort  of  conscious  mental  relation  of  man 
to  the  Absolute;  but  on  the  other  hand,  all 
philosophy  or  attempt  at  philosophy,  however 
dogmatic,  is  forced  to  acknowledge  some  sort 
of  a  limit  beyond  which  any  such  relation  as 
can  properly  be  called  'knowledge'  can  not  be 
claimed  to  extend."  He  gives  certain  definitions 
of  the  Absolute  which  of  their  very  nature 
render  knowledge  of  It  out  of  the  question. 
If  the  Absolute  is  designated  as  the  totally 
unrelated  there  is  no  knowledge  to  be  had  of 
it.  The  Absolute  must  have  some  content,  can 
not  be  an  abstraction— "That  \vhich  has  no 
positive  characteristics  that  are  presentable  or 
representable  in  consciousness,  can  not  be 
known."  Another  unknowable  form  — "You 


—  154- 

can  not  know,  or  know  about,  the  Absolute, 
if  by  this  term  you  mean  to  designate  the  nega- 
tion of  all  positive  or  particular  characteristics." 
While  we  agree  with  these  statements,  there  is 
one  aspect  we  can  not  endorse- -"Nor  is  knowl- 
edge of  the  Absolute  possible  if  this  word  must 
be  identified  with  the  unchanging, —  with  that 
which  is  absolved  from  all  alterations  of  its 
own  states  or  of  the  relations  in  which  those 
states  stand  to  human  consciousness."  In 
addition  to  what  has  already  been  said,  the 
further  presentation  of  the  view  of  Aquinas  will 
show  that  our  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  does 
not  require  change  in  the  Absolute.  We  can 
apply  certain  attributes  to  Him,  derived  from 
a  consideration  of  His  manifestations. 

Are  these  attributes  the  same  in  kind  in 
God  and  creatures,  or  is  it  a  matter  of  degree 
only?  The  general  answer  is  obvious.  God 
who  is  independent  and  self-existent  Being,  and 
creatures  who  are  essentially  dependent  and 
caused  can  not  be  classed  together,  as  Spencer 
justly  remarks.  "Between  the  creating  and 
the  created  there  must  be  a  distinction  trans- 
cending any  of  the  distinctions  existing  between 
different  divisions  of  the  created."  And  here 
Spencer  finds  another  reason  for  calling  God 

36  Phil,  of  Knowledge,  pp.  593,  594,  595,  596,  597. 
36  First  Prin.  p.  81. 


—  '55  — 

unknowable:  knowledge  implies  classification, 
but  God  can  not  be  classed  with  the  created, 
and  hence  we  can  not  know  Him.  St.  Thomas 
has  the  same  distinction  "between  the  creating 

o 

and  the  created",  but  by  analogy  and  eminence, 
he  finds  that  God  is  knowable  in  some  way. 
"  We  can  not  know  the  truth  of  divine  things  " 

o 

says  Aquinas,  "according  to  their  nature,  hence 
it  must  be  known  according  to  our  own  nature. 
But  it  is  connatural  to  us  to  arrive  at  the 
intelligible  from  the  sensible  .  .  .  that  from  those 
things  that  we  know,  the  soul  may  rise  to  the 
unknown.  We  know  more  truly  what  God  is 
not  than  what  He  is  ...  hence  \vhat  we  say  of 
God  is  not  to  be  understood  as  proper  to  Him 
in  the  same  manner  as  it  is  found  in  creatures, 
but  through  some  manner  of  imitation  and 
likeness.  The  eminence  of  God  is  more  expressly 
shown  by  removing  from  Him  what  is  most 
manifest  to  us,  material  things".37  The  likeness 
is  not  a  "participation  of  the  same  form  .  .  . 

37  Non  possumus  veritatem  divinorum  secundum  modum 
suum  capere ;  et  ideo  oportet  quod  nobis  secundum  modum 
nostrum  proponatur.  Est  autem  nobis  cormaturale  a 
sensibilibus  in  intelligibilia  venire  .  .  ut  ex  his  quae  novimus 
ad  incognita  animus  surgat  .  .  .  De  Deo  verius  cognoscimus 
quid  non  est,  quam  quid  est.  Et  ideo  cum  de  omnibus  quae 
de  Deo  dicimus,  intelligendum  sit  quod  non  eodem  modo 
sibi  conveniunt,  sicut  in  creaturis  inveniuntur,  sed  per 
aliquem  modum  imitationis  et  similitudinis ;  expressius 
ostendebatur  hujusmodi  eminentia  Dei,  per  ea  quae  sunt 
magis  manifesta  ab  ipso  removeri.  Haec  autem  sunt 
corporalia.  Com.  on  Lomb.,  I,  Dis.  34,  q.  3,  a.  1. 


—  156  — 

but  it  is  a  certain  likeness  of  proportion,  which 
consists  in  the  same  relation  of  proportions,  as 
when  we  sa}-  eight  is  to  four  as  six  is  to  three, 
and  the  mayor  is  to  the  city  what  a  pilot  is  to 
a  ship."38 

The  attributes  applied  to  God  and  creatures 
have  a  relation  of  proportion — we  do  not  grasp 
their  full  expression  in  the  Divine  Being,  though 
we  seem  to  do  so  when  they  are  found  in 
creatures.  "When  the  name  wise  is  applied 
to  a  man,  it  in  a  way  circumscribes  and  com- 
prehends the  thing  signified,  but  not  so  in  the 
case  of  God,  where  the  thing  signified  still 
remains  as  uncomprehended  and  exceeding  the 
signification  of  the  name/'39  " Since  God  is  His 
being  which  no  creature  is,"  His  relation  to 
being  and  all  attributes  differs  from  that  of 
creatures,  "for  what  is  in  God  simply  and 
immaterially  is  in  the  creature  materiallv  and 


&s  Quaedam  similitude  enim  est  per  participationem 
ejusdem  forinae;  et  talis  similitude  non  est  corporalium 
ad  divina.  Est  etiam  quaedam  similitude  proportional- 
itatis:  sicut  se  habent  octo  ad  quattuor,  ita  sex  ad  tria 
et  sicut  se  habet  gubernator  ad  navem.  Ibid,  ad  2. 

39  Cum  hoc  noraen,  sapiens,  de  homine  dicitur,  quodammodo 
circumscribit  et  comprehendit  rein  significatam ;  non  autem 
cum  dicitur  de  Deo;  sed  relinquit  rein  siguificatam  ut 
incomprehensam  et  excedentem  norninis  significatam.  Sum. 
TheoL,  I,  q.  13,  a.  5. 


I 

—  157  — 

manifoldly."40  " It  then  follows  that  attributes 
are  applied  to  God  and  creatures  according  to 
analogy,  that  is  proportion.  .  .  And  thus  what- 
ever is  said  of  God  and  creatures  is  said  as  there 
is  some  relation  of  the  creature  to  God  as  to  a 
principle  and  cause,  in  which  preexist  excellently 
all  the  perfections  of  things.  .  .  In  those  things 
which  are  said  analogically,  there  is  not  one 
concept  as  in  univocals,  but  the  name  \vhich  is 
used  manifoldly  signifies  diverse  proportions  to 
one  thing."  This  proportion  or  relation  of 
objects  in  the  analogical  sense  is  not,  as  St. 
Thomas  points  out,  based  on  an  agreement  to 
something  distinct  from  the  two  objects  related, 
and  which  "must  be  something  prior  to  both, 
to  which  both  are  related,"  but  is  reference 
based  on  something  found  in  each,  "where  the 

40  Deus   autem  alio  modo  se  habet  ad  esse  quam  aliqua 
alia   creatura ;     nam    ipse    est    suum    esse,    quod    nulli    alii 
creaturae  competit.     Cum  quod  in  Deo  est  immaterialiter 
et  simpliciter,  in  creaturis   sit   materialiter  et   multipliciter. 
Pot.,  q.  7,  a.  7. 

41  Dicendum  est  igitur  quod  hujusmodi  noniina  dicuntur  de 
Deo  et  creaturis,  secutidum   analogiam,  id  est   proportionem. 
.  .  Et  sic  quidquid  dicitur  de  Deo  et  creaturis,  dicitur  secun- 
dum  quod  est  aliquis  ordo  creaturae   ad  Deum,  ut  ad  princi- 
pium    ad    causam,    in   quae   praeexistunt  excellenter  onines 
rerum   perfectiones.  .  .  Neque    enim    in    his  quae  analogice 
dicuntur,  est  una  ratio,  sicut  est  in  univocis  .  .  .  sed   nomen 
quod  sic  multipliciter  dicitur,  significat  diversas  proportiones 
ad  aliquid  unum.     Sum.  Theol.,  q.  13,  a.  5. 


—  158  — 

one  is  prior  to  the  other."  In  God  and  creatures 
the  basis  of  analogy  is  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect — "  nothing  is  prior  to  God,  and  He  is  prior 
to  the  creature."  There  is  then  a  reason  for 
saying  that  "good  and  other  qualities  are  pre- 
dicated commonly  of  God  and  creatures,"  and 
that  is,  because  "the  divine  essence  is  the  super- 
excellent  likeness  of  all  things."42 

God  as  First  Cause  contains  in  absolute  per- 
fection the  shado wings  of  Himself,  yet  St. 
Thomas  remarks  that  the  unchangeableness  of 
God  is  not  affected  by  this:  for  He  is  wise  and 
good  and  the  like,  antecedently  and  independently 
of  the  existence  of  these  qualities  in  creatures. 
These  predications  are  not  simply  a  matter  of 
degree,  nor  yet  do  they  wholly  differ  in  kind ; 
still  we  can  see  that  we  have  a  peculiar  case 
here  in  the  relation  of  creatures  to  God.  God 
occupies  a  position  that  nothing  else  can  occupy, 
as  regards  what  is  known  to  us,  and  conse- 
quently we  are  on  solid  ground  while  we  mount 
from  human  considerations  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  Divine.  It  is  not  hard  for  us — if  it  is  not 
rather  a  necessity — to  admit  that  our  feeble  ut- 
terances find  a  realization  in  God  much  beyond 

42  Divina  esseiitia  est  omnium  rerum  similitude  superexcel- 
leus.  Et  ex  hoc  inodo  similitudinis  contingit  quod  bonum  et 
hujustnodi  praedicantur  communiter  Deo  et  creaturis.  Pot., 
q.  7,  a.  7  ad  6. 


—  159  — 

anything  we  can  see  here  in  creation,  and  that 
the  phrase,  God  is  all  this  eminently,  is  happily 
and  suggestively  chosen.  On  the  strength  of  the 
view  of  Aquinas  just  presented,  the  questions  of 
J.  S.  Mill  may  be  understood  at  their  true  value. 
"To  say  that  God's  goodness  may  be  different 
in  kind  from  man's  goodness,  what  is  it  but 
saying,  with  a  slight  change  of  phraseology,  that 
God  may  possibly  not  be  good?"  And  again, 
"I  will  call  no  Being  good,  who  is  not  what  I 
mean  when  I  apply  that  epithet  to  my  fellow 
creatures."  God  is  all  that  creatures  are  and 
eminently  more ;  this  method  of  eminence  leads 
us  as  near  to  a  proper  or  quiddative  concept  of 
God  as  we  can  reach. 

We  have  then  a  right  to  attribute  to  God 
certain  qualities  on  the  basis  of  creatures, 
because  there  is  some  similarity  between  the 
effects  and  their  causes.  The  effects  are  many, 
and  thus  offer  various  ways  of  approach  to  a 
specification  of  our  Idea  of  God.  Moreover,  the 
nature  of  our  intelligence  is  such  that  we  can 
not  grasp  the  essence  of  anything  at  once,  but 
it  is  only  by  degrees  that  we  arrive  at  a  com- 
plete knowledge  of  it,  in  so  far  as  it  is  knowable 
to  us.  This  is  all  the  more  true  in  our  dealings 
with  the  nature  of  God  —  we  stammer  rather 

43  Quoted  by  Fiske,  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Phil.,  v.  2,  p.  407. 


—  i6o- 

than  speak.  Yet  we  must  not  forget,  that 
though  our  Conception  of  God  is  a  human 
concept,  as  all  our  concepts  must  be,  yet  it  is 
a  true  Concept  of  God,  as  far  as  we  can  attain 
it.  St.  Thomas  thus  expresses  this  matter: 
"Our  intellect  apprehends  divine  perfections  in 
the  manner  in  which  they  exist  in  creatures,  and 
it  names  them  as  it  apprehends  them.  In  the 
names,  therefore,  that  we  give  to  God  we  must 
consider  two  things --the  perfections  themselves 
that  are  signified,  as  gooodness,  life,  and  so  on, 
and  the  manner  of  signifying  them.':  The  per- 
fections themselves  as  perfections  "are  properly 
applied  to  God,  even  more  properly  than  to 
creatures,  and  are  predicated  of  Him  with 
priority",44  since  He  is  the  Cause;  but  the 
manner  of  predication  depends  on  the  nature 
of  our  mind.  This  distinction  seems  to  answer 
fully  the  misgivings  of  Prof.  Royce  about  the 
adequacy  of  the  treatment  of  St.  Thomas 
regarding  the  divine  attributes.45  "  Our  intellect 
since  it  knows  God  from  creatures,  to  under- 

44  Intellectus  auteui  noster  eo  modo  apprebendit  eas  secun- 
dum  quod  sunt  in  creaturis ;  et  secundum  quod  apprehendit, 
ita  significat  per  nouiina.  In  nominibus  igitur  quae  Deo 
attribuimus,  est  duo  considerare  scilicet  perfectiones  ipsas 
significatas,  ut  bonitatem,  vitam  et  bujusmodi;  et  modum 
significandi.  Quantum  igitur  ad  id  quod  significant  bujus- 
modi nomina  pioprie  competuut  Deo,  et  niagis  proprie  quaru 
ipsis  creaturis;  et  per  prius  dicuntur  de  eo.  Sum.  TbeoL, 
I.  q.  13,  a.  3. 

*»  Cfr.  pp.  30,  31. 


stand  God,  forms  conceptions  proportioned  to 
the  perfections  proceeding  from  God  to  creatures. 
These  perfections  preexist  in  God  unitedly  and 
simply,  in  creatures  they  are  divided  and  mani- 
fold .  .  .  To  the  various  and  multiple  concep- 
tions of  our  intellect,  there  is  but  one  principle, 
altogether  simple,  imperfectly  understood  by 
those  conceptions."46  This  sounds  like  Anthro- 
pomorphism. 

In  one  sense,  as  so  many  Theists  have  pointed 
out,  all  our  knowledge  is  anthropomorphic,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  we  must  think  as  anthropoi, 
as  men.  Martineau  writes :  "  In  everv  doctrine 

•/ 

therefore,  it  is  still  from  our  microcosm  that  we 
have  to  interpret  the  macrocosm ;  and  from  the 
type  of  our  humanity  as  presented  in  self  knowl- 
edge, there  is  no  more  escape  for  the  pantheist 
or  materialist  than  for  the  theist.  Modify  them 
as  you  may,  all  causal  conceptions  are  born 
from  within,  as  reflections  or  reductions  of  our 
personal,  animal,  or  physical  activity :  and  the 
severest  science  is  in  this  sense,  just  as  anthropo- 
morphic as  the  most  ideal  theology."47  Balfour, 
contrasting  Theology  and  Science,  says,  "for 
controversial  purposes  it  has  been  found  con- 
venient to  dwell  on  the  circumstance  that  our 
idea  of  the  Deity  is  to  a  certain  extent  necessarily 

46  Sum.  TheoL,  I.  q.  13,  a.  3. 

47  A  Study  of  Religion,  v.  1,  p.  336. 


102 


anthropomorphic  while  the  no  less  certain,  if 
somewhat  less  obvious,  truth  that  an  idea  of 
the  external  world  is  also  anthropomorphic, 
does  not  supply  any  ready  argumentative 
weapon."48  In  this  sense,  our  idea  of  God  must 
be  anthropomorphic,  and  no  one  should  be  sur- 
prised thereat.  When,  however,  it  is  said  we 
transfer  to  God  simply  and  without  any  modifi- 
cation what  we  perceive  in  all  experience,  then 
Anthropomorphism  ceases  to  be  tenable. 

Spencer  finds  a  gradually  diminishing  Anthro- 
pomorphism in  the  history  of  religion,  though, 
to  his  mind,  it  is  still  very  prominent.  "  Indeed 
it  seems  somewrhat  strange,"  he  says,  "that 
men  should  suppose  the  highest  worship  to  lie 
in  assimilating  the  object  of  their  worship  to 
themselves.  Not  in  asserting  a  transcendant 
difference,  but  in  asserting  a  certain  likeness, 
consists  the  element  of  their  creed  which  thev 

w 

think  essential."19  We  have  already  discussed 
the  nature  of  likeness  or  similarity.  He  goes  on 
to  say,  "It  is  still  thought  not  only  proper  but 
imperative  to  ascribe  (to  God)  the  most  ab- 
stract qualities  of  our  nature.  To  think  of  the 
Creative  Power  as  in  all  respects  anthropo- 
morphous, is  now  considered  impious  by  men 
who  yet  hold  themselves  bound  to  think  of  the 

48  Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,  c.  12,  p.  244. 
*  First  Prin.,  p.  109. 


—  163  — 

Creative  Power  as  in  some  respects  anthropo- 
morphous, and  who  do  not  see  that  the  one 
proceeding  is  but  an  evanescent  form  of  the 
other."  This  objection  of  Spencer  is  fully  met 
by  the  Canons  of  Attribution  laid  down  by  St. 
Thomas,  and  especially,  if  we  remember,  that 
Aquinas  considers  our  knowledge,  and  chiefly 
the  principle  of  causality,  as  objective  and 
universal. 

We  certainly  do  ascribe  to  God  "the  most 
abstract  qualities  of  our  nature",  but  we  do 
this  in  a  way  that  removes  all  suspicion  that 
our  Concept  of  God  is  not  worthy  of  Him, 
according  to  His  manifestations  to  us.  In  brief, 
by  causality,  we  recognize  God  as  containing 
all  the  perfections  that  we  perceive  in  His 
works,  by  remotion  or  negation,  we  eliminate 
all  imperfections  as  found  in  their  human 
expression  and  arrive  at  a  positive  perfection, 
and  then  we  ascribe  this  perfection  to  God  in 
an  eminent  way --we  say,  it  finds  its  realization 
in  Him  in  a  manner  proper  to  a  self-existent 
Being.  This  method  avoids  the  charge  of 
Anthropomorphism  which  has  been  justly  made 
to  those  who  have  neglected  it.  "The  omission 
of  careful  treatment  of  the  method  of  appli- 
cation in  the  writings  of  many  Englishmen  who 

40  Ibid.,  p.  110. 


—  164  — 

belong  to  the  Demonstrative  School  has  laid 
them  fairly  open  to  the  charge  of  anthropo- 
morphism.'1 No  true  Theist  would  admit  that 
his  Conception  of  God  is  anthropomorphic, 
nothing  is  further  from  his  mind  than  to  con- 
ceive God  in  this  way;  he  must  then  seek  a 
form  of  presentation  that  will  adequately 
express  the  view  he  holds.  All  Theists,  in  a 
way,  betray  signs  of  a  proper  conception,  and 
if  one  ventures  to  question  the  insufficiency  or 
incompleteness  of  their  position  by  pointing  out 
lacunae,  they  immediately  reply,  what  you 
suggest  is  contained  in  my  treatment.  This 
attitude  was  emphasized  in  the  discussion  that 
followed  Prof.  Royce's  lecture  on  The  Concep- 
tion of  God,  at  the  University  of  California. 
God  was  discussed  under  the  Attribute  of 
Omniscience.  The  criticism  offered  was,  that 
other  and  essential  attributes  of  God  were 
ignored;  Prof.  Royce,  in  his  reply,  stated,  that 
these  were  implied.  This  is  but  an  illustration 
of  the  tendency  to  contract  the  Infinite  and  fit 
It  into  a  mould  that  will  contain  any  idea  we 
choose  to  form  of  It.  The  desire  for  unity,  for 
an  all-embracing  unity  is  a  worthy  one,  but 
must  not  run  counter  to  actual  conditions.02  We 


61  Caldecott.      The  Phil  of  Rel. ,  p.  60.     St.  Thomas  belongs 
to  the  Demonstrative  School. 

62  Cfr.  St.  Thomas  and  Modern  Thought,  E.  A.  Pace,  Cath. 
Univ.  Bulletin,  v.  2. 


—  i65- 

do  not  wish  to  say  that  one  can  not  confine 
one's  self  to  the  discussion  of  a  single  attribute, 
but  one  should  not  seek  a  rounded  concept  in 
this  way.  It  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  our 
mind,  and  it  is  unfair  to  the  subject. 

Prof.  Royce  at  the  end  of  his  argument 
claims  that  his  position  is  essentially  that  of 
St.  Thomas.  The  method,  I  think,  is  the  same, 
granting  the  basis  on  which  it  rests,  but  the 
completed  Concept  is  entirely  different.  As  far 
as  the  single  attribute  Omniscience  is  concerned , 
from  the  author's  premises,  no  fault  is  to  be 
found  with  it,  and,  though  rigorously  speaking, 
it  contains  the  other  attributes,  it  is  not 
satisfying  to  rest  in  it  as  there  set  forth.  We 
propose,  therefore,  to  present  briefly  the  most 
important  and  essential  attributes  of  God  as 
found  in  Aquinas,  and  show  how  his  Theory 
of  Knowledge  and  Canons  of  Attribution  are 
made  use  of  in  attaining  these,  and  the  result 
will  be  the  rounded  Concept  of  God  according 
to  St.  Thomas. 

SECTION  IV.— APPLICATION  OF  PRINCIPLES. 

The  Concept  of  the  Infinite.  It  was  the  sup- 
posed inadequacy  of  finite  things  to  lead  to  a 
concept  of  the  Infinite,  that  gave  birth  to  Onto- 
logism,  which  posits  an  immediate  vision  or 
intuition  of  Ged.  The  formation  of  this  and 


—  i66  — 

other  concepts  brings  out  clearly  the  need  of  a 
well-defined  and  consistent  theory  of  knowledge, 
as  well  as  the  demand  for  methods  that  make 
for  a  legitimate  application  of  the  theory.  "  Our 
intellect  in  understanding,  reaches  to  the  infinite; 
as  evidence  we  have  the  fact,  for  any  given  finite 
quantity,  it  can  think  a  greater.  This  tendency 
of  the  intellect,  would  be  in  vain,  were  there  not 
some  infinite  intelligible  thing.  There  must  then 
be  some  infinite  intelligible  thing  which  must  be 
the  greatest  of  things;  and  this  we  call  God. 
Again,  the  effect  cannot  extend  beyond  its  cause. 
But  our  intellect  can  only  come  from  God,  who 
is  the  First  Cause  of  all,  therefore  our  intellect 
cannot  think  anything  greater  than  God.  If 
therefore  we  think  something  greater  than  every 
finite,  it  follows  that  God  is  not  finite."  This  is 
not  the  argument  of  St.  Anselm,  for  its  basis  is 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  Thus  from  finite 
things,  from  effects,  through  the  operation  of 
our  intellect,  we  reach  the  Infinite. 

How  can  finite  things  lead  to  the  Infinite? 
Are  we  not  simply  piling  finite  upon  finite  as 
Locke  held,  and  at  most  landing  at  the  indefinite 
with  a  'something  beyond  '?  We  cannot  actually 
know  infinite  quantity,  because  "we  could  only 
understand  it  by  receiving  part  after  part  .  .  . 

1  C.  6?.,  1.  1,  c.  43. 


—  I67  — 

and  thus  the  infinite  could  not  be  known  unless 
we  enumerated  all  its  parts,  which  is  impossi- 
ble."2 This  is  not  the  idea  of  the  infinite  applied 
to  God,  for  "God  is  not  called  Infinite  privatively 
as  quantity."  Here  enters  the  idea  of  matter 
and  form,  implying  perfection  and  imperfection. 
"A  thing  is  called  infinite  because  it  is  not  finite. 
Matter  is  made  finite  in  a  way  through  form, 
and  form  through  matter.  .  .  Matter  is  perfected 
through  the  form  by  which  it  is  made  finite, 
and  thus  the  infinite  as  attributed  to  matter  has 
the  concept  of  the  imperfect,  for  it  is  as  matter 
-without  form.  But  form  is  not  perfected  through 
matter,  but  rather  its  amplitude  is  restricted, 
whence  the  infinite  considered  from  the  side  of 
form  not  determined  by  matter  has  the  concept 
of  the  perfect."  God  then  "is  not  called  Infinite 

2  (Infinitum)  non   potest  intelligi   nisi  accipiendo  pattern 
post  partem  .  .  .  et  sic   infinitum  cognosci   non   posset  actu, 
nisi  omnes  partes  ejus  numerarentur ;  quod  est  impossible. 
Sum.  Theol.,  I.  q.  86,  a.  2. 

3  Infinitum   dicitur  aliquid   ex   eo  quod   non   est   finitum. 
Finitur  autem  quodammodo  et  materia  per  formam,  et  forma 
per   materiam.  .  .  Materia  autem   perficitur  per  formam  per 
quam   finitur ;  et  ideo  infinitum  secundum   quod  attribuitur 
materiae,    habet    rationem   imperfecti ;  est  enim   quasi   ma- 
teria non  habens  formam.     Forma  autem   non   perficitur  per 
materiam  magis  per  earn   ejus   amplitude  contrahitur ;  unde 
infinitum,    secundum    quod    se    tenet    ex  parte  formae  non 
determinatae  per  materiam,  habet  rationem  perfecti.     Sum. 
Theol.,  I.  q.  7,  a.  1. 


—  i68  — 

privatively  as  quantity,  for  the  infinite  of  this 
nature  is  reasonbly  unknown,  because  it  is  as 
matter  without  form,  which  is  the  principle  of 
knowledge.  But  He  is  called  Infinite  negatively, 
as  form  per  se  subsisting,  not  limited  through 
receiving  matter.'1  "The  formal  Infinite, which  is 
God,  is  known  in  Himself,  but  unknown  to  us  on 
account  of  the  defect  of  our  intellect,  which  in  our 
present  condition  has  a  natural  aptitude  to 
know  material  things.  And  thus  now  we  can 
know  God  only  through  material  effects."  The 
difficulty  arising  from  the  disproportion  of  the 
finite  and  the  infinite  is  answered  on  the  basis  of 
analogy  or  proportion,  in  as  far  as  "  proportion 
signifies  some  relation  of  one  to  another,  either 
of  matter  to  form  or  of  cause  to  effect.  Thus 
nothing  forbids  a  proportion  of  the  creature  to 
God  according  to  the  relation  of  the  understand- 
ing to  the  understood,  as  also  according  to  the 
relation  of  the  effect  to  the  cause."6  We  might 
recall  here  the  principle  of  knowledge,  that  the 
species  is  not  the  thing  known  primarily,  but  the 
object  which  it  represents.  It  is  finite  of  course, 

4  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  54. 

5  Infinilum  autem  formale,  quod  est  ,Deus,  est  secundum  se 
notum ;  ignotum  autem  quoad  nos,    propter  defectum   intel- 
lectus   nostri    qui   secundum   statutu    praesentis   vitae   habet 
naturalem    aptitudiriem    ad    materialia    cognoscenda.     Sum. 
TheoL,  I.  q.  87,  a.  2.  ad  1. 

•  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  54. 


—  i6g  — 

but  it  contains  the  object,  the  infinite,  in  the 
imperfect  and  negative  way  that  we  know  it, 
and  in  so  far  gives  us  a  true  concept.  The  con- 
cept is  positive  also,  though  it  is  reached  by  way 
of  remotion.  Moreover,  we  see  evidence  here  of 
the  principle  of  knowledge — that  all  things  are 
known  according  to  the  nature  of  the  knower. 
We  know  God  in  our  finite  way,  but  the  object 
known  is  the  Infinite  represented  by  the  species. 
The  ideas  in  this  concept  are — matter  and  form, 
imperfection  and  perfection.  God  is  pure  form 
without  any  matter,  He  is  therefore  perfect, 
infinitely  perfect.  We  can  know  Him  as  infinite 
however,  only  through  objects  that  have  a 
material  covering.  We  remove  this  material 
covering  by  abstraction  and  negation,  and  then 
we  arrive  at  an  idea  of  God  under  one  aspect, 
that  of  Infinite  Perfection. 

God  is  Omniscient.  Since  "  God  is  in  the  height 
of  immateriality,  it  follows  that  he  is  on  the 
summit  of  cognition."  We  have  seen  the 
position  of  immateriality  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  it  is  the  basis  of  knowledge  for  the 
knower  and  the  known.  "The  immaterialitv 

j 

of  a  thing  is  the  reason  of  its  knowableness, 
and  the  degree  of  knowledge  depends  on  the 
degree  of  immateriality."  The  discussion  of 

7  Immaterialitas  alicujus  rei  est  ratio  quod  sit  cognoscitiva; 
et  secundum  modum  immaterialitatis  est  modus  cognitionis. 
Sum.  Theol.  I.  q.  14,  a.  1. 


—  170  — 

the  Infinite  showed  that  God  was  pure  form, 
and  hence  wholly  immaterial,  and  thus  infinitely 
knowable  and  knowing.  "  We  find  in  the  \vorld 
many  things  moving  through  intelligence,  it  is 
then  impossible  that  the  Prime  Mover  be  with- 
out intellect."  Again,  irrational  objects  tend 
toward  ends,  and  this  is  not  by  chance,  hence 
this  'end  must  be  given  them  by  another  who 
is  the  founder  of  nature  .  .  .  but  he  could  not 
give  a  purpose  to  nature  unless  he  were  intelli- 
gent." God's  knowledge  and  that  of  man 
differ.  "Man  has  diverse  cognitions  according 
to  the  objects  known-.".  His  knowledge  is 
successive,  and  admits  of  varying  degrees  of 
certitude,  which  he  expresses  by  various  names, 
as  wisdom,  intelligence,  and  the  like.  In  God 
there  is  but  a  simple  cognition  to  which  we 
can  apply  these  different  names,  yet  in  such  a 
manner  "that  from  each  of  them  as  they  are 
used  for  divine  predications  we  exclude  what  is 
of  imperfection  in  it,  and  retain  only  \vhat  is 
of  perfection."  "Everything  that  pertains  to 

8C.  G.,  1.  1,  c44. 

9  Ibid.,  c.  56. 

10  Homo  autem  secundum  diversa  cognita,   habet  diversas 
cognitiones  .  .  .  Unde   simplex    Dei    cognitio    omnibus    istis 
nominibus  nominari  potest ;    ita  tatnen  quod  ab  unoquoque 
eorum,    secundum   quod    in   divinam   praedicatiouem   venit, 
secludatur  quidquid  imperfectionis  est,  et  retineatur  quidquid 
perfectionis  est.     Sum.  Theol.,  I.  q.  14,  a.  1  ad  2. 


the  imperfect  mode  proper  to  the  creature  must 
be  excluded  from  the  meaning  of  the  name." 
God  is  not  simply  intelligent,  but  He  knows  all 
things  at  once;  "every  intellect  that  under- 
stands one  thing  after  another,  is  sometimes 
potentially  intelligent  and  sometimes  actually . .  • 
But  the  Divine  Intellect  is  never  potentially,  but 
always  actually  intelligent,  hence  it  does  not 
understand  things  successively,  but  it  under- 
stands all  things  at  once."  Prof.  Royce  says, 
the  Being  that  is  Omniscient  "would  behold 
answered,  in  the  facts  present  to  his  experience, 
all  rational,  all  logically  possible  questions. 
That  is,  for  him,  all  genuinely  significant,  all 
truly  thinkable  ideas  \vould  be  seen  as  truly 
fulfilled,  and  fulfilled  in  his  own  experience." 
Again,  "His  experience  then,  would  form  one 
wrhole,  but  the  whole  as  such  would  fulfil 
an  all-embracing  unity,  a  single  system  of 
ideas."  But  in  wrhat  way  is  He  all  this  ?  Here 
Prof.  Royce  goes  astray.  It  is  true  he  admits, 
that  God  has  "richer  ideas  than  our  fragments 
of  thoughts";  and  he  also  truly  remarks,  "these 
things,  w^herein  we  taste  the  bitterness  of  our 
finitude,  are  what  they  are  because  they  mean 

11  Quandocumque   nomen   sumptum   a    quacumque  perfec- 
tione   creaturae  Deo   attribuitur,  secludatur  ab   ejus   signifi- 
catione   omne   illud   quod  pertinet   ad   imperfectum  modum 
qui  competit  creaturae.     Ibid.,  ad  1. 

12  C.  G.,  1.  1,  c.  56.        13  Loc.  cit.,  p.  10. 


-   172  — 

more  than  they  contain,  imply  what  is  beyond 
them,  refuse  to  exist  by  themselves,  and  at  the 
very  moment  of  confessing  their  own  fragmen- 
tary falsity  assure  us  of  the  reality  of  that 
fulfilment  which  is  the  life  of  God."14  We  can 
not,  however,  admit  his  statement  when  he 
enters  into  details,  for  he  seems  to  find  realized 
in  his  Omniscient  Being  things  that  St.  Thomas 
was  careful  to  exclude,  by  his  method  of  remo- 
tion.  The  absence  of  this  discrimination  leads 
Prof.  Royce  to  say,  "the  total  limitation,  the 
fragmentariness,  the  ignorance,  the  error, —  yes 
(as  forms  or  cases  of  ignorance  and  error),  the 
evil,  the  pain,  the  horror,  the  longing,  the 
travail,  the  faith,  the  devotion,  the  endless 
flight  from  its  own  worthlessness, —  that  con- 
stitutes the  very  essence  of  the  world  of  finite 
experience,  is,  as  a  positive  reality  somewhere 
so  experienced  in  its  wholeness  that  this  entire 
constitution  of  the  finite  appears  as  a  world 
beyond  which  in  its  whole  constitution,  nothing 
exists  or  can  exist."  "Evil,  pain,  horror", 
are  not  known  as  a  "positive  reality"  for  they 
are  negations  and  imperfections,  and  hence  find 
no  place  in  God  except  through  a  knowledge 
of  their  opposites  —  "because  God  knows  bona 
He  also  knows  mala",  for  evil  is  "privatio 

14  Ibid.,  pp.  14,  15. 
16  Ibid.,  pp.  46,  47. 


—  173  — 

boni".16  All  imperfection  and  limitation  must 
be  removed  from  the  Omniscient,  the  above 
quotation  limits  the  Omniscient  to  the  sole 
experience  of  the  finite  in  its  entirety,  "  beyond 
which,  in  its  whole  constitution,  nothing  exists 
or  can  exist."  We  have  then  in  the  Concept 
of  the  Omniscient  according  to  St.  Thomas,  the 
ideas  of  immateriality  and  actuality,  the  requi- 
sites for  knower  and  known.  Our  knowledge 
is  perfect  as  it  approximates  to  the  full 
expression  of  these  qualities ;  we  know  only 
through  material  conditions,  we  remove  these 
and  arrive  at  a  knower,  who,  because  He  is 
on  the  apex  of  immateriality,  is  likewise  on  the 
summit  of  cognition. 

God  is  Omnipotent.  This  attribute  is  but  the 
extension  of  the  action  of  the  will.  Apart  from 
the  identity  of  all  perfection  in  God,  St.  Thomas 
frequently  unites  the  ideas  of  intelligence  and 
power.  "Power  is  not  attributed  to  God  as 
something  really  different  from  His  knowledge 
and  will,  only  conceptually;  power  means  the 
principle  of  executing  the  command  of  the  will 
and  the  direction  of  the  intelligence.  These  three 
are  one  in  God."17  Practically  the  same  reasons 

16  Sum.  TheoL,  I.  q.  14,  a.  10. 

17  Potentia  non  ponitur  in  Deo  ut  aliquid  differens  a  scientia 
et  a  voluntate,  secundum  rem;  sed  solum  secundum  rationem; 
inquantum   scilicet   potentia  import  ,t  rationern  principii  ex- 


•  174- 

that  lead  us  to  ascribe  Omniscience  to  God  lead 
us  to  attribute  Omnipotence  to  Him.  We  see  the 
evidence  of  will  in  rational  creatures,  and  we 
see  the  natural  inclination  of  all  things  to  an 
end ;  the  short-comings  and  imperfections  mani- 
fested in  our  endeavors,  for  we  are  often 
thwarted  and  only  attain  success  by  overcom- 
ing obstacles,  bring  us  to  a  will  where  all  this 
is  absent,  and  where  execution  is  co-extensive 
\vith  rational  determination.  The  idea  of  cause 
runs  though  the  whole  presentation  of  this  at- 
tribute, and  thus  largely  repeats  what  we  have 
already  said.  "  It  is  further  manifest  that  every- 
thing according  to  its  actuality  and  perfection 
is  the  active  principle  of  something.  .  .  God  is 
pure  act  and  simply  and  universally  perfect,  nor  is 
there  any  imperfection  in  Him.  .  .  In  God  there- 
fore, is  the  highest  power."18  God  is  a  cause 
that  the  effect  cannot  fully  express,  as  we  saw  in 
the  discussion  of  similitude.  "God  is  not  a  uni- 
vocal  agent,  for  nothing  agrees  with  Him 

18  Manifestum  est  enini  unuraquodque  secundum  quod  est 
actu  et  perfectum,  secundum  hoc  est  principium  activuni  ali- 
cujus.  Deus  est  purus  actus,  et  simpliciter  et  universaliter 
perfectus,  neque  in  eo  aliqua  imperfectio  locuin  habet.  Unde 
maxime  ei  competit  esse  principium  activum,  et  nullo  modo 
pati.  Ibid.,  q.  25,  a.  1. 

equentis  id  quod  voluutas  imperat,  et  ad  quod  scientia  diri- 
git.  Quae  tria  Deo  secuudurn  idem  couveniunt.  Sum.  Tbeol., 
I.  q.  25,  a.  1  ad  4. 


•  175- 

specifically  or  generically.  .  .  But  the  power  of 
a  non-univocal  agent  is  not  wholly  expressed 
in  the  production  of  its  effect."  Thus  effects 
or  creation  do  not  express  the  limit  of  His 
power,  for  there  is  nothing  to  contrain  Him 
to  this  full  expression.  We  have  then,  a  concep- 
tion of  free,  infinite  powder,  arrived  at  from  a 
consideration  of  limited  and  imperfect  power 
here  below.  The  limitations  are  removed  and 
we  have  Omnipotence. 

God  is  a  Person.  The  attribution  of  Person- 
ality to  God  sums  up  briefly  the  whole  method 
of  divine  predication  according  to  St.  Thomas. 
"  Person  means  what  is  perfect  in  all  nature, 
viz.,  subsistence  in  a  rational  nature.  Whence, 
since  whatever  partakes  of  perfection  is  to  be 
attributed  to  God  because  His  essence  contains 
all  perfection  in  itself,  it  is  proper  that  this  name 
person  be  predicated  of  God,  but  not  in  the  same 
manner  as  it  is  said  of  creatures,  but  in  a  more 
excellent  way."  The  word  person  is  not  given 

19  Deus  non  est  agens  univocum.     Nihil   enim   aliud   potest 
cum   eo   convenire   neque   in  specie,  neque  in  genere.  .  .  Sed 
poteutia   agentis   non  univoci   non  tota   manifestatur  in    sui 
effectus  productione.     Ibid.,  a.  2  ad  2. 

20  Persona   significat   id  quod  est    perfectissimum    in    tota 
natura;  scilicet   subsistens   in   rational!    natura.     Unde  cum 
omne  illud   quod   est   perfeciionis  Deo   sit  attribuendum,  eo 
quod  ejus  essentia  continet  in  se  omnem  perfectionem,  con- 
veniens  est  ut  hoc  nomen  persona  de  Deo  dicatur  ;  non  tamen 
eodem  modo  quo  dicitur  de  creaturis,  sed  excellentiori  modo. 
Ibid.,  q.  29,  a.  3. 


—  176  — 

more  prominence  specifically  in  the  writings  of 
Aquinas,  for  the  simple  reason  that  its  com- 
ponent elements — intelligence  and  will — are  fully 
treated  by  him.  He  answers  an  objection  to  the 
effect  that  this  name  person  is  not  applied  to 
God  in  the  Scriptures,  by  saying  there  was  no 
need  of  the  word  until  the  idea  it  stood  for  was 
called  in  question.  This  name  is  especially  ap- 
propriate to  God  "since  to  subsist  in  a  rational 
nature  is  great  dignity."21  The  terms  of  the 
definition  given  by  Boetius,  adopted  and  ex- 
plained by  St.  Thomas — person  is  the  individual 
substance  of  a  rational'nature — are  realized  in 
God.  Individual  means  one,  distinct  from  others; 
substance  means  existence  per  se,  no  need  of  any 
other  for  its  existence;  rational  nature  means 
intelligible  nature  in  general,  not  the  discursive 
way  of  reasoning  of  our  intelligence.  In  this 
light,  the  definition  is  perfectly  valid,  receiving 
confirmation  from  the  various  elements  that 
compose  it.  Today  it  would  be  interesting  to 
show  in  the  light  of  psychological  experiment 
that  personality  is  actually  a  perfection.  I  do 
not  think  the  above  definition  would  need  modi- 
fication as  giving  the  essentials  of  the  concep- 
tion, though  it  is  possible  that  certain  qualities 

21  Magnae  dignitatis  est  in  rational!  natura  subsistere.  .  . 
Sed  dignitas  divinae  excedit  omnem  dignitatem;  et  secundum 
hoc  maxima  competit  Deo  nomen  personae.  Ibid.,  ad  2. 


—  177  — 

usually  attributed  to  personality  would  be 
shown  to  rest  on  a  less  secure  basis  than  is 
ordinarily  supposed.  As  yet  there  is  no  decided 
case  even  against  any  of  these,  such  as  unity, 
permanence,  and  the  like.22  Mr.  Bradley  has  a 
bit  of  reasoning,  on  the  subject  of  personality, 
that  is  after  the  fashion  of  Aquinas.  "The 
Absolute,  though  known,  is  higher,  in  a  sense, 
than  our  experience  and  knowledge ;  and  in  this 
connection  I  will  ask  if  it  has  personality.  .  . 
We  can  answer  in  the  affirmative  or  negative 
according  to  its  meaning.  Since  the  Absolute 
has  everything,  it  of  course  must  possess  person- 
ality. And  if  by  personality  we  are  to  under- 
stand the  highest  form  of  finite  spiritual 
development,  then  certainly  in  an  eminent  degree 
the  Absolute  is  personal.  For  the  higher  (we 
may  repeat)  is  always  the  more  real.  And,  since 
in  the  Absolute  the  very  lowest  modes  of  expe- 
rience are  not  lost,  it  seems  even  absurd  to  raise 
such  a  question  about  personality."  Thus, 
again,  this  concept  is  derived  from  what  we 
perceive  in  rational  creatures ;  we  eliminate  its 
imperfection  as  there  found,  and  in  the  refined 
condition  we  attribute  it  to  God.  "This  name 
person  is  not  proper  to  God,  if  we  consider 
whence  the  name  arises,  but  if  we  consider  what 

22  Cfr.  Piat,  La  Personne  Humaine. 

23  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  531. 


the    name      signifies     it    is    highly    proper    to 
God."24 

We  might  go  through  the  whole  series  of  at- 
tributes as  found  in  St.  Thomas,  and  we  should 
note  the  same  principles  operating  through  all. 
When  w^e  considered  the  proofs  for  God's  exist- 
ence wre  arrived  at  five  aspects  of  God,  and  we 
have  just  considered  a  few  more  in  detail  to 
illustrate  his  method  and  to-  show  howr  con- 
sistent he  is  throughout  the  long  and  difficult 
handling  of  the  Conception  of  God  as  known  by 
us.  Yet  did  we  follow  this  discussion  to  its  end, 
prolong  it  as  we  would,  the  final  outcome  \vould 
not  be  a  strictly  proper  or  adequate  concept  of 
God.  We  should  only  know  God  in  a  way, 
though  our  knowledge  would  be  real  and 
thorough  to  that  extent — a  fact  long  ago 
pointed  out  by  St.Chrysostom,  and  valid  against 
Agnosticism.  A  partial  knowledge,  says  he,  is 
not  absolute  ignorance,  nor  is  relative  ignorance 
the  absolute  absence  of  knowledge.13  We  can 
designate  at  most,  the  lines  along  \vhich  our 
endeavors  are  to  move  in  forming  as  perfect  a 
Concept  of  God  as  is  in  our  power.  These  have 

24  Quamvis  hoc  iiomen,  persona,  nou  conveniat  Deo  quan- 
tum ad  id  a  quo  inipositum,  est  nomen;  tamen  quantum  ad  id 
ad  quod  significandum  imponitur,  maxime  Deo  convenit. 
Sum.  Theol.,  I,  q.  29,  a.  3  ad  2. 

2i  Com.  in  Mattb.,  21:  23. 


—  179  — 

been  well  expressed  by  Hontheim.  To  form  a 
concept  of  God  it  is  sufficient:  a)  to  have  the 
things  of  the  world,  from  which  we  can  conceive 
perfection  in  general,  and  single  perfections  in 
particular;  b)  to  have  a  faculty  of  the  mind  to 
overcome  contradictory  notions,  by  which  we 
can  conceive  individual  perfections,  denying  the 
conjoined  imperfection,  by  which  especially  we 
can  think  of  them  without  limit,  as  infinite;  c) 
that  we  can  unite  into  one  notion  the  perfections 
thus  conceived.26  These  are  the  principles  of 
Aquinas  that  we  have  tried  to  set  forth  in  our 
presentation.  He  follows  them  out  faithfully, 
and  accepts  the  conclusion  they  offer.  The  con- 
cept is  analogous,  derived  through  a  species  or 
similitude  that  reflects  God  mediately.  All 
knowledge  is  through  species,  but  we  have  no 
immediate  species  of  God,  hence,  strictly,  no 
proper  or  quiddative  concept,  for  a  concept  of 
this  nature  should  agree  alone  with  the  object 
it  represents. 

St.  Thomas  then,  not  without  meaning,  gives 
as  the  most  appropriate  name  of  God — Qui  Est. 
He  gives  his  reasons  for  this  attitude ;  they  are 
taken  from  the  meaning  of  the  phrase,  from  its 
universality,  and  from  its  co-signification.  "It 
does  not  mean  any  form,  but  being  itself,  and 


26  Theodicea,  p.  19. 


i8o  — 

since  the  Being  of  God  is  His  essence,  which  is 
proper  to  no  other,  it  is  manifest  that  among 
other  names,  this  especially  names  God  properly, 
for  everything  is  named  from  its  form."27  All 
other  names  "determine  God  in  a  way,  but  our 
intellect  can  not  know  God  at  present  as  He 
is  in  se."  Finally,  this  phrase  means  "esse  in 
praesenti,  and  thus  is  properly  applied  to 
God,  for  His  Being  knows  neither  past  nor 

/ 

future."29  This  phrase — Qui  Est — is  the  proper 
Concept  of  God  considered  in  Himself,  since  He 
alone  is  sell-existent  Being,  and  all  else  depend- 
ent, created  existence;  but  this  concept  does  not 
say  enough  for  us  as  it  stands ;  it  is  truly 
comprehensive  of  all  the  attributes  we  can  con- 
ceive of  God,  yet  not  satisfying  to  us.  There  is  a 
two-fold  tendency  of  the  human  mind — the  one 
to  contraction  and  the  other  to  expansion. 
We  desire  to  press  into  as  small  a  compass  as 
possible  the  greatest  amount  of  matter,  and 
thus  we  seek  for  a  telling  phrase  and  an  all- 
embracing  idea.  The  other  tendency  asserts 
itself  when  we  seek  to  know  to  its  fullest  the 
subject  we  are  handling.  \\'e  use  every  available 


27  Non  euiin  significat  formani  aliquani,  sed  ipsuni  esse. 
Unde  cum  esse  Dei  sit  ipsa  ejus  essentia,  et  hoc  nulli  alii 
conveniat,  mauifestum  est  quod  inter  alia  nomina  hoc  niaxime 
proprie  nominal  Deuni.  Unumquodque  enini  denominator  a 
sua  forma.  Sum.  Thc.ol ,  I.  q.  13,  a.  11. 

88  Ibid.  3y  Ibid. 


means  to  make  it  yield  all  that  it  contains,  we 

•/ 

analyze  it  thoroughly.  St.  Thomas  has  recog- 
nized both  these  tendencies  in  the  question  of 
God.  He  has  given  us  the  short  phrases — Actus 
Purus,  Omnino  Imrnutabilis,  Qui  Est;  but  know- 
ing how  little  these  convey  to  our  minds  as  they 
stand,  he  has  subjected  them  to  a  careful  and 
detailed  analysis  with  the  result  that  we  have 
tried  to  express.  "God  considered  in  Himself  is 
altogether  one  and  simple,  but  still  our  intellect 
knows  Him  according  to  diverse  conceptions, 
because  it  cannot  see  Him  as  He  is  in  Him- 
self."30 We  shall  then  follow  the  lead  of  our 
intelligence  at  work  on  created  things  and 
arrive  at  the  varied  and  full  number  of  perfec- 
tions they  mirror  forth,  for  they  are  but 
ambassadors  of  a  King  whose  riches  they 
can  not  fully  portray;  and  the  result  of 
it  all  will  be  a  Concept,  showing,  that  "God  is 
One,  Simple,  Perfect,  Infinite,  Intelligent,  and 
Willing/ 


31 


30  Deus   autem   in    se   consideratus  est  omnino  unus  et  sim- 
plex, sed  tamen  intellectus  noster  secundum  diversas  concep- 
tiones   ipsuin   cognoscit ;  eo    quod    non   potest  ipsum,  ut  in 
seipso  est,  videre.     Ibid,,  I,  q.  13,  a.  12. 

31  Opus.  2. 


i83- 


EPILOGUE. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  Agnosticism  is 
rather  a  mental  attitude  than  a  doctrine.  There 
is  so  much  truth  in  it,  and  it  enters  so  largely 
into  the  actual  state  of  our  cognitions,  that 
it  is  unfortunate  that  it  should  have  set  itself 
to  combat  ex  professo  the  limited  knowledge 
that  it  is  our  portion  to  attain  and  possess. 
Its  position,  however,  is  not  legitimate,  and  the 
human  mind  will  hold  all  the  more  tenaciously 
to  its  birthright,  because  it  is  so  meagre,  and 
still  more  because  there  are  men  leagued  to 
wrest  this  little  from  it.  And  yet  Agnostics 
themselves  lay  claim  to  a  great  store  of  knowl- 
edge, quite  sufficient  to  destroy  their  profession 
of  ignorance.  There  is  some  truth  in  the  state- 
ment of  Ladd:  "A  more  stupendous  system  of 
alleged  cognitions  that  have  absolute  value,  and 
that  concern  ultimate  and  permanent  entities 
and  unalterable  truths,  has  never  been  put 
forth  by  any  reflective  mind  than  the  system 
issued  under  the  cover  of  this  agnosticism. ':  A 
definition  of  terms  would  go  a  great  way  in 


1  Phil,  of  Knowledge,  p.  592. 


—  184- 

giving  the  true  position   of  the    limits    of   our 
knowledge. 

We  find  it  frequently  stated  in  Theistic  presen- 
tations that  the  manifestation  of  the  Creator 
in  His  works  is  of  such  a  nature  that  a  further 
knowledge  of  Him  through  another  source, 
namely,  Revelation,  is  almost  a  necessary 
consequence.  In  fact,  Prof.  Flint  devotes  a 
chapter  in  his  work  on  Theism,  to  discussing 
w^hat  he  calls  the  Insufficiency  of  Mere  Theism. 
St.  Thomas  also  advocates  the  moral  necessity 
of  Revelation  in  arguments  that  have  become 
commonplaces  in  Apologetics.  The  knowledge 
of  God  is  'the  result  of  a  studious  inquiry' 
that  most  men  can  not  undertake  —  either  on 
account  of  their  "natural  indisposition  to 
know",  their  occupations  in  life,  or  indolence, 
since  the  "consideration  of  almost  the  whole 
of  philosophy  is  related  to  the  knowledge  of 
God."  Moreover,  this  would  be  a  lifelong 
quest,  and  even  then  "on  account  of  the  weak- 
ness of  our  intellect  in  judging,  error  is  generally 
found  in  the  investigation  of  human  reason.' 

Therefore  the  Divine  Clemency  has  fruitfully 
provided,  that  even  those  things  that  reason 
can  investigate,  be  held  by  faith;  and  thus  all 
men  can  easily  become  partakers  of  divine 
knowledge,  without  doubt  and  without  error." 

2  C.  G.,  1.  1.  c.  4. 


Revelation  gives  us  a  firmer  and  more  extended 
knowledge  than  we  can  attain  to  by  the  simple 
light  of  reason.  Yet  St.  Thomas  finds  the  gift 
of  Revelation  very  inadequate  to  exhaust  the 
knowledge  we  can  have  of  God. 

We  have  seen  how  St.  Thomas  held  that  all 
men  have  a  knowledge  of  God  in  confuso,  in 
the  sense  explained;  they  ascend  to  a  higher 
knowledge  through  Demonstration,  which  is 
still  very  imperfect ;  Revelation  adds  its  portion, 
and  still,  to  the  mind  of  Aquinas,  we  are  far 
from  being  satisfied.  Man  craves  for  more 
knowledge,  he  is  longing  for  a  view  that  will 
end  his  desires  while  it  will  not  cease  to  employ 
his  knowing  power.  This  satisfaction  and 
reposeful  mental  activity  can  only  find  a  home 
in  the  presence  of  the  Power  that  implanted  this 
unrest  in  man.  "  We,  in  as  far  as  we  know  that 
God  exists,  and  other  facts  already  presented, 
are  not  quieted  in  desire,  but  \ve  desire  yet  to 
know  God  in  His  essence",3  we  seek  His  Face. 
St.  Thomas  then  concludes  that  man's  ultimate 
happiness  is  to  know  God.  Ultimate  happiness 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  operation  of  the  intellect 
alone,  since  no  desire  leads  to  such  a  height  as 
the  desire  of  understanding  the  truth.  All  our 
desires,  whether  of  pleasure  or  any  kind  what- 

' 
3  C.  G.,  1.  3,  c.  50. 


—  i86- 

soever,  can  not  rest  in  aught  else.  But  the 
desire  of  truth  is  not  satisfied  till  it  reach  the 
highest  Source  and  Author  of  all." 

We  noted  before  that  in  the  system  of  Aquinas 
God  is  the  Creator  and  End  of  Man.  The 
imperfection  of  our  knowledge,  and  the  desire 
we  have  for  a  more  and  more  perfect  knowl- 
edge, opens  out  the  prospect  of  another  life  to 
Aquinas,  where  the  God  we  kno\v  so  little  about 
at  present  will  be  known  as  the  Infinite,  All- 
embracing  Reality  that  will  give  us  not  only 
intellectual  peace,  but  will  spread  before  us 
riches  now  unknown.  Aquinas  then  justly 
remarks,  "let  those  blush  who  seek  the 
happiness  oi  man,  so  highly  placed,  in  lower 
things."5 


4  C  G.,  1.  3,  c.  50. 

5  C.  G.,  1.  3.  c.  49. 


-i87- 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


WORKS   OF   ST.  THOMAS. 

SUMMA  THEOLOGICA.     Pars  Prima,  Questions  2-26,  44-49. 
(Commentaries  of  Cajetan  and  Capreolus). 

SUMMA  CONTRA  GENTILES.  Books  i;  2,  cc.  1-27;  4, 17-25,  49-76. 
(Commentary  of  Ferrariensis). 

COMMENTARY  ON  THE  SENTENCES  OF  THE  LOMBARD.  Book  i. 

QUAESTIONES  DlSPUTATAE  : 

De  Potentia  Dei,  articles  n. 

De  Creatione,  articles  19. 

De  Simplicitate  Divinae  Essentiae,  articles  n. 

De  His  Quae  Dicuntur  De  Deo,  articles  4. 

DE  VERITATE  : 

Ouaestiones  :    i.  De  Veritate,  articles  12. 

2.  De  Scientia  Dei,  articles  15. 

3.  De  Ideis,  articles  8. 

5.  De  Providentia,  articles  10. 
10.  De  Mente,  articles  13. 

OPUSCULA  : 

13.  De  Differentia  Divini  Verbi  et  Humani. 

14.  De  Natura  Verbi  Intellects. 

2.  Compendium  Theologiae  ad  Fratrem  Regiualdum. 

42.  De  Potentiis  Animae. 

51.  De  Intellectu  et  Intelligibili. 

68.  Super  Librum  De  Trinitate. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

Bibliographic  thomiste  de  1878  a  1888.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret., 
Sep.  1888,  577-603. 

SCHNEID,  M.  Die  Litteratur  iiber  die  thomisfsche  Philoso- 
phic seit  der  Encyclika  Aeterni  Patris.  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u. 
Spek.  Theol.,  1887,  269-308. 

WORKS   ON    SCHOLASTICISM. 

DEWULF.  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  Medievale.  1900,  259- 
290. 


—  i88  — 

DUBLIN  REVIEW.  Authority  of  the  Scholastic  Philosophy, 
v.  13,  N.  S.,  33-48.  The  Relation  of  Scholastic  to  Modern 
Philosophy,  v.  20,  281-326.  Pope  Leo  XIII.  and  Modern 
Studies,  v.  3,  3.  S.,  190-210. 

GUTHLIN.  La  Scolastique  et  Aristote.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret., 
1882,  255-262. 

HAUREAU.     Histoire  de  la  Philosophe  Scolastique.  v.  2. 
HEBERT,    M.      Thomisme    et    Kantisme.     Annal.    de    Phil. 

Chret.,  1886,  364-385. 
PICAVET,  F.     Le  Mouvement  Neo-Thomiste.  Revue  Philoso- 

phique,  v.  33,  281-309;  v.  35,  394-422. 

REGNON  DE.  Quelques  mots  sur  la  Scolastique.  Annal.  de 
Phil.  Chret.,  1885,  17-30. 

ROYCE,  J.  Pope  Leo's  Philcsophical  Movement  and  its  Rela- 
tions to  Modern  Thought.  Boston  Evening  Transcript. 
July  29,  1903.  (To  be  found  also  in  The  Review  of  Catholic 
Pedagogy,  Dec.  1903.) 

STOCKL.  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  des  Mittelalters.  v.  2, 
421-734. 

TALAMO.     L'Aristotelismo  Delia  Scolastica.  iSSi. 
TURNER,  W.     History  of  Philosophy.  1903,  343-381. 

WARD,  W.  The  Scholastic  Movement  and  Catholic  Philoso- 
phy. Dublin  Review,  v.  25,  3.  S.,  255-272. 

WORKS  ON  ST.  THOMAS. 

EUCKEN.  Die  Philosophic  des  Thomas  von  Aquino  und  die 
Cultur  der  Neuzeit.  Zeitschr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Philos.  Kritik, 
v.  87-88.  Thomas  von  Aquino  und  Kant,  ein  Kampf 
zweier  Welten.  Kant  Studien,v.  6. 

ADEODATUS,  AUREL.  Die  Philosophic  des  hi.  Thomas  von 
Aquin.  Koln,  1887.  pp.  64.  (It  answers  Eucken's  article. ) 

CHURCH  QUARTERLY  REVIEW.     St.  Thomas   Aquinas,  v.  n, 

59-78  ' 
DOMET  DE  VORGES.     Philosophic  de  Saint  Thomas  d'Aquin, 

par  dom    Mayeu   Lamey.    Annal.  de    Phil.  Chret.,   1885, 

595-605. 

DUBLIN  REVIEW.     Letter  of  Pope  Leo  XIII.  on  St.  Thomas  of 
quin.  v.  5,  3.  S.,  196-199. 

FRANCHI  AUSONIO.  Le  caractcre  general  de  S.  Thomas  et  sa 
philosophic.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1885,  497-513. 

FROSCHAMMER.  Die  Philosophic  des  Thomas  von  Aquin. 
1887. 


189  — 

GI<OSSNER,  M.  Die  Philosophic  des  hi.  Thomas  von  Aquin. 
Gegen  Freschammer.  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol. 
vols.  6,  7,  8,  9. 

GuTBERTvET,  C.  Thomas  von  Aquin  und  Immanuel  Kant. 
Der  Katholik,  v.  73-2,  1893,  1-16,  139-152. 

D'HuivST,  MON.  Panegyrique  de  S.  Thomas  d' Aquin.  Annal. 
de  Phil.  Chret.,  1884,  189-209. 

WERNER,  C.  Der  heilige  Thomas  von  Aquino.  3  vols.  New 
Edit.  1889.  (This  work  is  exhaustive.) 

VAUGHAN,  R.  B.     St.  Thomas,  his  Life  and  Labors,  2  vols. 

THEORY  OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

BARBERIS,  A.  T/esthesime'trie  et  la  psychologic  de  S. 
Thomas.  Annal.  de  Phil  Chret.,  1888,  113-123. 

BACELAERE  VAN,  F.  L.  St.  Thomas's  Philosophy  of  Knowl- 
edge. Phil.  Rev.,  v.  12,  611-628. 

BEU*,  S.  S.  Agnosticism.  Christian  Thought,  8th  series, 
224-241. 

BOMBARD.     De  I'objectivit6  de  la  metaphysique.    Annal.  de 

Phil.  Chret  ,  1885,  515-529- 
BONNETY,  A.     Nouvel  examen  de  1'opinion  de  S.  Thomas  sur 

1'origine  de  nos   connaissances.     Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret., 

1847,31-49. 
BULUOT,  J.     La  veritable  Assimilation  scolastique.  Annal.  de 

Phil.  Chret.,  1887,  156-171;  368-383;  443~463- 
CHAREYRE,  J.  P.     L' Assimilation  scolastique.  Annal.  de  Phil. 

Chret.,  1887,  Jan.,  Feb.,  March. 

DOMET  DE  VoRGES.  Theorie  de  la  connaissance,  d'apres 
saint  Thomas  d' Aquin.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1886, 
455-472.  L'objectivite"  de  la  connaissance  intellectuelle 
(d'apres  St  Thomas  d' Aquin).  Revue  Neo-Scolastique, 
v.  3,  1896,  24-44.  La  Perception  et  la  psychologic 
thomiste. 

DUBLIN  REVIEW.  St.  Thomas's  Theory  of  Knowledge,  v.  25, 
N.  S.,  405-435.  The  Scholastic  Doctrine  of  Science,  v.  26, 
N.  S.,  151-185.  The  Scholastics  on  Intellect  and  Abstrac- 
tion, v.  26,  N.  S.,  400-441.  The  Physiological  Psychology 
of  St.  Thomas,  v,  7,  3.  S.,  345~358 

FARGES,  A.  Theorie  de  la  perception  immediate  d'apres 
Aristote  et  S.  Thomas.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1891,  441- 
468. 

FONSEGRIVE.  La  mesure  de  nos  connaissances  objectives. 
Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1892,  614-623. 


—  190  — 

GARDAIR,  J.  Theorie  de  la  connaissance  d'apres  S.  Thomas. 
Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1891,  373-382,  La  connaissance 
d'apres  S.  Thomas  d'Aquin.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1887, 
572-596. 

GREDT,  P.  J.  Das  Erkennen  (as  found  in  St.  Thomas).  Jahr. 
f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol.,  1898,  408-421. 

GARDAIR,  J.  L'objectivite  de  la  Sensation.  Annal.  de  Phil. 
Chret.,  1895,  9-29. 

CLARKE,  R.  F.  The  Sources  of  Agnosticism.  Month,  ¥.45, 
316-329.  The  Coryphaeus  of  Agnosticism.  Ibid.,  457-591. 
Some  More  Agnostic  Fallacies.  Ibid.,  v.  46,  375-391. 

HARRIS,  W.  T.  Thoughts  on  the  l^asis  of  Agnosticism.  Jour- 
nal of  Spec.  Phil.,  v.  15,  113-120. 

MACKAY-SMITH,  A.  Agnosticism.  Christian  Thought,  2nd 
Series,  300-321. 

MOMERIE,  A.  W.     Agnosticism.  London,  1889.  3rd  Edit. 
PIAT,  C.     L'  Intellect  Actif.  Paris. 

ROBERTY  DE,  E.  Agnosticisnre.  Paris,  1892.  L'lnconnais- 
sable,  sa  me'taphysique,  sa  psychologic. 

REGNON  DE,  Metaphysique  des  causes  d'apres  saint  Thomas 
et  Albert  le  Grand.  Paris,  1885. 

STRAUB,  F.     De  objectivitate  cognitionis  humauae. 

SCHMID,  A.  Erkenntnisslehre.  Freiburg,  1890,  2  vo's.  v.  I, 
401-438;  v.  2,  170-180,  372-418. 

WARD,  J.  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism.  Gifford  Lectures, 
96-98. 

WIUMANN,  O.  Geschichte  des  Idealismus.  3  vols.  1896,  v.  2, 
442-541. 

GOD. 

ANSELM,  ST.  In  Philosophical  Classics.  Chicago.  1903.  (The 
Ontological  Argument,  as  held  from  Plato  to  our  time,  is 
given  in  the  Introduction.) 

BARRY,  G.  W.  The  Battle  of  Theism.  Dublin  Review,  v.  12, 
3.  S.,  270-290. 

BERTIN.  La  Preuve  de  I'Existence  de  Dieu  du  Proslogium 
de  S.  Anselme.  Annal.  de  Phril.  Chret.,  1895.  155-166. 
(The  occasion  of  much  discussion  at  the  Scientific  Inter- 
national Congress  of  Catholics  at  Brussels  in  1894.) 
Response  aux  objections.  Ibid.,  277-286. 

BERTAULD,  P.  A.  Etude  critique  des  preuves  de  1'existeuce 
de  Dieu.  2  vols.  1891. 


BOEDDER.     Natural  Theology  (Stonyhurst  Series). 
BOWNE,  B.  P.     Philosophy  of  Theism.  New  York,  1889. 

BRAUN.  La  notion  d'Absolu  et  1'existence  de  Dieu.  Annal. 
de  Phil.  Chret.,  1892,  79-121. 

BROCKHOFF,  J.  Die  Lehre  des  hi.  Thomas  von  der  Erkenn- 
barkeit  Gottes.  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol.,  1887,  224- 
351;  1888,  122-137;  1889,  182-197;  1891,  332-357,  451-468. 

BROGUE  DE.  La  formation  dans  Tame  de  Pidee  de  Dieu. 
Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1892,  506-517.  Le  principe  de 
raison  suffisante  et  1'existence  de  Dieu.  Ibid.,  1889, 

393-417. 

CAIRD,  J.  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Religion. 
1901. 

CARD,  E.  L'Idee  de  Dieu  et  ses  nouveaux  critiques.  Pari«, 
1864. 

CHRYSOSTOM,  BRO.  The  Theistic  Argument  of  St.  Thomas. 
Phil.  Rev.,  v.  2. 

CAI,DECOTT,  A.  The  Philosophy  of  Religion.  London.  1901. 
Selections  from  the  Literature  of  Theism.  Edinburg.  1904. 

CI.ARKE,  R.  F.     The  Existence  of  God,    A  Dialogue.    Month. 

v.  59.  I53-1 76,  3°5-324,  4^9-494- 
DRISCOLI,.     Christian    Philosophy.    God,    Sec.    and    rev.    ed. 

Benzigers.  1904. 

DOME?  DE  VORGES.  L'Inconnaissable  et  M.  Fouille°e.  Annal. 
de  Phil.  Chret.,  1894,  389-400,  552-560. 

DUQUESNOY,  F.  Les  preuves  de  1'  existence  de  Dieu  re"duites 
a  une  preuve  unique.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1891, 
161-183, 

DUTERTRE,  P.  La  raison  humaine  n'a  ni  la  connaissance 
naturelle,  ni  la  vision  directe  de  l'infini.  Annal.  de  Phil. 
Chret.,  1851,  325-343. 

DZIEWICKI.  Le  Dieu  d'Aristote.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1881, 
1070-1085. 

ESSER,  T.     Rosminian  Ontology  (Not  founded  on  St. Thomas) 

v.  21,  3.  S.,  35-47-  Dub.  Rev. 
ERMONI,  V.     La  personnalite  de  Dieu  et  la  critique  contem- 

poraine.  Annal  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1892,  20-50. 

FARCES,  A.  L'Idee  de  Dieu  dans  Aristote.  Annal  de  Phil. 
Chret.,  1894,  560-586.  L'Idee  de  Dieu.  Paris. 

FEI.DNER.  Die  sogenannte  Aseitas  Gottes  als  konstitutives 
Princip  seiner  Wesenheit.  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol., 
1893.  421-441. 


FENELON.     Traite*  de  1'existence  de  Dieu.  1872. 

FLINT,  R.  Theism.  Scribner.  1896.  yth  Edition.  Anti- 
Theistic  Theories  (Baird  Lecture,  1877).  Agnosticism. 
Scribner.  1903. 

FISKE.  J.  The  Idea  of  God,  as  Affected  by  Modern  Knowl- 
edge. Boston,  1895.  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy.  New 
York.  1884,  2  vols.  v.  I,  cc.  6,  7;  v.  2,  part  3,  cc.  2,  3. 

FRASER,  A.  C.     Philosophy  of  Theism.  Scribner,  1896. 

GABAYL,  F.  Zurn  Begriff  des  Absoluten  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u. 
Spek.  Theol.,  1903,  207-225. 

GASQUET,  J.  R.  Present  Position  of  the  Arguments  for  the 
Existence  of  God.  Dub.  Rev.  v.  14,  3.  S.,  65-78. 

GAYRAUD.  L'argument  de  saint  Anselme.  Annal.  de  Phil. 
Chret.,  1887,  163-205. 

GHEYN  VAN  DEN.  La  definition  de  la  religion  d'apr£s  S. 
Thomas.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Cbret.,  1891,  36-58. 

GlyOSSNER,  M.  Der  Gottesbegriff  in  der  neueren  und  neue- 
sten  Philosophic.  Jahr.  f.  -Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol.,  1894. 
(Supplement. ) 

GOBBET  D'ALVIELA.     L'Idee  de  Dieu.  Paris.  1892. 

GROUSLE,  L.  A  un  philo-ophe  qui  a  demontr£  1'  existence  de 
Dieu.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1898,  5-23. 

GuTBERLET,  C.     Die  Theodicee   Miinster.  1890,  2nd  Edition. 

GUYTON,  A.  L'argument  de  saint  Anselme.  Annal.  de  Phil. 
Chret.,  1894,  263-283. 

HANNE,  J.  W.     Die  Idee  der  Absoluten  Personlichkeit. 
HARPER,  T.     From  Logic    to  God.   Dub.  Rev.    v.  u,    3.   S., 

373-307. 
HARRIS,  S.  S.     The  Theistic  Argument  from  Man.  Christian 

Thought,  2nd  Series,  321-333. 

HEBERT  M.  La  Derniere  Idole.  Etude  sur  La  "Person- 
nalite"  Divine.'1  La  JMetaphysique  et  Morale,  1902.  (A 
discussion  that  declares  that  the  proofs  offered  by  St. 
Thomas  for  God's  existence  are  insufficient.) 

HENRY,  F.  A.  The  Finite  and  the  Infinite.  Jour,  of  Spec. 
Phil.,  v.  4,  193-210,  287-304. 

HEWITT,  A.  F.  The  Christian  Agnostic  and  the  Christian 
Gnostic.  Amer.  Cath.  Quart.  Rev.,  Jan.  1892.  Rational 
Demonstration  of  the  Being  of  God.  In  Neely's  History 
of  the  Parliament  of  Religions,  1893,  Chicago. 

T.     The   Absolute,   A   Person.  Christian  Thought,  5th 
Series,  321-335. 


193- 

HOLLAND,  R.  A.     Agnosticism,  Philosophy  in  Relation  to  it 

and  to  Religion.  Jour,  of  Spec.  Phil.  v.  16,   157-171;  v.  17, 

163-69,  3S6-66- 

HONTHEIM.     Institutiones  Theodicaeae.  1893. 
HUGONIN,  MON.     Dieu  est-il  inconnaissable?  Annal.  de  Phil. 

Chret.,    1894,    129-145,    217-233;   1895,    409-439-     Les   At- 

tributs  de  Dieu.  Ibid.,  1895,  505-532. 

HUMPHREY.  His  Divine  Majesty,  or  the  Living  God.  Lon- 
don, 1897. 

ILLINGWORTH  J.  R.  Personality  Human  and  Divine.  New 
York.  1892. 

KATHOLIK,  DER.  Die  Lehre  des  hi.  Thomas  iiber  Gott.  v. 
29,  26-42,  167-180,  291-308;  v.  30,  316-336.  Die  Erkenn- 
barkeit  Gottes  nach  der  Lehre  des  hi.  Thomas  von  Aquin. 
v.  83,  242-257. 

KERNAERET  DE.  La  preuve  de  1' existence  de  Ditu  par  le 
mouvemeut.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1887,  64-75. 

KNIGHT,  W.     Aspects  of  Theism.  1893. 

LADD,  G.  T.  Philosophy  of  Knowledge,  c.  21,  Knowledge 
and  the  Absolute.  New  York.  1897. 

LECLERE.  Examen  critique  des  preuves  classiques  de  1'ex- 
istence  de  Dieu.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1891,  26-48,  159- 
98,  257-77. 

LEIGHTON,  J.  A.  Typical  Modern  Conceptions  of  God.  New 
York.  1901. 

LILLY,  W.  S.     The  Great  Enigma.  New  York.  1892. 

MAISONNEUVE,  L.  La  personnalit£  humaine  et  les  theories 
contemporaines.  Annal.  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1894,  65-88,  163- 
178. 

MARTINEAU,  J.  A  Study  of  Religion.  New  York.  1888,  2 
vols.  Essays,  v.  i,  cc.  3,  4,  5. 

MILL,  J.  S.     Three  Essays  on  Religion. 

MONTH.  Material  Analogies  in  the  Supernatural  Order,  v. 
53.  529-538. 

ORMOND,  A.  T.  Some  Aspects  of  Theistic  Logic.  Christian 
Thought,  5th  Series,  401-417. 

PEGUES.  Theologie  thomiste  d'apres  Capreolus.  Revue 
Thomiste.  v.  8.  Pouvons-nous  sur  cette  terre  arriver  £ 
connaitre  Dieu?  50-77.  De  la  voie  rationelle  qui  nous 
conduit  a  Dieu.  288-310.  L'ide'e  de  Dieu  en  nous.  505-531. 

PESCH,  T.     Die  grossen  Weltrathsel.  Freiburg,  1884.  2  vols. 


PIAT,  C.  Quid  Divini  Nostris  Ideis  Tribuat  Divus  Thomas. 
Paris.  1890.  (In  the  same  volume  with  L'Intellect  Actif.) 

RAMEY,  P.  De  I/ide'e  d'lnfini.  Anna!,  de  Phil.  Chret.,  1886, 
615-623. 

RASHDAU,.  Personality,  Human  and  Divine,  c.  VIII.  in 
Personal  Idealism.  New  York.  1902. 

ROYCE,  J.     The  Conception  of  God.  New  York.   1898. 

SCHELI,,  H.  Der  Gottesbegriff  in  Katholizismus  and  Pro- 
testantismus.  Jahr.  f.  Phil.  u.  Spek.  Theol.,  1888,  241-299. 

SCHNEIDER,  C.  M.  Das  Wissen  Gottes  nach  der  Lehre  des 
hi.  Thomas  von  Aquin.  Regensburg.  1884.  4  vols.  Cfr. 
vols.  i,  2.  Natur,  Vernunft,  Gott  (  Natural  Knowledge 
of  God  according  to  St.  Thomas.) 

SCHURMAN.     Agnosticism.  Phil.  Rev.  v.  4. 

SEUNGER,  J.  Agnosticism.  New  Theology  and  old  Theology 
on  the  Natural  and  Supernatural.  Milwaukee,  pp.  79. 

SERTii,i,ANGES.  Preuve  de  1'existence  de  Dieu  et  I'eternite' 
du  monde.  Ce  rnonde  preuve-t-il  Dieu?  Ibid  ,  Nov.  and 
Dec.  1903. 

SETH,  A.     Two  Lectures  on  Theism.  New  York,  1897. 

SHANAHAN,  E.  T.  John  Fiske  on  the  Idea  of  God.  Cath. 
Univ.  Bull.,  Jan.  1897. 

VAN  WEDDIGEN.     Philosophic  de  S.  Anselme.  c.  IV. 
VAUGHAN,  J.  S.      Evolution    as   an    Argument   for    Theism. 

Month,  v.  53.  344-6 1. 
WARD,  W.  G.     Philosophy  of  the  Theistic  Controversy.  Dub. 

Rev.,  v.  7,  3.  S.,  49-86.     Philosophy  of  Theism. 


INDEX  OF   NAMES. 


Albert  the  Great,  21,  26,    27 
Alexander  of  Hales,  21 
Angel  of  the  Schools,  cfr.  St. 

Thomas 

Anselm,  St.,  21,  101,  102,  104 
Aquinas,  passim 
Areopagite,  19 
Aristotle,  19,  25,  27,  38,  85 
Augustine,  St.,  7,  19 

Balfour,  iCi 
Berkeley,  70 
Bernard  of  Tours,  24 
P.oedder,  138 
Boethius    19,  20,  176 
Bunaventure,  St  ,  21 
Bowne,  151 
Bradley,  6,  i,  77 

Caldecott,  6,  90,  129,  149,164 

Capreolus,  7 

Carus,  8,  9 

Chry sos torn,  St.,  178 

David  of  Dinant,  24 

Democritus,  38 

Descartes,  28,  69,  101 

Dewey,  27 

DeWulf,  21,  22 

Dionysius    the     Areopagite, 

19,  20 
Driscoll,  no 

Epicurus,  39 
Erigena,  21,  24 
Eucken,  26,  29 

Farges,  66 
Fiske,  147,  [59 


Flint    133,  134,  184 
Froschaminer,  31 

Gardair,  66 
Gioberti,  136 
Giinther,  31 

Hamilton,  79,  8 1 
Hanne,  114 
Harris,  23,  26 
Hegel,  TOI 
Hermes,  31 

Hontheim,  113,  114,  179 
Hume,  79,  85 
Huxley,  128,  129 

Janet  et  Seailles,  3,  23 
Jourdain,  16 

Kant,  28,   29,  72,   73,  76,  78, 

79,  85,  TOI,  105,  iT9,   133 
Kleutgen,  84 

Ladd,   2,  39,  59,   67,  80,   82, 

T54-  '83 

Leibniz,  101,  102,  103 
Leo,  Pope,  28 
Lindsay,  22,  27,  39 
Locke,  101,  166 

Malebranche,  136 
Mansel,  153 
Martineau,  161 
Mill,  J.  S.,  79,  82,  159 

Pace,  164 
Paulsen,  5,  29 
Pegues,  7 
Peillaube,  67 


—  196  — 


Fiat,  78,  177 

Plato,   19,  43,  44,  45,  5',  58, 

76 

Portmann,  16 
Prantl,  26 
Proclus,  45 

Raymond  of  Pennafort,  St., 

12 

Reginald,  16 
Rosmini,  136 
Royce,  6,  27,  30,  98,  160,  164, 

165,  171,  172 

Scotus  Erigena,  21 


Sertillanges,  128 
Setb,  68,  69,  132 
Spencer,  5,  79,  82,  130,  131, 

136,  146,  M7,  151,  153.  154, 

162,  163 

Spinoza,  28,  101 
Straub,  81 

Turner,  4 
Ueberweg,  24 

Werner,  10,  n,  14,  15,   16,  20 
Windelband,  25,  26,  39 


—  197  — 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS. 

Absolute,  how  understood,  151-154. 
Abstraction  in  knowledge,  60  62. 
Agnosticism,  120,  129,  136,  147,  153,  178,  183. 
Analogy,  87-91;  predication  by,  149-150,  154-158. 
Anthropomorphism,  149,  161. 
Aristotelianism,  23,  25. 
Assimilation  in  knowledge,  34,  35,  36,  45. 

Attributes,  how  predicated  of  God,  149-150,  154-158;  how  they 
differ,  154;  of  God,  how  attained,  179;  Infinite,  165169; 
Omniscient,  169-173;  Omnipotent,  173-175:  Personal,  175- 
178;  Unchangeable;  151-  152;  Absolute,  153-154. 

Canons  of  Attribution,  148,  165. 

Cause,  First,  108,  112;  misapprehensions  of,  125;  nature  of, 
125-127;  two  views  of,  127;  two  factors  in  formation  of 
concept  of ,  109;  infinite  series,  127-129. 

Causality,  not  treated  especially  by  Aquinas,  83-85:  how  idea 
of,  acquired,  84-85;  division  of,  85;  efficient,  86,  116-117, 
125;  similarity  in,  86-89;  known  by  effects,  81,  89-92; 
principle  of,  119;  exemplar  cause,  121;  its  knowledge 
power,  124. 

Cognition,  cfr.  Knowledge. 

Commentary  on  the  Lombard,  outline  of,  14. 

Compendium  Theologiae,  outline  of,  16. 

Conception  of  God  defined,  119-120. 

Conceptualism,  67. 

Demonstration,  a  priori,  a  posteriori,  106;  God  known  by,  107. 

Dogmatism,  67, 

Dualism  of  Arabians,  24. 

Eclecticism,  21. 

Existence  of  God,  97;  relation  of  conception  or  nature  of  God 
to,  97;  not  known  per  se,  99-101;  not  by  Ontological 
Argument,  loi;  known  by  demonstration,  106;  by  mani- 
festations, 107;  arguments  for,  116;  of  motion,  116;  of 
efficient  cause,  116;  of  contingency,  117;  of  perfection, 
118;  of  order,  118. 


198  — 

God,  problem  of,  its  position  in  works  of  Aquinas,  16-19;  in 
Middle  Ages,  21;  to-day,  i,  23,  existence  of,  16,  19,  95-119; 
as  Fir  t  Cause,  119-130;  nature  of,  130-165:  knowable  in 
se,  132-134;  not  comprehensively  nor  intuitively,  134;  not 
by  way  of  Ontologism,  136-141  ;  known  by  way  of 
remotion,  causality,  eminence,  143-150;  a  postulate,  120; 
Unchangeable,  151-152;  Absolute,  153-154;  Infinite,  165- 
169;  Omniscient,  169-173;  Omnipotent,  173-175;  a  Person, 
175-178;  as  qui  est,  179-180;  value  of  knowledge  of,  17; 
conception  of,  defined,  119-120;  Creator  and  End  of  man, 
17,  18. 

Idealism,  Personal,  115-120. 

Ideas,  as  state  of  mind,  69;  as  representation,  69-73;  qualities 
of,  76-79:  divine,  73,  122. 

Immateriality  of  knowledge,  34,  36,  96,  134;  denned,  46;  basis 
of  knowledge  for  both  subject  and  object,  46-53;  same  as 
actuality,  49. 

Incarnation,  27. 

Infinite,  idea  of,  how  attained,  166;  how  understood,  166-168; 
matter  and  form,  167. 

Innatism,  67,  96,  97;  of  Aquinas,  109-116. 

Intellect,  outline  of  intellectual  knowledge,  54;  being,  proper 
object  of,  55;  essence  of  material  things,  56-57;  active, 
58,  77,  95,  96,  144;  its  function,  60-63;  to  abstract,  60-62; 
to  illumine  plantasma,  63;  to  make  singular  universal, 
62,  68;  relation  to  passive,  59. 

Intuition,  96,  97,  no. 

Knowable,  how  things  are,  99-100. 

Knowledge,  theory  of,  relation  to  knowableness  of  God,  2-3, 
95-96;  elements  of  a  theory  of,  33-34;  immateriality  and 
actuality  in,  34,  36,  46;  assimilation  in,  34,  35,  36,  45; 
intentio  in,  35,40,  same  as  verbum  mentale  in  intellectual,, 
41;  species  in,  35-41;  general  outline  of  theory  of,  34-35; 
three  fundamental  principles  in,  36;  relation  of  subject 
and  object  in,  36-37;  verbum  mentale  in,  41,  65;  validity 
of,  46,  65-73:  two  kinds  of,  54;  abstraction  in,  60-63;  idea 
in,  69;  proportion  in,  72-75,  91;  relativity  of,  79-83;  two 
kinds  of,  54. 

Matter,  first,  24;  materialism,  29;  in  knowledge,  cfr.  Imma- 
teriality. 

Method,  eniployed,3-6,  18,  27;  of  remotion,  cansalitv,  eminence, 
144,  148. 

Mysticism,  21. 


•  199- 

Naturalism,  29. 

Nature  of  God,  Spencer  and  Aquinas  on,  130;  infinitely  know- 
able  in  se,  132;  Flint's  view  of  God  in  se,  133;  not 
comprehended,  134;  position  of  Aquinas  on,  141;  reduced 
to  primum  ens ;  analysed,  142. 

Neo-Platonism,  25. 

Neo-Scholasticism,  28. 

Nominalism,  67,  76. 

Omnipotent,  relation  to  will,  173;  idea  of,  how  attained,  174. 

Omniscient,  idea  of,  how  attained,  170;  meaning  of,  171;  view 
of  Royce,  171,  172. 

Ontologism,  defined,  136;  of  Malebranche,  137;  of  Gioberti, 
137;  of  Rosmini,  138;  Aquinas'  view  of,  133-141;  and  the 
Infinite,  165. 

Ontological  Argument,  of  Anselm,  102;  Descartes,  102;  Leib- 
niz, 102-103;  nature  of,  103-104;  flaw  of,  105;  a  petitio 
prin  cipii,  105. 

Pantheism,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25;  of  Arabraus,  24. 
Peripateticism,  67. 

Personality,  23,  24;  of  God,  175-178;  how  idea  of,  attained, 
175;  meaning  of,  176;  Bradley's  view  of,  177. 

Philosopy,  Arabian,  21,  23  25;  Jewish,  21,  25;  in  Middle  Ages, 
22,  29;  of  Aquinas  declared  insufficient  to-day,  20;  regard- 
ing Theory  of  knowledge,  30;  regarding  God,  30-31. 

Platonism,  25. 

Quaestiones  Disputatae,  outline  of,  15. 

Realism,  67,  89;  moderate,  76,  85. 

Relation  in  knowledge,  147,  150;  kinds  of,  151;  of  creatures  to 
God,  152. 

Relativity  of  Knowledge,  79-83. 
Religion,  21. 

Remotion,  method  of,  143;  nature  of,  144;  application  of  prin- 
ciple of,  145,  149. 
Revelation,  184-185. 

Scholasticism,  21,  22,  26,  27,  27  ;  faculty  theory  of,  59; 
phantasia  in,  62. 

Sensism,  67. 

Similarity,  definition  of,  86;  between  cause  and  effect,  86-89; 
kinds  of,  89;  knowledge  given  by,  89-92,  149. 

Similitude,  same  as  likeness  or  representation;  twofold,  37; 
place  of,  in  knowledge,  42-43;  Plato's  view  of,  44. 


—  2OO 

Species,  sensible,  35;  intellectual,  35.  39,  64;  synonymous  with 
forma  and  similitude,  38;  impressa,  38;  expressa,  38; 
meaning  of,  39-41;  equivalent  to  image,  37;  no  preexist- 
ing, 39;  relation  of,  to  object  known,  40-41,  65,  68. 

Summa  Theologica,  outline  of,  10-12;  Contra  Gentes,  outline 
of,  12,  13;  contrasted  \vith  Summa  Theol.,  13-14. 

Theodicy,  21,  25. 

Thomas,  St.,  relation  to  other  thinkers  on  question  of  God,  19, 

25,  26;  power  of  assimilation,  20,  22,  26;  no  mere  imitator, 
22,  25,  27-28;  as  imitator,  26,  27. 

Trinity,  27. 

Truth,  defined,  73;   of  faculties,  73-75;  judgment  in,  75. 

Unity,  95,  164. 

Universals,  21,  76. 

Validity  of  knowledge,  taken  for  granted  by  Aquinas,  65; 
sensitive,  67;  intellectual,  68-73. 


3_AJe?^?5v 

/^V  'OF  THE          \ 

fuNlVERSir 


BIOGRAPHICAL. 


Matthew  A.  Schumacher  was  born  March  8,  1879, 
in  Chicago,  Illinois.  Pursued  his  primary  studies 
at  St.  Mary's  Parochial  School,  South  Bend,  Indiana. 
Entered  the  University  of  Notre  Dame  in  1892, 
where  he  received  an  A.  B.  in  1899.  Entered  Holy 
Cross  College,  in  1900,  and  at  the  same  time  took 
up  studies  at  the  Catholic  University  of  America. 
These  studies  centred  especially  around  Philosophy, 
Psychology,  and  Apologetics.  —  Thanks  are  due 
to  Dr.  E.  A.  Pace,  for  suggestion  and  stimulation, 
during  the  whole  course  of  Philosophy ;  also  to 
Dr.  Aiken,  Professor  of  Apologetics. 


ERRATA. 


On  p.  36,  1.  2,  read  fundamental  for  fandamenial. 

On  p.  70,  1.  17,  read  ideas  for  idea. 

On  p.  77,1.  7  of  notes,  read  complementum  for  eomplementum, 

On  p.  80,  1.  11  of  notes,  read  I  call  for  is  called. 

On  p.  83,  1.  16,  read  perception  for  preception. 

On  p.  87,  1.  16,  supply  to  before  the  axiom. 

On  p.  112,  1.  2  of  notes,  read  quamdam  for  quandam. 

On  p.  126,  1.  6  of  notes,  read  universi  for  univcrsali. 

On  p.  130,  1.  19,  read  First  for  Frst. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


:     - 


.    , 


LD  21A-40m-4.'ii:: 
(D6471slO)476B 


General  Library 
University  of  California 
Berki 


IIBRARY 


YB  23012 


